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Abstract 
Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects of Identity Markers in English 
 
This thesis investigates semantic and pragmatic aspects of identity markers in contemporary 
English. In the first part, it overviews some current definitions and understandings of identity, 
theories of meaning with a focus on conceptual theories of meaning, and categorisation as an 
innate function of the mind which is expressed in language. The first, theoretical part is 
predominantly semantics-oriented, whereas the second includes semantic and pragmatic 
considerations. The second part includes a categorisation of identity markers according to the 
pragmatic viewpoint. The pragmatic viewpoint is to be understood in the sense of practical and 
meant to display all the different areas of human experience that are expressed through language 
as names for aspects of identity. They are put into four groups which may overlap in some 
instances. People are identified by proper names, physical and non-physical conditions, beliefs, 
and kin and other inter-personal relations. The chapter on pragmatic considerations of identity 
markers then explores how their use may be manipulated and interpreted in discourse, through 
intentions of causing offence and shame, giving praise, speaking figuratively, relying on 
stereotypes, etc. It also looks at how markers are expressed syntactically and orthographically.         
 
Key words: identity markers, abstract concepts, categorisation, stereotyping, pragmatics 
 
Izvleček 
Semantični in pragmatični aspekti identitetnih označevalcev v angleščini 
 
Magistrsko delo obravnava semantične in pragmatične vidike rabe identitetnih označevalcev v 
sodobni angleščini. Prvi del vsebuje nekaj sodobnih definicij in načinov razumevanja identitete, 
teorije pomena s poudarkom na konceptualnih teorijah pomena besed, ter poglavje o 
kategorizaciji kot prirojena lastnost uma, ki se izraža v rabi jezika. Prvi, teoretični del je 
predvsem usmerjen na semantiko, drugi, praktični del pa na semantične in pragmatične aspekte 
rabe označevalcev. Drugi del naloge vsebuje kategorizacijo identitetnih označevalcev glede na 
pragmatične ozire. Pragmatični oziri so razumljeni v smislu praktične delitve različnih področij 
življenja, ki se v jeziku izražajo preko imen raznoraznih vidikov identitete. Delitev vsebuje štiri 
področja, ki se mestoma prekrivajo. Posamezniki se lahko istovetijo z lastnim imenom, s 
fizičnimi in nefizičnimi lastnostmi in stanji, z nazori ter z družinskimi in ostalimi medosebnimi 
odnosi. Poglavje o pragmatični obravnavi identitetnih označevalcev nato opiše, kako se z njimi 
manipulira in kako jih je možno razumeti v diskurzu. Obravnava rabo označevalcev z namenom 
žalitve, sramotenja, hvale, metaforičnega izražanja, z zanašanjem na stereotipne predstave, itd. 
Vsebuje tudi kratko sintaktično in pravopisno obravnavo njihove rabe.  
 
Ključne besede: identitetni označevalci, abstraktni koncepti, kategorizacija, stereotipiziranje, 
pragmatika 
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1. Introduction 
 
“His blue eyes exuded concern, he held out an arm to steady Fat, and nodded gravely at Thin” 
(Ingham 178).  
With this thesis I aim to outline the usage of identity markers in contemporary English. I am 
interested to see how the abstract concept of identity is applied in everyday communication, 
and how extra-linguistic contexts shape our choice of words to describe each other as well as 
how people conceptualise identity markers.  
First, through literature review, I establish a theoretical framework within which identity 
markers can be studied or at the very least considered. This includes theories of identity, 
theories of meaning, and a chapter on categorisation. I derive theories of identity from 
sociology, whereas theories of meaning are sourced from linguistics, philosophy, and 
psychology. I look at various definitions of identity and establish a definition of my own to suit 
the aim of this thesis. Due to identity being an abstract concept with multifarious definitions, 
deciding on a single undisputable one is near to impossible, so however it is used in this thesis 
is not meant to be prescriptive, but rather as a guideline when choosing lexical items functioning 
as identity markers. Then, identity markers are defined. They may, of course, alternatively, be 
called identity labels. Theories of meaning present a relevant part of this thesis as they help to 
illuminate the ways in which people are thought to conceive of vocabulary, with a focus on 
abstract nouns such as markers of identity. The chapter on categorisation is meant to provide a 
simple overview of the ways in which ideas about identity marker categories are structured. 
The methodology chapter explains the process and design of my research and the methods 
applied in the writing of this thesis. The literature review which lays out the theoretical 
framework in the first part of the thesis serves as an introduction to the understanding of 
semantic and pragmatic aspects of identity markers as lexical items.  
The second, practical part of the thesis is introduced by the methodology chapter and is 
concerned with the various ways markers of identity are used and manipulated in 
communicative situations. First, categories of identity markers are distinguished according to 
their pragmatic considerations, i.e. how various areas of experience may be separated 
practically. The reasoning behind my categorisation is explained, and categories are named, 
exemplified and analysed. The fifth chapter focuses on where our vocabulary for identity 
markers is sourced, what informs our choices for applying particular markers to individuals and 
groups, what role they play in figurative language, how they are related to stereotyping, how 
we find them expressed syntactically, etc.  
The conclusion brings together the theoretical basis of the thesis and the analysis of the various 
pragmatic considerations of possible uses of identity markers in everyday communication. It 
also points to some open questions.  
I hope that the significance of this thesis is recognised in its attempt to point to the extraordinary 
world of describing people.   
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2. Literature review: Theories of identity, theories of meaning, and 
categorisation 
 
Literature review is comprised of three subchapters, namely a chapter on theories of identity, a 
chapter discussing theories of meaning, and a chapter on categorisation of lexical items, and 
specifically, identity markers.   
In the first part, based on literature review and dictionary definitions, I develop my own 
definition of identity to suit the purpose of this thesis, and I explain how identity markers relate 
to the notion of identity. I also point to some contention regarding the use of this term.  
In the second part of the theoretical basis, I first define the semantic and pragmatic approaches 
to language, as they provide different ways of analysing identity markers. Then I proceed to 
outline some of the most influential theories of meaning by paying special attention to the 
referential and conceptual theory of meaning, the latter of which I believe to have the best 
arguments for the interpretation of meaning of identity markers.  
The third part of this theoretical chapter is about the categorisation of lexical items. It focuses 
on the inevitability and importance of categorisation for our cognition in all walks of our daily 
lives.  
 
2.1. Identity Theory 
 
In everyday use, the term identity refers to who or what somebody is or a group of people are, 
which includes self-attributed identity and that attributed by others. As Wetherell notes in The 
SAGE Handbook of Identities, “Since the inception of identity studies, identity has been linked 
. . . with group membership, either ascribed by others, or avowed through sometimes passionate 
affiliation” (3). Identities are manifested through language, discourse and physical signs. 
Identity can be taken to mean “one and the same,” and more broadly as being in a relationship 
of similarity with something else. “According to the American historian Peter Gleason (1983), 
the term identity comes from the Latin idem et idem (the same and the same) . . . In vernacular 
use, it implies an object or a distinctive fixed essence which a person, a place or a group could 
possess” (Wetherell 5). It should be noted that the time span in which the “fixed essence” must 
be truly fixed is increasingly a matter of subjective opinion as some identities are starting to be 
considered quite flexible temporally, and in definition (think of, for example, current debates 
regarding voluntary gender identity ascription). Wetherell notes that Hodge, writing on critical 
discourse analysis and identity, presents identity with the same definition as Gleason and 
explains how its etymology influences its function in language: “This history brings out the 
deictic basis of the word. Identity does not represent a quality, it points to elements in the world, 
in a primal act of classification” (Wetherell 5). Identity is, therefore, to be considered as another 
expression for category attribution. Applied to identity markers, this means that the way they 
are used and interpreted depends on context, who chooses them, who they refer to, etc. Identity 
comprehended through the application of identity markers (which represent or name aspects of 
identity) is used to observe that individuals and groups of people have been classified or 
categorised for simpler communication and reduced cognitive effort.  
The Sage Dictionary of Sociology provides the following definition of identity,   
3 
 
One meaning of this term refers to the sense of self that develops as the child separates from parents and 
family and acquires a place in society. . . Sociologists often draw attention to the situational or contextual 
nature of identity. Whatever endures it is clear that we can choose from a wide variety of emphases 
depending on the matter in hand. Father, son, worker, countryman, Virginian, fundamentalist, American; 
which of these identities is given priority will vary according to circumstance.  
More recently, sociologists have argued that, in very highly modern societies, the sense that 
one’s identity stems from early socialisation may be changing. There may be two processes at work here. 
First, in advanced modernity there is greater scope for people to revise their identities through choice of 
lifestyle and through the way they adorn and comport themselves. Increasing numbers of people are 
resorting to cosmetic surgery to change their apparent identity at the bodily level. In this way, nearly 
every aspect of the self is seen as malleable and open to deliberate choice. Second (and contrastingly), 
with increasing understanding of our genetic backgrounds, people are increasingly thinking about their 
own identities in genetic terms. (144) 
Identity, as understood here, implies considering people from viewpoints of genetics, physical 
expression and modification, self-understanding, observable and unobservable phenomena, any 
state of an individual or a group of people at a given point in time and in a particular situation. 
Denoted as identity markers, these considerations are coded by lexical items naming our 
functions and roles in society across different situations, our kinship status, occupation, 
geographic location, nationality, our physical and behavioural characteristics and attitudes, our 
beliefs, as well as scientifically defined features, and more.   
Dictionaries are also flexible with regards to definitions of identity, for example, Merriam-
Webster online dictionary offers eleven ways of understanding the term, and some which stand 
out in particular are, “who someone is: the name of a person,” “the distinguishing character or 
personality of an individual,” “an equation that is satisfied for all values of the symbols,” “the 
qualities, beliefs, etc., that make a particular person or group different from others.” 
Complementary to these everyday uses of the term are the medical and legal definitions, for 
example, medical definitions: “the distinguishing character or personality of an individual” and 
“the relation established by psychological identification;” and some legal ones: “separate or 
distinct essence,” “distinguishing character of a person,” “especially: information (as a name or 
address) that distinguishes a person,” “the condition of being the same as a thing or person 
described, claimed, or accused” (merriam-webster.com). Cambridge online dictionary adds 
“the reputation, characteristics, etc. of a person or organization that makes the public think 
about them in a particular way” (dictionary.cambridge.org). Longman online dictionary notes 
that identity is “the qualities and attitudes that a person or group of people have, that make them 
different from other people” and individuals’ “name or who they are” (Idoceonline.com). 
An important question to ask is whether a fully comprehensive definition of identity is 
necessary or even possible. As Wetherell writes in “The Field of Identity Studies,”  
Nearly every scholar who works on identity complains about its slippery, blurred and confusing nature. 
Identity is notoriously elusive and difficult to define and nearly every generation of scholars since the 
1950s has included some keen to dismiss it as a consequence concluding it has no analytic value or 
purchase. Yet the study of identity persists and prospers, and the territory traced out and retraced by 
identity continues to be indispensable. (3) 
The “lack of analytic value” some scholars point to resonates with the earlier conclusion by 
Hodge that identity “does not represent a quality.” Its simple purpose is to name as an umbrella 
term the process or occurrence by which people categorise themselves using a multitude of 
identity markers. Identity and its articulations are often politically relevant and because of this 
alone deserve a closer examination.1 Much has been and continues to be written on the topic of 
 
1 Judith Butler, for example, writes on this in her article “Imitation and Gender Insubordination.” 
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identity in the social sciences, and this fact cannot be separated from the language and meanings 
used to encapsulate identities.  
Why to identify and how to identify or define an individual or a group of people? It is due to 
the “slippery, blurred and confusing nature” of identity that every definition maintains a degree 
of openness. Identity markers result from the process of identity recognition or category 
attribution, i.e. recognising a set of characteristics and giving it a collective name. This is the 
simplest way of defining what identity means, which enables a discussion of the meanings and 
implications of particular identity markers. Whereas every human can self-identify, i.e. apply 
lexical items functioning as identity markers to themselves, they are also always defined or 
identified by the social sphere they inhabit. Humans are collectively reproducers of language 
and the notions it codes as well as its appropriators and creators, so the application of identity 
markers has no designated gatekeepers.  
We identify because we rely on categorisation in every aspect of our lives, or as George Lakoff 
concludes, “There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, 
and speech” (5). Attributing an identity or rather naming aspects of it means the process of 
categorisation has occurred. Categorising (or labelling) is immanent to the working of our 
minds and we cannot conceptualise our experience and form judgments without it. Some are of 
the persuasion that “labels are for jam jars” and should not apply to people, which is 
unproductive. To communicate effectively with others, we have to rely on expressions already 
in existence and on their established meanings shared by the language community in the time 
and context we learned them, regardless of what we name this very process (of identity 
attribution), or whether we name it at all. 
To answer how to ascribe identities or aspects of identities is a bit of a challenge. Due to the 
openness of ‘identity’ as an abstract notion, there are no firmly established criteria by which to 
judge whether a certain expression should be perceived as an identity marker. Consequently, 
this thesis views identity as an amalgamation of every aspect of an individual’s experience 
(physical and non-physical) and which is discerned in the way individuals refer to themselves 
as well as in the way others perceive and describe them. All lexical items referring to this 
experience are considered identity markers. 
Identity markers are lexical items that describe people as individuals and groups through 
naming. They take the form of simple or complex nominal and adjectival phrases. To illustrate, 
illustrator and Mary are simple nominal phrases, secretary general is a complex nominal phrase 
In the sentence Mary is very tall, Mary functions as a simple nominal phrase and very tall as a 
complex adjectival phrase, both phrases being markers of identity. An easy argument for why 
adjectives should be considered identity markers is to notice that lexical items used to denote 
identity are nominal and adjectival in nature. For example, one may say I am trans or I am old, 
as well as I am a trans person and I am an old person. Some phrases that are adjectival within 
a sentence are nominal when considered on their own. Virtually any adjective used to describe 
a person is, therefore, solidified as a marker of identity once person is added to it, or when it is 
modified by the definite article, becoming a nominalised adjective as in the elderly. (I am 
elderly. I am an elderly person. The elderly need help.) 
Identity markers name various aspects of human experience that is either stable or malleable in 
time and perceived as a network of factors combined into the idea of identity. This thesis argues 
that a person’s identity as a concept commonly used in society can never be comprehended with 
the use of a single marker or multiple markers because it qualifies a process of recognition, not 
a substance. A large number of lexical items are used to describe ourselves and others and this 
immense vocabulary serves to name concepts we recognise as identities or aspects of identity. 
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As the concept of identity is not definitely fixed, I utilise this openness to cover a wide array of 
possibilities to categorise identity markers and think about their function in discourse. 
Throughout the paper the word ‘identity’ is used as shorthand for ‘aspects of identity,’ in fact, 
for categorised characteristics someone possesses and displays. Identity markers result from the 
process of identification.  
The act of identity marker attribution stems from ideations which are not solely a consequence 
of considering abstract concepts and naming them, but also of physical experience during which 
applicable lexical items are arrived at according to an individual’s judgment. In other words, 
whereas some ideas about aspects of identity, such as kinship relations, can be considered only 
through abstract thinking and need not result from witnessing their physical manifestation, other 
aspects can be perceived from direct physical manifestation. In this way, certain aspects of 
people’s identities are displayed visibly and can, therefore, be recognised by others and 
consequently categorised and named. While a woman wearing a bindi might be somewhat 
safely assumed to be a Hindu, knowing whether she has any siblings and whether a part of her 
identity is being a sister or an aunt is not obvious.  
As this world is inhabited by many people it stands to reason that while each individual is 
unique and could potentially be marked by a completely unique identity marker, it is 
unquestionable that everyone has some identity aspects in common with someone else. 
Following the notion that two things share an identity when they are identical or very similar, 
all identity markers that apply to individuals are applicable to groups as well. Regarding group 
identity at the dawn of the civil rights movement, Wetherell continues, summing up Gleason,  
in the 1950s scholars began to talk, at first tentatively, and then more forcefully, for the first time about 
racial and ethnic identities, national identities and religious identities. Membership of a social group was 
taken to define a person and specify who they were in the scheme of things. To the extent that the members 
of groups and social categories, such as Australians, Scots, Arabs, women and men, could be assumed to 
share similar, essential and defining characteristics, the group as a whole could be said to have an identity. 
(Wetherell 8) 
The “similar, essential and defining characteristics” enable the same identity markers to apply 
to a number of individuals who share these characteristics. In other words, ideas about who and 
what people (are like) are articulated by recognising some salient characteristics which 
members of a group have in common. Asserting that a group has an identity is the same as 
claiming that an individual has an identity. (A single aspect or multiple aspects of myself 
collectively have a category and by extension a name.) The salient feature can be chosen and 
pointed out, with identity claimed on the basis of it — in terms of groups, it is the one feature 
or multiple ones all those in the group have in common. A person might identify with the term 
Arab and therefore claim that being an Arab is their identity or one of its aspects. As far as this 
thesis is concerned, Arab is merely an identity marker. 
The concept of identity as a flexible term applicable to every facet of a person’s existence is 
thought counterproductive by some. With a critical eye to the very sense of what identity is 
meant to represent, Brubaker and Cooper, for example, argue that the concept of identity serves 
no purpose when it moves away from presenting essentialist notions (resulting in, I assume, a 
small number of identity markers as essential categories already in existence) and moves 
towards constructivist ones. They present this as problematic because, 
constructivism allows putative "identities" to proliferate. But as they proliferate, the term loses its 
analytical purchase. If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere. If it is fluid, how can we understand the ways 
in which self-understandings may harden, congeal, and crystallize? If it is constructed, how can we 
understand the sometimes coercive force of external identifications? If it is multiple, how do we 
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understand the terrible singularity that is often striven for - and sometimes realized - by politicians seeking 
to transform mere categories into unitary and exclusive groups? (1) 
Brubaker and Cooper do not believe identity can be properly examined if it is perceived as 
completely malleable instead of seen as some stable essence. If identity is seen in constructivist 
terms, this means that individuals are at liberty to invent identity categories as well as come up 
with their own meanings for identity markers, based on personal preferences. Consequently, 
there can be no firm grasp on or consensus in a language community of what a particular term 
denotes, nor what identity as a concept should be understood as. Brubaker and Cooper, 
therefore, do not subscribe to the idea that anything anyone considers an identity should be 
taken as a matter of fact, but rather believe that there should be a delimitation of lexical items 
which could be considered representatives of identity. The authors seem to suggest that 
identities should be denoted using a narrow, limited set of appropriate lexical items (i.e. identity 
markers).  
Brubaker and Cooper also question the very notion of identity as a worthwhile consideration 
for people who do not have to engage with it professionally: “‘Identity’ is a key term in the 
vernacular idiom of contemporary politics, and social analysis must take account of this fact. 
But this does not require us to use ‘identity’ as a category of analysis or to conceptualize 
‘identities’ as something that all people have, seek, construct, and negotiate” (2). Despite the 
fact that ideas around identity do not play a significant role in the lives of some people, identity 
markers, however, continue to be applied even if not termed in this way. As already argued, the 
idea of identity contains the multiplicity of an individual’s experience and is therefore denoted 
in language by lexical items termed identity markers, such as, for example, mother, fat driving 
instructor, retired teacher, optimist, Slovenian, gamer, fascist, brunette, etc. Expressions such 
as these answer questions Who am I? What am I like? Who/What are you/we/they (like)? Or 
alternatively, To what aspects of this person’s identity am I attributing a name?  
Identity markers combine to make up our ideas about identity which cannot be summed up 
using a single lexical item. To reiterate, a person’s identity can only partly be expressed in 
language; for example, a 25-year-old white Scottish male gay punk atheist librarian is a series 
of identity markers denoting some aspects of this person’s identity.  
Since identification of people is such an integral part of life in a community, requirements are 
made by law that “categories, such as race, sex, family, and citizenship,” are stated (Clarke 
749). ID cards, for example, often display identity information such as nationality or 
citizenship, full name and surname, date of birth, sex, etc. Chinua Achebe’s first passport 
described him as “a British Protected Person” (Achebe 1). In a society where racial categories 
or ethnic/visible minorities are not perceived as relevant information, for example in France, 
there might be no census of the racial or ethnic makeup of the public. However, in societies 
where English is spoken as a first language, the racial category and its subcategories defined by 
racial identity markers such as black, white, African-American, Caucasian, Asian, etc. are 
relevant across a number of contexts. Identity is often seen as a factor in legal proceedings and 
therefore “[w]hen identity disputes arise, a common move is to call for records like birth 
certificates, marriage licenses, application forms, or other documents to settle the issue” (Clarke 
749).  
Clarke distinguishes three types of identity and discusses the differences between ascriptive, 
elective, and formal identity, defining the latter as “identity . . . conferred through the execution 
of formalities by individuals claiming identities for themselves” (750). The ascriptive identity 
is understood to be attributed by others, whereas elective identity depends on personal 
decisions. The addition of the concept of formal identity, in a legal framework, shows how 
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aspects of identity and their respective identity markers are acquired according to how 
individuals define themselves through formal procedures, for example, through “signing 
paperwork” or “saying ‘I do’” (Clarke 750). “These practices do not simply reflect an 
underlying identity status; they create and constitute that status for legal purposes. They may 
also take on cultural significance” (ibid.). Regarding “formalities that constitute identity 
statuses for legal purposes, rather than those thought to merely reflect a status,” Clarke points 
out how, “[f]or example, through licensing and ceremony, a couple becomes married” (770). 
As a consequence of the official marriage ceremony the marital or family aspects of the 
newlyweds’ identities therefore become marked as spouse and husband and wife. They attain 
new markers of identity. Despite acknowledging the potential benefits of formal identity, Clarke 
argues that it also,   
risks disadvantaging those without resources, conferring the power to define identities on bureaucratic 
processes, opening the door to discriminatory enforcement, forcing individuals to fit their lives into 
Procrustean categories, and legitimating exclusionary arrangements. (751) 
And continues further on,  
Identity determination doctrines assign labels to individuals such as citizen or alien, parent or stranger, 
white or minority, man or woman. These types of identity are generally considered fundamental 
characteristics of human beings, contributing to a person’s “sense of self and place in the world.” But 
claims to these identities also have legal import, as demands for public recognition or redistribution of 
resources, cutting across domains such as employment, immigration, public benefits, and tax law. (754–
755) 
The conclusion that can be drawn from these statements is that in a legal sense identity is a very 
important concept, and some markers used to name aspects of identity can therefore be subject 
to great manipulation. Their definitions and functions should therefore be carefully considered. 
What markers are used and how they are defined has real life consequences, for some 
advantageous and for others disadvantageous.  
With regards to an ascriptive view of identity, Clarke notes how ascription of identity markers 
can be essentialist and deterministic, as well as the markers themselves being difficult to define 
(762). Essentialism is about attributing identity markers to groups and individuals on the basis 
of stereotypical assumptions and it “may result from biological understandings of categories 
like race or sex that presume certain aptitudes, interests, or roles flow naturally from genetics. 
But social understandings of the meanings of categories like ‘father’ and ‘mother’ may also 
involve stereotypes about what is entailed or required for each” (ibid.). Determinism means that 
“prescriptions about how group members should behave . . . may narrowly circumscribe an 
individual’s life choices. Identities may be ascribed to individuals who did not fully intend to 
adopt them. Thus, ascriptive understandings of identity lend themselves to the idea that identity 
is destiny” (ibid.). Therefore, being identified by certain markers can importantly affect and 
determine the course of one’s life. Increasingly, however, identity is being perceived as 
something changeable and unfixed that does not essentialise or determine individuals but is up 
to them to pick and change. This process results in elective identity.    
In contrast to identities being ascribed (with identity markers) from the outside is the attribution 
of identity markers by individuals to themselves. “Elective identity is akin to a contractual right 
to opt into or out of a particular identity. This choice may be ad hoc or a narrative process. It 
may be partial, inconsistent, or context dependent” (Clarke 763). Whereas race is considered 
by some as a non-existent and irrelevant identity category, in certain circumstances its 
designation is perceived as relevant. One such case is the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s requirement for “employers to submit data on the racial composition of their 
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workforces, [which] discourages employers from relying on any method other than self-
identification. Institutions that administer affirmative action programs generally defer to self-
identification as well” (Clarke 763). It appears that because conceptions of race are related to 
prejudice and result in sometimes highly contentious views, the most appropriate way to utilise 
markers denoting racial categories is for individuals to self-attribute them. The same approach 
is increasingly being taken with regards to marking aspects of identity related to gender, 
For example, a bill passed in 2013 by the California legislature provides: “A pupil shall be permitted to 
participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities, including athletic teams and competitions, 
and use facilities consistent with his or her gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil’s 
records.” “[H]is or her gender identity” is not defined any further. The language “his or her” suggests the 
choice between these options is left entirely to the student. Although there is some suggestion in the 
legislative history that gender identity must be “consistently expressed,” this language was not 
incorporated into the statute. (Clarke 763–764) 
The paragraph states clearly that gender identification in California is no longer ascriptive and 
therefore essentialist and deterministic, but elective, depending solely on the individual’s sense 
of self. Whether the right to attribute racial and gender identity markers should belong to the 
individual to whom the markers apply, to some outside authority figure, or other people who 
ascribe markers to those around them as they see fitting, is a matter of ongoing debate.  
 
2.2. Theories of Meaning 
 
Since this thesis deals with the semantic and pragmatic aspects of identity markers in the 
English language, I first establish what semantics and pragmatics are and how identity markers 
are viewed with both approaches in mind. Next follow some of the most influential theories of 
meaning which represent various ways in which word (and in some cases sentence) meaning is 
thought to be understood by the human mind. This thesis takes the position that the meaning of 
lexical items is conceptual in nature, i.e. lexical items such as identity markers exist in the mind 
as concepts.  
 
Semantics is, very broadly, the study of the meaning of sentences and lexical items outside of 
context, and pragmatics is the study of the meaning of utterances (sentences in use) and lexical 
items in context, i.e. within a particular communicative situation. Often what is communicated 
is not to be taken at face value, so correct interpretation of the utterance and its constituent 
lexical items depends on the hearer or reader’s active participation. Griffiths explains that 
“[s]emantics provides a set of possible meanings, and pragmatics is concerned with the choice 
among the semantic possibilities. Language users can take account of context, and use their 
general knowledge about how the world works, in order to build interpretations on this semantic 
foundation” (2). Context being a “a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s 
assumptions about the world” (Sperber and Wilson 15), allows for the interpretation of 
utterances.2 How an individual might interpret the meaning of an identity marker within context 
results from that individual's experience, and in this aspect all humans differ. Successful 
communication requires encoding, decoding, and inferential processes (Sperber and Wilson 3). 
Correct understanding of what is being communicated, therefore, depends on the speaker using 
 
2 Sperber and Wilson state that context includes the physical facts of the communicative situation, the 
communication up to the point of analysis, the interlocutors’ “expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses 
or religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the 
speaker,” etc. (15-16).  
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the appropriate expressions for the thoughts he is communicating, the hearer having the same 
conceptualisation of the expressions, as well as being able to infer what is being communicated 
with the help of contextual information.  
 
In short, the interpretation of the meaning of a marker outside of context differs from the 
interpretation of the same marker within specific communicative circumstances. To illustrate, 
the marker teacher is primarily understood as denoting a person who teaches a specific subject. 
If someone were to say She is the best teacher I’ve ever had, the interpretation of teacher could 
include an additional meaning, namely that of someone being an inspirational person from 
whom the speaker has learned a lot and holds in high regard, and not only of someone who 
teaches a specific subject. Somewhat differently, the marker dog denotes a type of animal as its 
primary meaning and outside specified context, but means an unpleasant man in a statement 
That man is a dog. The second part of the thesis includes further examples.  
 
The semantic aspects of identity markers pertain to this first theoretical part of the thesis which 
discusses theories of meaning (including possible understandings of meaning of identity 
markers) and they also pertain to studying semantic changes. While the thesis does not look at 
various types of semantic changes identity markers may undergo in detail, it broaches the topic 
in the chapter on neology in the second part, which includes changes in meaning in terms of 
reappropriation, while also observing synonymy, figurative language, highlighting the 
influence of political correctness, etc. All of these inform the pragmatic aspects of identity 
markers that are addressed in the second part of the thesis.  
 
In developing philosophical, psychological, and linguistic theories, when it comes to discussing 
meaning, ways of understanding, and names (taken in the most general sense, with identity 
markers for people falling into this domain), the identity markers most frequently reached for 
as examples are those of personal names, gender, kinship (father, mother, child), and bachelor. 
Lexical items from these areas serve as material for the interpretation of meaning as far as 
people are concerned. Goddard, for example, explains the componential analysis of meaning of 
lexical items with the help of gender (man, woman, boy, girl) and kinship (father, mother, son, 
daughter, brother, sister, grandfather and grandmother) markers (Semantic Analysis 45-49). 
He refers to the term bachelor in order to show how a dictionary definition might be too broad 
if the word is defined only as an unmarried man (Semantic Analysis 31). Jackendoff includes a 
discussion of the term as well,3 and Miller and Johnson-Laird mention bachelor with regards 
to lexical primitives.4  
Now we have a look at how people may understand word meanings before turning to concrete 
theoretical propositions. This is important to create a picture of how our ideas about meaning 
have spawned various theories about what we understand the meaning of lexical items to be. 
Word meaning contains the grammatical and lexical meaning. Here, the focus is on the lexical 
part of meaning.  
Cliff Goddard provides an overview of the study of meaning for beginners in Semantic 
Analysis: A Practical Introduction. The expression ‘sense’ can be used instead of ‘meaning’ 
(Goddard 5). Moore, however, in summing up Frege’s referential theory, distinguishes between 
‘sense’ and ‘meaning,’ and explains that the meaning of a lexical item is broader than its sense: 
“For example, it is a feature of a word’s meaning, but not of its sense, that it is a swear-word. 
 
3 Jackendoff refers to bachelor when he writes about Bolinger’s critique of Katz and Fodor’s distinguisher 
concept (114).  
4 “No one, for instance, would propose ‘bachelor’ and ‘spinster’ as primitives and define ‘married’ as ‘(adult 
and) not a bachelor or a spinster’” (Miller and Johnson-Laird 705). 
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(Many swear-words share their senses with non-taboo medical terms.)” (2). It might be useful 
to distinguish then, at least as far as semantics and pragmatics are concerned, that sense and 
meaning are synonymous in semantic analyses of lexical items, but not completely synonymous 
in pragmatic analyses, as facts about words such as being swear-words, used ironically, as 
diminutives, etc. are additions to the senses of the words’ meanings.   
Goddard begins by laying out what meaning is not. Meanings of words are not what they refer 
to because some words do not have a referent in the physical world, i.e. the object they denote, 
but still have a meaning (Semantic Analysis 4). For example, one might expect that pointing to 
a table displays the meaning of table, but the act of pointing merely picks out an object. It is 
not informative enough to qualify as a meaning. There are many different types of tables and 
they may serve different functions, so meaning is expected to be something more complex than 
a mere physical manifestation as visual representation. Also, one can grasp the meaning of a 
unicorn, despite the fact that unicorns do not exist in the physical world, i.e. do not have a 
referent that can be pointed to. Furthermore, sometimes different expressions can be used to 
refer to the same object, and even though their referent is one and the same, the expressions still 
differ in meaning (ibid.). By saying a name and pointing to an object with expectation that this 
act will inform us about the name’s meaning, one might be confused when that same object is 
called by a different name on a different occasion. Goddard notes the common humorous 
identification of a human being as a featherless biped (Semantic Analysis 5; Lieberman 39), 
and while both names can be used to denote a single being, a referent, they carry different 
meanings. A person might be called George while also being referred to as a son and a father. 
By pointing at a person named George and saying George or son or father, the meaning of these 
markers is not conveyed. In this thesis, nominal lexical items or names are understood in 
Fregean terms rather than merely representing people’s personal names. They are synonymous 
with identity markers. Moore observes that according to Frege, names are singular noun 
phrases, for example Plato, the positive square root of 16, the number of symphonies written by 
Schumann, joy, etc., and just because an individual might know what a reference of a given 
name is, it does not follow that the individual also understands the meaning of the name (Moore 
1).  
Next, meanings of expressions do not result from scientific knowledge (Goddard, Semantic 
Analysis 5). For example, identifying salt as NaCl does not convey the word’s meaning. 
According to Bloomfield, the meaning of expressions can be defined with precision only when 
they are related to science and technical terminology, but “we have no precise way of defining 
words like love and hate, which concern situations that have not been accurately classified” 
(qtd. in Goddard, Semantic Analysis 5). This assertion is relevant because love and hate are 
emotional states and therefore abstract notions just like markers of identity are. It can be safely 
assumed then that some if not most identity markers cannot be precisely defined. For Hilary 
Putnam, meanings of words are to be found in the linguistic community, but only a “special 
subclass of speakers,” meaning the scientists or professionals in their field, know exactly what 
the meanings of words pertaining to their field are, i.e. how those lexical items are to be defined, 
or more precisely, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for their definition (Putnam 
155; cf. Jackendoff 110). As far as identity markers are concerned, according to Putnam’s 
theory, only people who deal with identity professionally would be able to define meanings of 
identity terms most precisely. Murphy notes the reliance of people on dictionaries and other 
authoritative sources such as style manuals for supplying correct word meanings as “official” 
statements (Murphy 386). While he acknowledges that the prescriptive role these authoritative 
sources provide has its place, people utilise the vocabulary and may misuse it, and they do not 
rely entirely on dictionary entries for the correct word meanings in daily communication. 
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While non-scientists cannot be expected to understand meanings of expressions in scientific 
terms, they still understand meanings of everyday expressions, and can define them in their own 
way. Some might argue that the use of these expressions in daily life provides their meaning, 
i.e. the way they tend to be used in language shows their meaning (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 
6). While it is certain that meanings of expressions are related to how these expressions are used 
and connected to their referents, a precise understanding of what meaning is or where it is to be 
found eludes us.  
In terms of linguistic approaches to meaning, Goddard points to truth-conditional theories, 
conceptual theories, Platonist and structuralist theories, and to the semiotic approach, while also 
noting their weaknesses and objections. Frege’s referential theory and the conceptual theory of 
meaning are given special attention in this chapter as they provide the most solid basis for the 
understanding of meanings of identity markers.   
2.2.1. TRUTH-CONDITIONAL THEORIES OF MEANING 
Philosophy has made a considerable contribution to the study of meaning. Logic and sentence 
meaning, i.e. utilising logic to establish the truth value of sentences, are objects of study within 
philosophy which influenced the field of linguistics. Truth-conditional theories of meaning are 
concerned with sentences instead of single lexical items. According to these theories, “the 
meaning of a sentence is the conditions in the world which would have to be met for the 
sentence to be true” and “the meaning of a word is the contribution it makes to the ‘truth 
conditions’ of sentences in which it appears” (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 7). With regards to 
identity markers as abstract notions these theories of meaning are insufficient because they 
mostly depend on a direct link between lexical expressions and what is observable, i.e. the 
physical world. This is what, for example, Goddard notes from Lakoff’s work, namely that 
expressions related to morality, aesthetics, religion, philosophy, and “culture-specific words 
like Monday, bar mitzvah, associate professor, second base, or fiancé” clearly do not fit the 
bill (ibid.) (emphasis added). The truth-condition of a sentence can be challenging to establish 
when dealing with abstract notions.  
2.2.2. REFERENTIAL THEORIES OF MEANING 
The referential theory of meaning has its foundation in logic. Frege established terms such as 
‘sign,’ ‘sense,’ ‘reference,’ and ‘idea,’ and provided initial vocabulary for the study of meaning. 
The referential theory of meaning posits that meanings are defined in terms of reference, i.e. 
referents are required in order to grasp the meaning or sense of a name. However, even in the 
absence of physical referents, the sense of a name can be grasped. How could abstract nouns 
otherwise be understood? The conceptual theory of meaning complements and builds on the 
referential theory where abstract notions, such as identity markers, are concerned. Goddard’s 
assertion that meanings of words are not their referents coincides with Miller and Johnson-
Laird’s example which employs identity markers to explain Frege’s attempt at separating 
meaning from reference: “The man is John Brown.” Whereas the man and John Brown refer to 
the same person, i.e. both signs as names have the same reference, their meanings (senses) are 
not the same, i.e. they are not synonymous (Miller and Johnson-Laird 303). If they were 
synonymous, their informative value would be the same, but it clearly differs as the two terms 
are not interchangeable. For example, saying that “John Brown is John Brown” is different from 
saying “The man is John Brown,” as the two sentences have different meanings (ibid.). Frege 
acknowledges that a word’s sense (or meaning) can be grasped even without a physical referent, 
despite such thoughts not being able to “further scientific knowledge” (Frege, “Letter to 
Jourdain” 44). The meaning can be grasped even if cannot be scientifically defined. 
Frege recognises that in the absence of a real (physical) referent, senses may still be arrived at. 
He exemplifies this with “the celestial body most distant from the Earth,” (Frege, “On Sense 
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and Reference” 25) the existence of which we are not certain of, but understand it nonetheless. 
Therefore, the sense may be known and understood even when a referent is lacking. Similarly, 
I argue that identity markers may not necessarily refer to any particular person and can in fact 
be only ideas in our heads without a physical referent. Conceptual theories of meaning argue 
for this position. For example, Miss Universe does not necessarily refer to any particular person 
because it is an abstract notion and might lack a referent. The sense of the word might be known 
based on experience, and at a given point in time there might be an actual person (referent) we 
can point to and claim is Miss Universe, but the sense of Miss Universe can be explained and 
grasped even when there is no person at a given time holding this title. Identity markers can be 
said to have a referent when the person to whom they apply can be pointed to. As long as they 
are used to only communicate ideas in our minds, they can be said to not have a physical 
referent. 
If we accept that referents may exist in the minds of individuals, for example, we can imagine 
a unicorn despite unicorns not existing as physical referents, then this thought promotes the 
conceptual theory of meaning where mental referents as well as physical ones exist as concepts 
in our minds. I return to the conceptual theory of meaning at the end of this chapter.  
Frege defines ‘sense’ as the meaning of the word that maintains its concrete definition and 
which exists outside of people’s minds, i.e. it can be objectively defined. It is the definition of 
lexical units found in dictionary entries. ‘Ideas,’ on the other hand, exist in people’s minds, and 
sense is the meaning of the word to which people apply their own associated ideas (Frege, “On 
Sense and Reference” 25-26). So, sense is what we arrive at through observation and experience 
of the senses. Then, our subjective ideas rather than sense alone determine our choice for the 
application of particular identity markers within various communicative circumstances. Noting 
the distinction between senses and ideas, Frege points to the following example,  
A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name ‘Bucephalus’. 
This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign’s sense, which may be the common 
property of many and therefore is not a part of a mode of the individual mind. (Frege, “On Sense and 
Reference” 26)  
The sense is always the same and shared within a language community, but people’s ideas about 
it vary. The painter, the horseman, and the zoologist all probably understand the sense of 
Bucephalus most generally as a horse, but all inform this sense with subjective ideas based on 
their experiential background and ways of processing information which foreground various 
aspects. They will use the sense of the word as a backdrop to their own imagined creations.  
When two people are asked to imagine and define an identity marker, say a doctor, they will 
form images based on their individual ideas of the sense of the word. One person might imagine 
a male doctor, and another a female one, they might be wearing a white coat and a stethoscope 
or something else, and be inside a hospital or some other environment, performing doctor’s 
tasks, etc. The sense of doctor remains outside of what either of the two people imagines while 
they both understand the term, but they simply project their differing ideas onto it.  
In “On Sense and Reference,” Frege thinks about the sense of what is understood or imagined 
by the name Aristotle. Aristotle is an identity marker representing a personal name.  
In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ opinions as to the sense may differ. It might, for 
instance, be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody 
who does this will attach another sense to the sentence ‘Aristotle was born in Stagira’ than will a man 
who takes as the sense of the name: the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. (Frege, 
“On Sense and Reference” 24) 
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It should be noted that senses of identity markers (which include proper names) may be open 
to definition in varying degrees. Aristotle therefore might be defined by an individual as “the 
pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great” as well as “the teacher of Alexander the 
Great who was born in Stagira,” without considering that he had been a pupil of Plato. When 
these two senses are applied to the sentence “Aristotle was born in Stagira,” the result are two 
different sentences, namely The pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great was born in 
Stagira, and The teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira was born in Stagira. 
The first sentence is more informative than the second in which the same element repeats itself 
and some information is omitted. Frege is aware that sentence as well as word sense can be 
perceived differently. Sense is considered to be objective even if we have differing opinions on 
what it might entail as our own ideas differ. That is why our opinions vary regarding the senses 
of identity markers; our ideas about them differ.  
Frege’s discussion of sense and reference is relevant to the concept of identity markers as 
abstract notions because he notes that “[t]he regular connexion between a sign, its sense, and 
its reference is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in 
turn a definite reference, while to a given reference (which has a referent as an object) there 
does not belong only a single sign (Frege, “On Sense and Reference” 25).” In other words, a 
sign (i.e. the word used to reference a referent) has a definition (a sense) and it applies to a 
particular object which can be identified by the use of that sign. Objects (including people), 
however, can be identified by multiple signs, each designating one feature or a set of them. This 
also applies to abstract notions such as identity markers as mental images or extensions of 
physical objects. For example, imagine a woman as a physical being. The signs used to refer to 
this woman you imagine can be any of a number of possibilities, depending on what is believed 
to be true of her. She can be referred to as a woman, a parent, a child, a daughter, a Christian, 
a Belgian, a carpenter, a widow, a brunette, a libertarian, Jane, etc. These various signs or 
markers carry their own senses and can be informative in discourse about aspects of this person 
if she were real. They can all refer to one specific referent as well as to a number of referents.  
Lexical items denoting non-physical phenomena, but having abstract referents, are devoid of 
sense only in special cases. One can easily think of a sense for daughter, but would find it much 
harder to argue that Jane can be defined. The name is devoid of any sense because it might 
apply to any person but contains no information within itself and is therefore undefinable. Here, 
I would like to propose that the name might be more fittingly understood as an idea inside 
people’s minds (especially if they know a Jane or multiple ones) without having a related sense. 
Its meaning informs us that it is a name, but the sense of the name is lacking. It is semantically 
empty, but pragmatically relevant.   
2.2.3. STRUCTURALIST THEORIES OF MEANING 
Within the scope of structuralist theories of meaning, it is understood that “the meaning of any 
word is actually constituted by the totality of relationships this word has with the other words 
in the language” (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 9). In other terms, no word carries a meaning in 
itself, but is only defined or understood in relation to other words, and it therefore cannot be 
described but rather only noted by means of other lexical items in the form of componential 
semantic analysis (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 10). This means that words that fit into the same 
semantic field, provided it is narrow enough so that this is even doable, are compared in terms 
of their similarities and differences (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 43). For example, and as far 
as identity markers are concerned, lexical items man, woman, boy, and girl form one semantic 
field and are contrasted within it. All having the human component in common, man might be 
analysed as +male and +mature in opposition to woman who is -male and +mature, in 
opposition to boy who is +male and -mature, and in opposition to girl who is -male and -mature. 
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(Goddard, Semantic Analysis 45). Unfortunately, this type of analysis is inadequate for those 
identity markers that do not fit neatly into any particular semantic field and that cannot be 
interpreted in terms of binary oppositions. According to Eugene Nida, however, the contrasted 
features need not be binary (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 48). Nida introduces two types of 
components of analysis, namely the ‘diagnostic’ and the ‘supplementary,’ where the former 
includes components known as ‘markers’ and ‘classemes’ which enable specific distinctions 
among words in the same semantic field, and the latter type includes components known as 
‘distinguishers’ or ‘semes’ which help to define the meaning of the word extensively, but are 
not relevant in accounting for differences among the lexical items within the same semantic 
field (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 48). For example, a diagnostic componential analysis of 
woman and man would contain markers or classemes human, female, and adult for woman, and 
human, male, and adult for man. A supplementary componential analysis could then include 
distinguishers or semes, for example, ability to give birth for woman, and ability to grow a beard 
for man, etc.  
2.2.4. PLATONIST THEORIES OF MEANING 
A representative of a Platonist or a Platonic theory of meaning is Katz for whom meanings of 
lexical items are “relationships between expressions” that exist in abstract form outside the 
minds of individuals. Basically, meanings of lexical items do not depend on individual 
interpretation but are rather something objective to which individuals may have intuitive access 
(Goddard, Semantic Analysis 9; Jackendoff 109). This thought bears a similarity to Frege’s 
definition of sense. Katz’s position on understanding the meaning of lexical items also includes 
accounting for the difference between dictionary and encyclopaedic knowledge. The first is said 
to possess the real meaning of the lexical item (inevitably depending on necessary and sufficient 
conditions, which are discussed further on), whereas the second includes individuals’ subjective 
judgements and need not be subject of analysis (Jackendoff 116-117).   
2.2.5 TRANSLATIONAL OR SEMIOTIC THEORIES OF MEANING 
Another view that does not place the meaning of lexical items within the minds of individuals 
is the semiotic or translational approach. It does not concern itself with the ontology of meaning 
as nothing we do ever takes place outside of meaning, i.e. nothing can be described from a 
perspective outside of language and meaning, not even meaning itself. This approach is termed 
semiotic because “it takes the world of ‘signs’ as irreducible,” and translational because it is 
based on translating more complex lexical items into simpler ones that are “more easily 
understood” (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 10). ‘Signs’ in this case is another expression for 
lexical items as meaningful units of language, and they are irreducible because, according to 
Peirce, “it is impossible to reduce a sign to any elements that are themselves not signs” 
(Goddard, Semantic Analysis 11). Instead of trying to understand the meaning of lexical items, 
the semiotic approach translates lexical items, i.e. it puts them in simpler terms.  
Semantic primitives can be used to analyse meaning. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage or 
the reductive paraphrase approach developed by Bogusławski, Wierzbicka, and Goddard, 
presents a list of semantic primitives to be utilised when defining meanings of words in their 
simplest terms. Semantic primitives or primes compose semantic molecules as complex 
meanings. The paraphrase should provide the meaning in its entirety while also being simple 
and basic enough to serve as a lexical universal which could be translated into any other 
language (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 56-59). The set of semantic primitives which has 
expanded through the years currently counts over sixty items, and is expected to provide a 
“complete lexicon for semantic analysis” (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 60). The analysis need 
not comprise merely of semantic primes but can also contain complex terms, “provided that 
none is more complex than the original term being defined and provided none needs to be 
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defined in terms of the original word” (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 61).5 Lakoff and Johnson 
do not support the idea that complex concepts, such as identity markers for example, can be 
defined by semantic primes that cannot be decomposed further, 
Standard theories of meaning assume that all of our complex concepts can be analyzed into 
undecomposable primitives. Such primitives are taken to be the ultimate “building blocks” of meaning. 
We believe that the standard theories are fundamentally mistaken in assuming that basic concepts are 
undecomposable primitives. (69)  
The way that identity markers can be defined employing the theory of semantic primes is 
different from the way dictionaries approach definitions. Goddard analyses the marker children 
with the use of semantic primes in the following way: 
a. people of one kind  
b. all people are people of this kind before they can be people not of this kind  
c. when someone is someone of this kind, this someone has lived for a short time, not a long time  
d. the bodies of people of this kind are small  
e. when people are like this, they can do some things, they canʼt do many other things  
f. because of this, if other people donʼt do some good things for them, bad things can happen to them  
Goddard, “Semantic primes” 719  
While explaining the concept of children or child in this way appears to be quite exhaustive, it 
is not the regular way individuals tend to think or conceptualise of identities. Rather than 
thinking of identity markers in such analytical terms, we see or create mental images that fit the 
description but we do not represent them using such simple vocabulary. The images in our 
minds are made up of ideas that often cannot be communicated without relying on semantic 
molecules, i.e. complex meanings. For example, children are also daughters and sons, and these 
are complex meanings which can but tend not to be described by semantic primitives. Semantic 
molecules are more readily employed when describing identity markers than semantic primes, 
because to analyse a marker all the way to its most basic components during communication 
requires more cognitive effort and is impractical compared to retaining some decomposable 
lexical items.   
The marker woman, rather than only being defined by semantic primes, includes a semantic 
molecule child as a marker as relevant in determining the meaning of woman,  
Essentially, the proposal is that the concept of women depends on the idea that there are two kinds of 
people’s bodies, women being people of the kind whose body type allows them to have children. In other 
words, the concept of ‘women’ depends semantically on the concept of ‘child.’ (Goddard, “Semantic 
primes” 722).   
Interestingly, the concept of child, as previously seen, does not seem to depend on the concept 
of woman, and neither on the concept of mother, or father, despite the very existence of a child 
 
5 Goddard notes: “We’ve already seen that the standard componential analysis for Y’s mother as [-MALE, 
PARENT OF Y] is open to the criticism that parent is not a prior and more intelligible term than mother. Nor, 
incidentally, is parent any more translatable than mother or father. On the contrary, it is easy to find languages 
without any such word. In such cases the requisite meaning is expressed, not surprisingly, as ‘mother and father’” 
(Semantic Analysis 62).  
 
16 
 
being biologically dependent on a parent or a person who gives birth, a woman, a human adult 
female. Goddard defines women as: 
a. people of one kind  
b. someone can be someone of this kind after this someone has lived for some time, not for a short time  
c. there are two kinds of peopleʼs bodies, people of this kind have bodies of one of these two kinds  
d. some parts of bodies of this kind are not like parts of bodies of the other kind  
e. the bodies of people of this kind are like this: at some times there can be inside the body of someone of 
this kind a living body of a child [m] 
Goddard, “Semantic primes” 722 
While it is difficult to imagine any person’s thought process while defining meanings of identity 
markers in the way Goddard presents the use of semantic primes, he shows the potential to 
explain the lexicon differently. With Wierzbicka they “argue that the meaning of men 
incorporates ‘women’ as a semantic molecule. Subsequently, all three of these basic social 
categories, i.e. ‘men’, ‘women’ and ‘children’, are needed in the explications of numerous other 
words; for example, in the domain of kinship” (Goddard, “Semantic primes” 722). Such 
understanding is relevant to show that “in the old structuralist canon ‘men’ and ‘women’ were 
analysed as [+MALE, +ADULT] and [–MALE, +ADULT], respectively. This depicted these 
two words as symmetrical in semantic structure and made no reference to ‘children’ whatever” 
(ibid.). Such componential analysis is not how people tend to describe their understanding of 
word meaning. It would be hard to argue that a woman is primarily understood as not male, to 
be presented simply as the term’s negative opposite. Rather, it is defined in more informative 
terms, such as being a female and perhaps the inclusion of the possibility to have a child.  
2.2.6 CONCEPTUAL THEORIES OF MEANING 
Lastly, conceptual theories, unlike the ones listed above, posit that meanings of lexical items 
are to be found within the minds of individuals where they exist as concepts or structured ideas 
(Goddard, Semantic Analysis 7). They are based on cognitive abstractions and generalisations 
which form the salient features of notions and objects. It should be noted, however, that there 
is no empirical proof to support the existence of concepts as they are unobservable. Among 
conceptual theories, two different views are in opposition, namely the ‘empiricist’ and the 
‘rationalist.’ Within the scope of the empiricist view, complex concepts are believed to develop 
through time as the individual builds on simple ideas acquired through sensory experience 
ubiquitous among humans (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 8). Alternatively, the rationalist view 
holds that the formation of concepts does not depend merely on sensory experience but that 
“the very simplest concepts are a natural or innate property of the human mind, activated by 
experience but not wholly and solely derived from it” (ibid.). In sum, concept formation is 
understood to be a result of an “innate predisposition” (ibid.).  
Psycholexicology concerns the linguistic workings of individuals’ minds, and studies the 
meanings of lexical items within a psychological framework. It approaches meanings of words 
as concepts, and therefore contributes to conceptual theories of meaning. This is where 
psychology and linguistics intersect. Miller and Johnson-Laird write about it extensively in 
Language and Perception. They observe that perception precedes linguistic competence and 
that “people rely on perception as one way to attach meaning to their linguistic symbols” (2). 
So, perception being only one way of comprehending a lexical item means that there are other 
ways which contribute to the formation of complex meanings within the mind. Naturally, these 
other ways have to do with the formation of concepts once linguistic skills are acquired, and 
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which serve as a vehicle to arrive at bigger or more complex concepts. Miller and Johnson-
Laird point out that “[i]n order to recognize the denotation of a label, one must also know what 
objects and events bearing that label can be used for or what they are expected to do” (267). In 
simpler terms, the meaning of a lexical item is grasped once we know what to predict about 
people, animals, objects, emotions, ideas, etc. that the particular expression names.   
In The Big Book of Concepts, Murphy writes about the classical view of concepts which argues 
that meanings of words and category membership are adequately expressible by definitions (11-
15). The classical view holds that “concepts are mentally represented as definitions,” and 
definitions provide necessary and jointly sufficient characteristics that place the concepts within 
particular categories (ibid.). Necessary conditions must be present for an identity marker to 
apply to an individual but do not guarantee that the marker will apply to the individual, whereas 
the presence of sufficient conditions allows the application of an identity marker to the 
individual. For example, for a person to be identified as a woman, she must first be a human, 
and a female, and an adult — these are the necessary conditions. They do not guarantee that 
this person is a woman if they are considered separately. If this person is a human and a female, 
but not yet an adult, she is not considered a woman. All the necessary conditions must be met 
at the same time, therefore becoming sufficient conditions, in order for woman to apply to this 
person. When sufficient conditions are met, the proper attribution of identity markers is 
guaranteed. For a person to be identified as a father, this person must be male —it is a necessary 
condition which does not guarantee that the person is or will be a father, but must still be 
present. The sufficient condition to be considered a father is to be a human adult male who has 
offspring.  
The theories of necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e. decompositional theories) have been 
contested numerous times (Murphy 17). Wittgenstein, for example, argues that the concept of 
game applies to multiple types of games, which share similarities, but the term itself is so widely 
applicable that it cannot be adequately defined by necessary and sufficient conditions 
(Jackendoff 118-119). In other words, the meaning of game “cannot be captured in a specifiable 
set of common features” (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 13). Katz defends the necessary and 
sufficient conditions approach to definition by asserting that “there are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for words like ‘brother’ (‘male sibling’) and ‘highball’ (‘drink of diluted spirits 
served with ice in a tall glass’),” and that Wittgenstein’s claim that the meaning of game cannot 
be appropriately defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions does not disprove his 
theory (Jackendoff 120). Jackendoff states that the solution, however, is not to be found in 
“nondecompositional theory, formulated in terms of prototypes, associative networks, or 
meaning postulates” (109). In summary, it seems reasonable to expect that for some lexical 
items definitions of meaning are as simple as finding necessary and sufficient conditions, and 
for others, perhaps more complex ones, especially some nouns,6 this theory does not suffice. 
For example, Goddard argues that the concept cat is semantically very complex because of how 
ever-present and relevant cats are in anglophone societies. These societies are not very involved 
with the lives of tigers however, and consequently the concept of tiger is semantically less 
complex (Semantic Analysis 246). For cats, the explication is much longer, specific, and 
detailed (in terms of category, habitat, size, appearance, behaviour, relation with people), in 
sum, a lot more extended than that for tigers, because of the sheer observation and experience. 
All this considered, what certainly seems to be a well-defended position is that “word meanings 
must be treated as internalized mental representations” (Jackendoff 109). 
 
 
6 See Jackendoff 119 
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Jackendoff’s summation of conditions that need to be met in order to appropriately define 
meanings of words involves ‘necessary,’ ‘centrality,’ and ‘typicality' conditions. “Words can 
differ widely in which kinds of conditions are most prominent. Kinship terms, for example, are 
among the purest cases involving necessary conditions [as seen earlier with the brother 
example]; in color names, centrality conditions play the most crucial role” (121). Jackendoff 
also discusses the fact that the introduction of necessary and sufficient conditions leads to a list 
of conditions which define whether the lexical item is or is not a definite member of a category. 
This implies that there is such a thing as belonging certainly into a category or not belonging. 
“If some object meets all the conditions, it is judged an instance of the category; if it fails to 
meet one or more, it is judged a non-member, and that’s that” (Jackendoff 115). The classical 
view of concepts does not allow for objects to fall into multiple categories, and does not 
distinguish between better or worse examples of category members (Murphy 15). “In a real 
sense, the definition is the concept according to the classical view” (ibid.). However, concepts 
are often not easily defined as they tend to be comprised of a multitude of intersecting aspects 
and their category membership is consequently not easily determined or decided upon (Murphy 
15-20).   
Murphy understands a concept as “a nonlinguistic psychological representation of a class of 
entities in the world. This is your knowledge of what kinds of things there are in the world, and 
what properties they have” (385). Concepts as mental representations are related to our 
knowledge, including past experience, and they influence how we understand and respond 
effectively to situations in the present, and these experiences in turn shape and reshape our 
concepts. The following example by Murphy demonstrates how our experience interacts with 
the concepts of identity markers we possess:  
For example, if we meet a new, highly talkative person and begin to suspect that he or she is a bore or 
instead a sociopath, our behaviors toward the person will differ accordingly. If told by someone else that 
the person is a lawyer or instead a priest, our behaviors will again differ. We rely on such categories to 
direct our behavior, sometimes despite more reliable information directly observed about the person. (2) 
(emphasis added) 
Identity markers represent categories because the identification of people means that 
simultaneously categorisation is taking place, whether consciously or subconsciously. 
Sometimes the observable situation is insufficient or misleading for a correct or intended 
application of identity markers. Therefore, our concepts have to be flexible enough to entertain 
mending and nuanced ways of attribution, which result from verbal communication and the 
introduction of other concepts that influence the already existing ones.  
Each individual’s mental images and concepts differ from everyone else’s, and might not even 
be imagined as a concrete image but only as an awareness of some salient features attributed to 
the known identity markers. We cannot see into each other’s minds. However, we do tend to 
conceptualise of identity markers based on experience, which is often shared in a common 
cultural milieu. Our experience of the physical world and identity markers used in discourse 
that are applied during our experience in the physical world connect into meaningful ideas—
concepts. It can be argued that no real person can stand as a referent for a particular identity 
marker (except for personal names). Fittingly, semantic theory makes a relevant distinction 
between referring and non-referring expressions. For example, in the statement Emily is a 
pharmacist, Emily is a referring expression and pharmacist a non-referring one as generic 
concepts such as identity markers (with the exclusion of personal names, which are proper 
nouns and usually refer to a specific individual) do not have referents. Personal or proper names 
are not generic concepts because they are devoid of sense, as noted earlier.  
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More popular than the classical conceptual theory of meaning are conceptual ‘prototype’ and 
‘exemplar’ theories (Murphy 40). They do not hold that meanings of words are adequately 
expressible by definitions. According to the prototype theory, “people rely on summary 
representations of the entire category rather than specific exemplars in making judgments about 
the concept” (Murphy 65). A prototype, therefore, stands as the best representative of its 
category within the mind of an individual. The exemplar view argues that people do not 
conceptualise of objects and notions in their entirety. Rather, they rely on memories and 
experience with the use of the lexical item, or as Murphy phrases it, “a person’s concept of dogs 
is the set of dogs that the person remembers. In some sense, there is no real concept (as normally 
conceived of), because there is no summary representation that stands for all dogs” (49). These 
sets are referred to as exemplars. The process of recollection and categorisation is believed to 
be subconscious because “one typically does not have conscious experience of a definition or a 
list of features, either. Access to the concept representation is often very fast and automatic” 
(Murphy 50). Murphy also presents a view of concepts as playing an integral part in people’s 
general world knowledge. The proposition is such that knowledge of concepts is not gained 
separately from knowledge of other aspects of life. Therefore, concepts get composed from and 
influenced by a variety of knowledge streams and in turn new concepts influence our previous 
knowledge (Murphy 60). Theories of concepts which employ either the prototypical, exemplar, 
or knowledge approach all “predict that categories will have gradations of typicality and that 
there will be borderline cases” (Murphy 64). This prediction is unlike the one postulated by the 
classical theory which does not seem to acknowledge degrees of typicality because it is 
concerned only with whether an item is or is not a category member. Non-classical theories also 
“claim category fuzziness as an integral part of conceptual processing, rather than an unhappy 
influence of something that is not the ‘true’ concept” (ibid.). Just because a concept category is 
fuzzy, it does not mean that the members which are deemed to cause its fuzziness are not 
category members.  
For Murphy, lexical items derive their meanings from concepts, and the correlation between 
concept and lexical item is not one-to-one, i.e. one single concept need not necessarily 
correspond to only one word, as a single word can name various concepts, and in turn multiple 
words can relate to only one concept, whereas some concepts are not even named (389). In the 
process of socialization people learn which concepts and words to connect (Murphy 392). Word 
meaning can be learned by first having a concept and then learning the expression that applies 
to it, or by particular lexical items influencing the formation of a new concept (Murphy 399-
400). Murphy aptly concludes that the alterations in our concepts interact with alterations in our 
vocabulary (400).  
We learn words and their meanings by pointing, i.e. referring, and by verbally defining them. 
The meanings of some identity markers, such as doctor, can be learnt from context, while 
others, nephew, for example, can only be learnt through verbal definition. Whereas concepts 
still develop even in the absence of verbal definitions, the introduction of lexical items 
influences the formation of concepts, perhaps solidifies them, and the more varied vocabulary 
a person possesses, the more distinct concepts they can name and distinguish (Goddard, 
Semantic Analysis 253).   
When it comes to identity markers, the vast variance in conditions that would have to be met in 
order to neatly delimit categories and fit individuals within them speaks against the sufficiency 
of necessary and sufficient conditions. They might suffice for some, perhaps even most, 
markers, but not all. As a partial solution Searle introduced ‘criterial attributes’ and a large 
enough number of them may suffice for the lexical item to be delegated as a member of a 
category (Jackendoff 116). By extension, the person who satisfies the criterial attributes can be 
considered a category member and attributed the respective marker. What might be the criterial 
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attributes for a person to qualify as clinically obese? The problem remains as to who gets to 
decide what these attributes are and how many of them must be present in order for certain 
categorisation to take place. Here, prototypicality and fuzziness of categories could be 
introduced as another solution. Identity markers are thereby not applied to individuals according 
to sets of definite criteria but are rather the result of people’s judgements whether another 
individual should be identified by a particular lexical item based on subjective ideas about 
prototypical features (cf. Jackendoff 116). In other words, people may be seen as either better 
(more typical or typical) or worse (less typical or atypical) examples of the category to which 
they ‘belong’ and to which some identity marker might apply.  
Subjective judgements certainly contribute to a large portion of identity marker attribution. 
Sometimes, there is little room for objective authority on necessary and sufficient conditions 
unless the markers are defined within, for example, legal frameworks where conditions or 
typicality recognition is more rigorous than in everyday judgements. However, even if an 
individual is less typical an example of the identity marker from the one typically imagined or 
expected, presenting a fuzzy component of her category, she is nonetheless identifiable by the 
marker regardless of her own and other individuals’ subjective judgements (cf. Jackendoff 116). 
Jackendoff states that “fuzziness is an inescapable characteristic of the concepts that language 
expresses” (Jackendoff 117; cf. Murphy 21; cf. Goddard, Semantic Analysis 747).  
What if instead of ‘fuzzy,’ ‘typical,’ and ‘prototypical’ members of category, the concept of 
‘normality’ were utilised? The concept of ‘normality’ within category does not hold water in 
the sense that the application of markers could include considering the typical representatives 
of a category as normal and the not typical ones as not normal. This process again would depend 
on subjective judgements of normality (Jackendoff 117-118). Therefore, Jackendoff concludes 
that “[t]hose who reject the use of normality in definitions must adopt the tactic that only 
exceptionless conditions can be part of a word’s meaning; if we haven’t yet found the necessary 
conditions, we just have to look harder” (118). In other words, should we decide against 
employing the notions of normal and not normal category representatives, it follows that the 
definitions of words we accept are those which hold for all representatives of the category at all 
times under all conditions. So necessary and sufficient conditions would in this way facilitate 
an objective characteristics list. Thus, we have circled back to Wittgenstein’s proposition about 
the meaning of game not being possible to define in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, as the term has too many applications for which even minimal universal objective 
characteristics could be stated. This realisation resulted in Wittgenstein introducing the term 
‘family resemblance’ instead of ‘meaning,’ but it has not developed further as a means of 
analysis (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 14; Jackendoff 118-119). It stands to reason that the 
necessary and sufficient conditions as well as prototype and exemplar approaches to meaning 
must be relevant depending on the name and category in question.   
To conclude the chapter on understanding meanings of lexical items, three points, severely 
narrowed down from considerations of semantic theory, are as follows:  
1) we are hardly likely to come up with a system of meaning description that could be applied 
universally due to translational difficulty alone, 
 
7 Goddard notes that it is questionable whether the fuzzy sets can be taken as representing linguistic knowledge 
(Semantic Analysis 74).  
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2) semantic primitives, i.e. lexical items that cannot be reduced further, are to be expected as a 
collection of terms used in the analysis of meaning (cf. Miller and Johnson-Laird 705; cf. 
Jackendoff 112-1138),  
3) it is commonly accepted that meanings of most words are a subjective matter and 
consequently not able to be comprehensively defined “in terms of a list of cut-and-dried 
objective features” (Goddard, Semantic Analysis 13).  
Related to the final point is the fact that senses of identity markers may result from aspects of 
the markers being put into opposition or compared to some other already existing and 
established ones. Identification takes place not only through recognising what someone is like, 
and what their salient features are according to relevance in a given context, but also through 
recognising how they differ from someone or something else. In other words, identity markers 
contain senses which are arrived at as a matter of course, of simple recognition, as well as those 
that come about when aspects of people’s identities are contrasted with the ostensibly opposite 
senses. An example of this being the definition of woman as an opposite of man, where male in 
man is considered the neutral or primary marker and female is represented as negative male, as 
a secondary marker, a derivation defined in terms of negation. Man can likewise be defined as 
not female. This applies not only to identity markers for individuals but also for groups of 
people, abstract entities such as political or religious organisations, etc. 
When considering abstract entities such as large organisations, for example, the European 
Union, there exists no physical reference that can be pointed to as being representative of the 
EU. The Union cannot speak for itself, therefore it is anthropomorphised. Crumly Deventer and 
Thomas show how politicians and people who live in the EU have tried to articulate their 
relation to this abstract notion. This is a case in point how the human need to verbalise identities 
obviously extends beyond just physical human beings. How to identify the European Union?  
Interestingly enough, the EU itself has struggled to define its identity, arguing on the one hand that it “is 
a family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity” but 
then adding that “It is not a State intended to replace existing States, nor is it just an organization for 
international cooperation.” We thus find two (at the very least) constructs operating side by side – the one 
that is inclusive, underscoring elements of belonging, juxtaposed with the second that stresses what it is 
not. (Crumly Deventer and Thomas 336) 
People who are representatives of the EU have had difficulty to define it, and therefore defining 
aspects of themselves. The Union is on the one hand defined as what it is — “a family of 
democratic European countries” — and what it is not — “a State intended to replace existing 
states,” nor “just an organization for international cooperation.” Since definitions are relational, 
i.e. they derive from relating one phenomenon to another, defining one thing in terms of it not 
being something else is one such process. For example, the green colour can be defined as a 
colour that is not yellow, red, blue, etc. While this definition does not describe the green colour, 
it relates the notion to others in the same field, and enables us to learn through exclusion 
something about it. The same thought process applies to defining a European. Crumly Deventer 
and Thomas argue that two ways of identification, namely the inclusionary (what it is) and 
exclusionary (what it is not), are applicable to the term: 
[T]he first establishes European identity in inclusionary terms as the result of constitutive formations 
structured around existing demographic, historical, and cultural modalities, whereas the second functions 
through recourse to exclusionary constructs in which identity is simply expressed in negative and 
 
8 In Jackendoff’s analysis the “finite set of semantic/conceptual primitives” provides the satisfaction conditions, 
which are collectively finite sufficient and necessary conditions which define the meaning of the word and 
determine its reference (112-113).  
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dissociative registers – being European means not being African, Latin American, Asian, and so on. (336–
337) 
Similar to how female could be understood as a negative opposite of male, so can the EU be 
defined by markers expressing a negation of other markers, i.e. what it is not (there exist 
organisations solely with the aim of international cooperation but the EU is not one such 
organisation). Identity markers which are not conceptualised as being in opposition to another 
single marker can still be defined in terms of exclusion, but this way of going about defining 
what a name is in terms of what it lacks says nothing about what it contains and is therefore 
unproductive. At the very least it is not as informative as providing information about what it 
is. For example, marker accountant does not stand in a logical opposition to any other marker, 
and an accountant in a firm can be defined as not CEO, or not sales representative, etc., but 
this information says nothing about what is typical of accountants. Defining meaning of names 
in this way is everything but satisfactory. Even when female is defined as not male, knowing 
what is contained in the meaning of male does not inform about what is not male, except by 
noting that some aspects of what defines male are absent in beings defined as not male.  
 
2.3. Categorisation 
 
Categorisation is a mental process which continually enables us to organise our thoughts and 
express them with precision. As already established, the images we see in the mind with regards 
to identity markers differ among humans, so the categories or classes of those images differ as 
well. How individuals relate words to ideas or images, i.e. what their criteria for associating 
certain lexical units and mental images are, depends solely on them. Lakoff states that “[m]ost 
categorization is automatic and unconscious, and if we become aware of it at all, it is only in 
problematic cases” (6). Identities as abstract concepts represent one such problematic case. 
Regarding the importance of categorising in everyday life, Lakoff goes on to say that: 
In moving about the world, we automatically categorize people, animals, and physical objects, both 
natural and man-made. This sometimes leads to the impression that we just categorize things as they are, 
that things come in natural kinds, and that our categories of mind naturally fit the kinds of things there 
are in the world. But a large proportion of our categories are not categories of things; they are categories 
of abstract entities. We categorize events, actions, emotions, spatial relationships, and abstract entities 
of an enormous range: governments, illnesses, and entities in both scientific and folk theories, like 
electrons and colds. (6) (emphasis added) 
Lakoff’s observation of automatic categorisation is relevant for identity markers because while 
individuals’ mental representations and categories of identity markers vary, every individual 
who uses language also inevitably categorises people according to existing categories which 
already have a name. Identity markers themselves can be considered categories, because a 
particular collection of ideas can be assembled under a designation of an identity marker, and a 
particular collection of identity markers can then form another, more complex category. For 
example, a Slovene might be defined as a person who is a citizen of Slovenia and who speaks 
Slovene. This is one category. A biologist is a person who studies biological processes. This is 
another category. A teacher is a person who teaches other people a subject in school, for 
example. This is yet another category. My primary school teacher was a Slovene biologist. This 
is another more complex category.  
The process of categorisation is related to the process of concept formation within the mind. 
This is why the notion of prototypes as category representatives is applied in conceptual theory 
as well. Concepts are categories. In Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories 
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Reveal about the Mind, Lakoff argues that humans rely on ‘idealized cognitive models’ (ICMs) 
to organise knowledge. Consequently, categories and prototypes are said to result from this 
process (68). Lakoff demonstrates this idea using the example of bachelor, the ICM of which 
is based on a number of presuppositions:  
bachelor is defined with respect to an ICM in which there is a human society with (typically 
monogamous) marriage, and a typical marriageable age. The idealized model says nothing about the 
existence of priests, “long-term unmarried couplings,” homosexuality, Moslems who are permitted four 
wives and only have three, etc. With respect to this idealized cognitive model, a bachelor is simply an 
unmarried adult man. (70) 
In the idealised cognitive model just presented, the marker bachelor applies to unmarried adult 
men. It is not a model which specifies in more detail the different kinds of unmarried adult men. 
In other words, in the language community in which the term is used as just defined, priests, 
unmarried steady couples, gay men, Muslim men who can marry multiple women, etc. are not 
deemed the usual representatives of the marker bachelor despite being unmarried adult men. 
Whereas theoretically they might all be considered bachelors, a consensus in western society is 
to not consider them in this light and consequently to avoid attributing the name. These minority 
cases are further from the prototype or ICM of the bachelor category than, for example, a 
straight man in his thirties who is looking to settle down but taking his time.  
Using Winograd’s list, which demonstrates the complexity of human thought and meaning 
when attributing markers that appear very straightforward, Pinker provides even more examples 
of bachelor in his book How the Mind Works, and causes the reader to carefully consider her 
understanding of the term: “A bachelor, of course, is simply an adult human male who has never 
been married. But now imagine that a friend asks you to invite some bachelors to her party. 
What would happen if you used the definition to decide which of the following people to 
invite?” (13) 
Here the reader is expected to think about her own idea of who qualifies as a bachelor, so she 
must inevitably first consider who a prototypical bachelor is, and then who is not prototypical 
but might still be attributed the marker.  
Arthur has been living happily with Alice for the last five years. They have a two-year-old daughter and 
have never officially married. 
Bruce was going to be drafted, so he arranged with his friend Barbara to have a justice of the peace marry 
them so he would be exempt. They have never lived together. He dates a number of women, and plans to 
have the marriage annulled as soon as he finds someone he wants to marry.  
Charlie is 17 years old. He lives at home with his parents and is in high school.  
David is 17 years old. He left home at 13, started a small business, and is now a successful young 
entrepreneur leading a playboy’s lifestyle in his penthouse apartment.  
Eli and Edgar are homosexual lovers who have been living together for many years.  
Faisal is allowed by the law of his native Abu Dhabi to have three wives. He currently has two and is 
interested in meeting another potential fiancée.  
Father Gregory is the bishop of the Catholic cathedral at Groton upon Thames.  
Pinker 13 
As Lakoff, Pinker also shows that the definition of bachelor as unmarried human adult male is 
insufficient at accounting for all the various possibilities we may consider from experience. 
Namely, the examples provided tend to give us pause for thought and can be considered fuzzy 
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category members, if considered at all. These examples make it clear that the identity markers 
we choose to use depend on the context and on one’s own perception of the term. We seem to 
automatically apply markers to people and rarely consider them closely. Pinker concludes, 
“Knowing who is a bachelor is just common sense, but there’s nothing common about common 
sense. Somehow it must find its way into a human or robot brain” (13). This common sense, I 
believe, is gained through the interaction of the individual with the collective consciousness. A 
shared cultural experience is what enables claiming common sense. This observation is 
particularly relevant to the problem of teaching artificial intelligence machines to reason like a 
human being. Pinker continues,  
An intelligent being has to deduce the implications of what it knows, but only the relevant implications . 
. . Only when artificial intelligence researchers tried to duplicate common sense in computers, the ultimate 
blank slate, did the conundrum, now called “the frame problem,” come to light. Yet somehow we all solve 
the frame problem whenever we use common sense. (15)  
Pinker himself notes that “the rules of common sense, like the categories of common sense, are 
frustratingly hard to set down” (14). One typical example of this is deciding what the criteria 
are for attributing a particular nationality or bloodline or racial category, especially for people 
from “mixed” families and backgrounds. The frame problem, or rather, categorisation, as 
Lakoff notes, is only “automatic and unconscious” until we encounter problematic cases which 
make it difficult for us to decide how exactly to name them and which criteria to apply as 
arguments for our decisions. The prototype or ICM might not be brought into question, but 
other aspects of the person’s identity influence one another and play a role in what identity 
markers we choose to refer to the person, at least in some cases, as seen with bachelor or Arab 
or woman. Pinker notes that “whenever one tries to program a set of criteria to capture the 
members of a category, the category disintegrates” (12). Often, then, the criteria for the 
application of some markers are not so straightforward in delineating who clearly is a category 
member and who is not. Our common sense depends on the context, and it is not as simple as 
to say that the problem of frames is solved automatically. Sometimes we are faced with doubts 
about what identity markers to pick when referring to a person even when the prototype seems 
to be enough to provide easy categorisation. However, our decisions about attributing identity 
markers are based on prototypes or ICMs and all other information which influences how we 
perceive that prototype.  
Within categories, it is common for some kind of gradation to exist. Categories might be 
considered as inherently gradable or non-gradable. As an unmarried adult male, the marker 
bachelor does not represent a category of gradation because one simply either is or is not an 
unmarried adult male (Lakoff 71). However, Lakoff continues, “[o]ne kind of gradience arises 
from the degree to which the ungraded ICM fits our knowledge (or assumptions) about the 
world” (ibid.). In other words, the ICM, the definition or the sense of the marker might not 
completely overlap with our experience in the world, which results in our perception of the 
marker as having degrees of prototypicality. This is rooted in drawing comparisons between 
various cognitive models, in this case, for example, the one for bachelor and another for pope 
(Lakoff 71). They both denote unmarried male adults, which is their point of overlap, but pope 
is certainly not considered a bachelor, despite the fact that this marker can by definition still 
apply. Popes as a rule do not get married, so to consider them as qualifying as bachelors is 
inappropriate. “One needs the concept of ‘fitting’ one’s ICMs to one’s understanding of a given 
situation and keeping track of the respects in which the fit is imperfect” (Lakoff 71).  
Not all categories of identity markers are considered to have gradations of membership. 
Similarly to the non-graded category bachelor, Lakoff states: “The category U.S. Senator is 
well defined. One either is or is not a senator. On the other hand, categories like rich people or 
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tall men are graded, simply because there are gradations of richness and tallness” (21). To sum 
up, identity markers for functions people perform in society are generally not gradable, whereas 
markers of physical and socio-cultural characteristics are.  
While one cognitive model suffices for the term bachelor, some cognitive models can combine 
to form complex models, where “a number of cognitive models combine to form a complex 
cluster that is psychologically more basic than the models taken individually. We will refer to 
these as cluster models” (Lakoff 74). Mother is such a complex model identity marker. Online 
dictionaries define the term as “a female parent.”9 Biologically, in terms of humankind, it 
applies to a woman who has birthed a child. This definition is so simple and broad that it can 
encompass all the various forms of motherhood without providing specific examples. They are 
learned through experience with contextual use of the term. In identity marker attribution, 
cluster models therefore demonstrate that we tend to think of some identity markers in complex 
ways but simultaneously perceive them as simple, drawing on as much experience as possible 
to derive the appropriate meaning during communication. Lakoff further notes that, 
According to the classical theory, it should be possible to give clear necessary and sufficient conditions 
for mother that will fit all the cases and apply equally to all of them. Such a definition might be something 
like: a woman who has given birth to a child. But as we will see, no such definition will cover the full 
range of cases. (74) 
Necessary and sufficient conditions of the classical conceptual theory provide a dictionary 
definition of mother, but keep its application very broad so as to encompass all possible varieties 
of motherhood. One must know what a female is and what a parent is, which is another complex 
concept in itself, in order to arrive at an idea of what a mother is — a complex cluster concept 
whose variations can only be grasped through contextual learning and learning other specific 
terms that name models of mother within the cluster. Though mother seems simple enough to 
define and everyone understands what it means on a surface level (perhaps what Pinker would 
refer to as easily solvable by common sense), our ideas about it can vary significantly, mostly 
due to variations in experience, as well as to the cultural inclination to relate various forms of 
providing care to the prototypical idea of a mother. Instead of relying on a non-comprehensive 
definition, paradigm and fringe cases are utilised to define the sense or senses of the cluster 
model.  
The paradigm or cognitive models for mother that Lakoff presents are the birth, genetic, 
nurturance, marital, and genealogical ones.  
The concept mother normally involves a complex model in which all of these individual models combine 
to form a cluster model. There have always been divergences from this cluster; stepmothers have been 
around for a long time. But because of the complexities of modern life, the models in the cluster have 
come to diverge more and more. Still, many people feel the pressure to pick one model as being the right 
one, the one that “really” defines what a mother is. But although one might try to argue that only one of 
these characterizes the “real” concept of mother, the linguistic evidence does not bear this out. (Lakoff 
75) 
In other words, the versatility of usage of the mother marker is proof that there does not exist 
one prime example representing the definition of real mother. Lakoff notes that the decision on 
the “real,” the first or primary meaning reflects our innate need to have a primary model to refer 
to. While any of the given models contributes to the representation of a real mother, one model 
is still being sought after to provide the best example, the prototype, the paradigm. “It would 
be bizarre for someone to say: I have four real mothers: the woman who contributed my genes, 
 
9 dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/mother, ldoceonline.com/dictionary/mother, merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/mother 
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the woman who gave birth to me, the woman who raised me, and my father’s current wife” 
(Lakoff 75). Of course, in the case of providing dictionary definitions, the decision on which 
model to pick as primary depends on the lexicographers, so “even among people who construct 
definitions for a living, there is no single, generally accepted cognitive model for such a 
common concept as ‘mother’” (Lakoff 75-76). This is probably why the most neutral way of 
defining the term is as seen in online dictionaries, namely as a female parent. Because this 
definition relies on another complex cognitive model (i.e. parent), it provides common ground 
on which lexicographers can agree.  
Mothers are classed by compound expressions such as “stepmother, surrogate mother, adoptive 
mother, foster mother, biological mother, donor mother, etc.,” and do not represent “kinds of 
ordinary mothers” or “simple subcategories” (Lakoff 76). All of these types are related to but 
different from mother as a central case or the basic category (ibid.). When one simply thinks of 
mother outside of any particular context, she is not likely to consider these subcategories first, 
because they are a step further from the central mother case.  
As prototypes often stem from metonymy, there is another way in which real mothers or mother 
as a central case might be conceived of and defined. Metonymy allows for the category to be 
comprehended by a representative of one of its subcategories. Therefore, the prototype is a 
metonymical “subcategory or member or submodel” which represents the entire category 
(Lakoff 79). In the case of mother, the metonymical prototype is the stereotype of the housewife 
(ibid.). This is because “in our culture, housewife-mothers are taken as better examples of 
mothers than nonhousewife-mothers” (Lakoff 80). Lakoff also notes the connection between 
stereotypes and experience, namely that the housewife stereotype may result from only one 
experiential model of mother, namely the one of nurturance (ibid.). Thus, the nurturing mother 
subcategory or the housewife serves as a metonymical prototype to represent the mother marker 
as a whole, and another subcategory of mother, for example, the working mother is then defined 
in contrast to the housewife (Lakoff 81).  
Goddard also discusses the mother marker. He points out that “without modifiers the usual 
sense of mother is clearly that of birth-giver, and that the expressions the real mother and X’s 
real mother are confined to birth-giver” (Semantic Analysis 63). Admittedly, expressions such 
as (real) mother need not necessarily refer only to motherhood containing the biological aspect. 
They can refer to the nurturing aspect exclusively as well. Goddard however notes a slight 
syntactic and semantic difference in separating the two notions, namely the expression of the 
birth-giving model tends to include a possessive (my real mother), whereas the announcement 
of the nurturing model tends to include the prepositional phrase (a real mother to me) (ibid.). 
Goddard also observes that nuns can be considered mothers by analogy with the nurturing role 
(ibid.). As a secondary meaning, such an interpretation represents an extreme example of a 
fringe case. 
Regarding fringe cases, Lakoff additionally states that, 
not all possible variations on the central case [of mother] exist as categories. There is no category of 
mothers who are legal guardians but who don’t personally supply nurturance, but hire someone else to do 
it. There is no category of transsexuals who gave birth but have since had a sex-change operation. 
Moreover, some of the above categories are products of the twentieth century and simply did not exist 
before. The point is that the central case does not productively generate all these subcategories. Instead, 
the subcategories are defined by convention as variations on the central case. There is no general rule for 
generating kinds of mothers. They are culturally defined and have to be learned. (83–84) 
What is meant by claiming that “there is no category,” is that the language does not have a 
lexical unit to express this notion, i.e. the identity marker to name the category is absent. The 
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examples provided of unnamed mother categories surely exist, but since the words to succinctly 
convey the ideas are lacking, we rely on explaining the notions in detail in a communicative 
situation. As no mother is like any other, categorising is one of the basic features of human 
cognition and therefore identity markers for types of mothers are generated. As Lakoff 
observes, different models of mothers do not stem from one central model, as if there was 
originally only one type of mother and then others developed from it. Instead, different types 
of mothers (i.e. female parents) exist and because of having the component of a female parent 
in common, they represent “variations on the central case.”  
Because criteria for categorisation vary among people, dictionary definitions reflect this when 
it comes to deciding what criteria to consider when writing definitions of entries. Goddard 
makes note of how definitions of word meanings in dictionaries may be flawed due to either 
being circular or obscure, i.e. not provided in simpler terms, or due to being too narrow or too 
broad, by using unnecessary words, the ‘or’ disjunction which can leave the reader baffled, as 
well as by being open-ended and including terms like esp. and etc. (Semantic Analysis 27-31).  
To provide a name by which to identify someone, that someone, or rather an aspect of that 
someone, must be categorised; the salient features that merit the given name must be pointed 
out. Ever since Rosch dealt closely with categorisation in terms of identifying the structure of 
categories, it is perhaps easier to understand why definitions of identity markers are so varied 
and difficult to pin down in dictionaries (cf. Murphy 41-42). Lexicographers will define the 
prototypical member or the idealised cognitive model of a category that stands as its 
representative, but will not take into account the fuzzy category members, a phenomenon 
known as membership gradience, whereby it is acknowledged that some categories do not have 
clear boundaries but contain memberships of varying degrees, which can potentially be 
expressed by another word. This fits the idea of identity as a patchwork comprised of and 
expressed by a multitude of words. All labels used in identification can influence how close to 
the prototypical member of any identity category a person is. Rosch states that to “speak of a 
prototype at all is simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what is really referred to are 
judgments of degree of prototypicality” (qtd. in Lakoff 44). It is individuals who make these 
judgements and apply to others and to themselves the identity markers that fit most closely.  
For example, regardless of how different dictionaries may define the two names, Arab and 
woman, individuals might have a set of their own criteria by which they judge someone to be a 
woman or an Arab. Perhaps they would not consider someone an Arab if that person is not born 
and raised in an Arabic-speaking country and does not speak Arabic as a first language but is 
raised in an Arabic household in Switzerland. Such a person might have difficulty identifying 
themselves with the Arab marker even though its definition is quite straightforward.10 Woman 
is a marker that for some can be applied to transgender people who were born biologically male, 
but this option is not included in the definition nor in the prototype. However, it exists as an 
option, as the fuzzy element of the category which overlaps with other categories, that of man, 
or trans person for example.  
Concrete objects are more easily categorised, defined, imagined, and communicated than 
abstract notions, as our physical experience of the world enables us to recognise objects more 
simply than it is to understand one another’s perception of an emotional or mental experience. 
 
10 Online Cambridge Dictionary defines the noun Arab as “a person from Western Asia or North Africa who 
speaks Arabic as a first language,” and as “a person whose language is Arabic, an important language of the 
Middle East, or who comes from an Arabic-speaking country, esp. in the Middle East” 
(dictionary.cambridge.org).  
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When in doubt about attaching the right meaning to the right word, we most frequently refer to 
dictionaries. However, as already established, dictionaries often cannot account for the high 
semantic complexity of lexical items used to describe aspects of people’s identities nor for their 
correct pragmatic interpretations. Where abstract notions such as identity markers are 
concerned, agreeing on the most fitting description can be a challenging endeavour, precisely 
because agreement between lexicographers must be achieved. For this reason, definitions 
require simplicity.  
In everyday discourse people do not communicate about identities only in the simple and 
straightforward ways in which identity markers tend to be defined in dictionaries, but also as 
they subjectively see fitting and as they individually conceptualise them. A case in point is the 
definition of vegan as provided by the following online dictionaries: 
1. Merriam-Webster:  
a strict vegetarian who consumes no food (such as meat, eggs, or dairy products) that 
comes from animals; also: one who abstains from using animal products (such as 
leather)  
merriam-webster.com 
 
2. Longman:  
someone who does not eat any animal products at all, such as meat, fish, eggs, cheese, 
or milk  
                            ldoceonline.com 
3. Cambridge:  
a person who does not eat or use any animal products, such as meat, fish, eggs, cheese, 
or leather  
dictionary.cambridge.org 
4. Lexico:  
a person who does not eat or use animal products  
           lexico.com 
5. Urban Dictionary:  
– People who refrain from eating any animal products (or anything derived from 
animal products) or using animal products such as leather, silk, or wool. It is a more 
strict form of vegetarianism. People who are vegan are often passionate about their 
veganism.  
– Someone who slaughters and kills fruits, and vegetables.  
– Somebody who abstains from consuming products derived from the exploitation of 
animal life.  
– A word used to describe people totally convinced of their superiority. They are 
generally best avoided in almost all circumstances . . .  
urbandictionary.com 
The reason the online Urban Dictionary contains many definitions of the word is that its 
definitions are not provided by a lexicographical authority, but by anyone who wants to 
contribute. Merriam-Webster defines the marker in terms of another marker, i.e. vegan is a strict 
vegetarian, etc.; Longman omits the non-dietary concerns of vegans which are a relevant 
constituent of the marker; Cambridge as well as Lexico consider the dietary and non-dietary 
aspects of the vegan identity marker; Lexico also keeps to the shortest definition of all. 
Contrasted with the definitions provided by lexicographical authorities are the definitions of 
vegan found in the Urban Dictionary, which are elaborated in more detail in some cases and 
humorous in others. It is for this reason that the latter cannot be considered an authority on 
meaning, but it exemplifies a wider scope of usage of the marker and people’s individual 
understandings of the term. 
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3. Methodology 
 
The second part of this thesis concerns my classification of identity markers from a pragmatic 
viewpoint, namely how they can be classed or categorised according to the four main areas of 
use, and how they are interpreted and manipulated in language through syntax as well as 
ostensive-inferential communication. 
 
The research, analysis and discussion conducted are qualitative in nature with data having been 
gathered across a few years and providing a random sampling. I have collected lexical items 
considered identity markers from newspapers, magazines, fiction and non-fiction books, 
podcasts, television, YouTube videos, by word of mouth, etc. The sample I have chosen is not 
intended to be exhaustive. Most of the markers are meant to provide simple examples, however, 
some others are analysed more closely, depending on my personal interest and the availability 
of resources. Findings of the research and descriptions provided are based on observation 
aiming to be as objective and as broad as possible.  
 
Parallels are drawn with van Leeuwen’s article about the representation of social actors in 
English. Rather than in its entirety, the parts of van Leeuwen’s article which are reviewed are 
mainly concerned with nomination and categorisation (functionalisation and identification) of 
social actors. Due to the fact of categorisation always being subject to personal considerations 
as well as its insufficiency regarding clear-cut delimitations, some overlap is to be expected and 
not perceived as a flaw of the system. This project can only be descriptive in nature and it 
readily acknowledges that the human conceptual structures do not operate within explicit 
boundaries. Some considerations regarding identity marker use and manipulation are expected 
to be absent due to the sheer vastness of the area explored, therefore improvements and 
adaptations are more than welcome.     
 
The interpretations of identity markers in the passages of text I employ in this thesis to represent 
different ways of expressing aspects of people’s identities follow the principles of relevance 
theory, as laid out by Wilson and Sperber,  
Human cognitive processes, we argue, are geared to achieving the greatest possible cognitive effort for 
the smallest possible processing effort. To achieve this, individuals must focus their attention on what 
seems to them to be the most relevant information available. To communicate is to claim an individual’s 
attention: hence to communicate is to imply that the information communicated is relevant. (Sperber and 
Wilson vii) 
It must be noted that sometimes the communicative situation requires increased cognitive effort, 
for example in recognising that an utterance and identity marker are used in irony. The 
implicature of the sentence must always be considered, so the correct interpretation of the 
utterance is possible. “Some implicatures are made so strongly manifest that the hearer can 
scarcely avoid recovering them. Others are made less strongly manifest. It is enough that the 
hearer should pay attention to some of these weaker implicatures for the relevance of the 
intended interpretation to become manifest” (Sperber and Wilson 197).  
In the following examples I consider the markers and passages of text and analyse them with 
the expectation that the text and context have been informative and relevant enough for me to 
aptly comprehend the intended meaning behind the use of a marker. In circumstances when this 
is not possible, I rely on personal experience to appropriately inform my explanations and in 
some instances expand the possible uses and interpretations. Unanalysed lexical items only 
serve as representations of use.  
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In discourse, whether written or spoken, the meaning of lexical items is co-created and 
understood through progression of communication. Consequently, whatever notions about 
aspects of identity one might have with regards to particular identity markers, they are always 
subject to alteration due to variations in context, interlocutors’ intentions, and various 
possibilities of interpretation. In other words, the use and interpretation of identity markers is 
context-dependent.  
A speaker [or writer] who intends an utterance to be interpreted in a particular way must also expect the 
hearer [or reader] to be able to supply a context which allows that interpretation to be recovered. A 
mismatch between the context envisaged by the speaker and the one actually used by the hearer may 
result in a misunderstanding. (Sperber and Wilson 16) 
Communication depends on active participation on the part of the speaker and the hearer. The 
expressions which are chosen depend on particular communicative intentions of discourse 
participants. It is for this reason that Wilson and Sperber’s relevance theory of communication 
serves as a basis for utterance interpretation. It is assumed that the information communicated 
is relevant for the reader or speaker to correctly grasp the intended meaning of the utterance 
and the identity markers within it.   
Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory stems from Grice’s inferential theory according to which 
communication is an intentional-inferential process which requires the active participation of 
the hearer in order to infer what the speaker intends to communicate. The speaker knows how 
to get his intended meaning of the utterance across by keeping in mind what the hearer already 
knows and expects to learn as well as by using physical and verbal contextual information. The 
various methods he uses to guide the hearer towards the correct interpretation are a central part 
of the ostensive-inferential communication. The speaker acts through pointing, i.e. ostension, 
and the hearer can infer from the context and the speaker’s way of communicating which 
interpretation of the utterance and therefore identity markers is the appropriate one. The 
inferential and relevance theories are related because, according to Sperber and Wilson, “an act 
of ostension carries a guarantee of relevance, and . . . this fact – which we will call the principle 
of relevance – makes manifest the intention behind the ostension. We believe that it is this 
principle of relevance that is needed to make the inferential model of communication 
explanatory” (50). Whether the interpretation of the utterance “He’s a bastard” is the one in 
which the man referred to is understood as “a nasty man” or an “illegitimate” child (Sperber 
and Wilson 175), depends on the aforementioned processes. When the relevant information is 
communicated, it should guide the hearer to the correct interpretation.  
As I have not come across a thesis on the topic of this kind, van Leeuwen’s article has been the 
most helpful reference to check my own findings with those of someone else. This thesis does 
not aim to result in special discovery or to confirm or disprove a specific idea. Rather, its aim 
is to provide a collection of various ways in which identity markers are used in everyday 
language and what areas of knowledge their ‘categories’ cover. I expect that at the end the 
reader will have a better understanding of where the expressions we use to describe ourselves 
come from and with what purpose they are used.  
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4. Categorisation of Identity Markers from the Pragmatic 
Viewpoint 
 
This second part of the paper serves to outline the ways in which identity markers are employed 
in everyday communication. What follow are the pragmatic aspects of identity marker use. 
First, there is a short overview of Miller and Johnson-Laird’s observations regarding generic 
person labels as well as van Leeuwen’s categorisation of aspects of representations of social 
actors in discourse. Then, a list of broad categories of identity markers used in everyday spoken 
and written discourse is provided, which distinguishes between markers that denote proper 
names, conditions (physical and non-physical), beliefs, and kin and other inter-personal 
relations. Finally follow some particular ways in which identity markers are created, 
manipulated in discourse, and understood from the viewpoint of pragmatics in order to achieve 
certain communicative aims.  
 
4.1. Identity Markers according to Miller and Johnson-Laird 
 
Miller and Johnson-Laird provide some specific examples of identity markers in Language and 
Perception. They separate them into two groups, namely the individual markers which include 
proper names such as “Martha Washington, Martin Luther King, Xavier Cugat, Millard 
Fillmore,” and generic markers which include common nouns like “person, man, woman, child, 
boy, girl, wife, father, citizen, lawyer, client, owner, friend” (301). The ‘generic person labels’ 
are generic markers because they can apply to any person, depending on whether the person 
possesses the set of characteristics categorised by the name.  
A great variety of English words are available to designate different kinds of persons. Those with some 
reliable perceptual foundations include: person, adult, man, woman, child, youngster, kid, boy, girl, 
baby, infant. Occupational designations are far more numerous but require memorial rather than 
perceptual recognition: doctor, lawyer, miner, farmer, sailor, politician. Occupants of certain social 
roles may be denoted by distinctive terms as long as they hold that role: president, director, chairman, 
colonel, congressman. In sports, team members are designated by the positions they play: fullback, 
shortstop, center, server. There are many relational designations in addition to kin terms: employer, 
employee, assailant, victim, seller, buyer, friend, enemy. Some labels, once applied, can haunt a man 
for years: convict, addict, thief, deserter, traitor, coward. And we have labels for race (Caucasian, 
Oriental, Bushman), religion (Jew, Christian, Catholic, Protestant), place of origin (Swede, Italian, 
Israeli), political party (Tory, Liberal, Communist, royalist), temperament (optimist, crank, 
curmudgeon, saint), ability (fool, genius, expert, novice)—and so the varieties go on and on. (Miller 
and Johnson-Laird 320) (emphasis added) 
To summarise, some “varieties” of markers name characteristics observable by the senses, for 
example, those of gender and maturity, whereas others depend on verbal description and 
memorised concepts, and name jobs, careers, functions, beliefs, behaviour, etc. Sometimes a 
marker names one role in a pair because the pair is in some kind of (an oppositional) 
relationship, for example, seller and buyer, and in other cases markers simply name a set of 
characteristics which at a certain point in time apply to an individual and are not perceived as 
having an opposite. Identity markers derive from our relation to social groups we are born into 
and those we become members of through personal engagement, as well as from physical, 
mental, and behavioural characteristics. Combined, they inform us about biology, kinship, 
personal names, the conditions we find ourselves in, geographic and cultural origin, and social 
standing and class, nationality, ethnicity and race, language, culture, political beliefs, education, 
religion, profession and occupation, gender, sexuality, communities, our opinions on ethical 
32 
 
and moral questions, our abilities and interests, attitudes towards others (whether we think of 
them fondly or negatively), about our bodily conditions, personality characteristics, etc.  
Acknowledging the multitude of various identity marker uses, Miller and Johnson-Laird aptly 
note that, 
[t]he heterogeneity of such person labels defies any attempt to analyze their underlying semantics. More 
accurately, any analysis of these labels would necessarily cut across many semantic domains. The 
heterogeneity becomes most obvious when we recall that almost any verb in English can be used to label 
a person who could serve as its subject: be/being, run/runner, own/owner, fly/flier, range/ranger, 
shave/shaver, listen/listener. Given the productive use of the “-er” morpheme in English, the variety of 
person labels is as great as the variety of agentive verbs. (Miller and Johnson-Laird 320) 
To put the point another way, the multifarious applications of markers concern all aspects of 
human social experience, consequently making near to impossible any kind of neat and formal 
all-encompassing categorisation or analysis. It is for this reason that different theories of 
meaning have been introduced as well as some possible ways of understanding the meanings 
and definitions of identity markers. The productive word formation process of turning verbs 
into nouns with the “-er” morpheme results in a quick and simple expansion of vocabulary for 
naming persons. Of course, it is not the only way identity markers make their way into language.    
 
4.2. Identity Markers According to van Leeuwen 
 
Van Leeuwen’s article “The Representation of Social Actors” discusses different ways people 
are named and presented in discourse in English by “draw[ing] up a sociosemantic inventory” 
of these ways (32). The article deals with critical discourse analysis and is pertinent to this 
thesis because the expression of identities of social actors, i.e. individuals and groups of people, 
happens through discourse, either spoken or written. Some terminology and observations by 
van Leeuwen are commented on below.  
 
To start, some of the relevant categories or aspects of representation of social actors in discourse 
are as follows: ‘genericisation’ and ‘specification,’ where the first aspect represents people as 
classes, and the second as “specific, identifiable individuals” (van Leeuwen 46). Another aspect 
is ‘individualisation,’ realised by singularity, in which they are presented as individuals. This 
is opposite of ‘assimilation,’ realised by plurality (Muslims, Australians), namely when people 
are presented as groups (van Leeuwen 48-49). ‘Indetermination’ anonymises individuals or 
groups, i.e. it leaves them unspecified, and is typically expressed by indefinite pronouns such 
as somebody, someone, etc. (van Leeuwen 51). ‘Determination,’ on the other hand, specifies 
the identity of social actors (ibid.). ‘Differentiation’ is used to explicitly distinguish an 
individual or a group of people from others. ‘Positive and negative appraisal’ is another aspect 
of representation, which refers to people in interpersonal terms. Namely, “social actors are 
appraised when they are referred to in terms which evaluate them, as good or bad, loved or 
hated, admired or pitied. This is realised by the set of nouns and idioms that denote such 
appraisal (and only such appraisal), as, for instance, ‘the darling,’ ‘the bastard,’ ‘the wretch’” 
(van Leeuwen 58). ‘Personalisation’ represents people as humans, “as realised by personal or 
possessive pronouns, proper names or nouns (sometimes adjectives, as, for example, in 
‘maternal care’) whose meaning includes the feature ‘human’” (van Leeuwen 59). 
‘Impersonalisation,’ on the other hand, represents people as non-human, either by ‘abstraction’ 
or ‘objectivation’ (ibid.). The former presents them by abstract nouns, for example, “the way in 
which ‘poor, black, unskilled, Muslim or illegal’ migrants are referred to by means of the term 
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‘problems’,” and the latter by concrete nouns through “metonymical reference”, for example 
referring to Australians as Australia, survey takers as the report or surveys, etc. (59-60) (all 
italics mine). ‘Categorisation’ and ‘nomination’ are also relevant aspects of representation. 
‘Categorisation’ of social actors in discourse is based on “identities and functions they share 
with others,” and for van Leeuwen stands in opposition to ‘nomination’ which expresses social 
actors’ unique identity (52). ‘Nomination,’ expressed by personal names, does not belong 
among the categories naming aspects of people’s social identities. I surmise that this is related 
to the observation that personal names are devoid of sense. Admittedly, many names can be 
argued to be infused with meaning, for example biblical names, where their etymology is 
established and names are given to children with special attention. It is frequently the hope of 
the name-giver that the child embody the characteristics his or her name is believed to carry. 
However, such names cannot be taken to contain a meaning of the kind other social identity 
markers do, which specify aspects of people’s identities that are as a rule observable and 
socially recognised. Whereas other markers form categories based on certain sets of semantic 
criteria, personal names are a single unanalysable category. Van Leeuwen divides ‘nomination’ 
into formal, semi-formal, and informal. Formal nomination includes only surnames and the use 
of honorifics is optional; semi-formal nomination includes an individual’s name as well as 
surname; informal nomination includes only the (first) name (van Leeuwen 53). Nomination 
may include titles such as honorifics, or standard titles and ranks, or denote kinship and personal 
relation terms, for example “Auntie Barbara” (ibid.). Auntie is an example of relational 
identification category. Honorifics and personal names are similar in denoting individuals’ 
unique identities. Besides individualisation, they do not fit into the other categories, i.e. 
representation aspects van Leeuwen puts forward. In this thesis, however, they are considered 
separately, because honorifics are semantically relevant, i.e. they have a sense which personal 
names, as argued earlier, do not.   
Van Leeuwen distinguishes between ‘functionalisation’ and ‘identification’ as two types of 
categorisation. While functionalisation produces markers or names which denote an 
individual’s active role or participation in a social activity, identification produces markers that 
denote passive states, i.e. states of being rather than acting.  
 
Functionalisation as a type of categorisation occurs when social actors are referred to in terms of an 
activity, in terms of something they do, for instance an occupation or role. It is typically realised in one 
of the following ways: first, by a noun, formed from a verb, through suffixes such as -er, -ant, -ent, -ian, 
-ee, e.g. ‘interviewer’, ‘celebrant’, ‘correspondent’, ‘guardian’, ‘payee’; second, by a noun, formed 
from another noun which denotes a place or tool closely associated with an activity . . .  through suffixes 
such as -ist, -eer, e.g. ‘pianist’, ‘mountaineer’; third, by the compounding of nouns denoting places or 
tools closely associated with an activity and highly generalised categorisations such as ‘man’, ‘woman’, 
‘person’, ‘people’ (occasionally functionalisations such as ‘assistant’), as in ‘cameraman’, 
‘chairperson’. (van Leeuwen 54) (emphasis added) 
 
Identity markers derive from ‘functionalisation’ as well as ‘identification.’ “Identification as 
the second type of categorisation occurs when social actors are defined, not in terms of what 
they do, but in terms of what they, more or less permanently, or unavoidably, are” (van Leeuwen 
54). ‘Classification,’ ‘relational identification,’ and ‘physical identification’ represent three 
subtypes of ‘identification’ (ibid.). ‘Classification’ is “historically and culturally variable,” and 
stems from classes or groups of people recognised as socially relevant, including “age, gender, 
provenance, class, wealth, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and so on” (ibid.). 
Through time, what is considered an active role might begin to be interpreted as a state of being, 
not acting, for example sexual orientation, which did not exist as a classification category before 
the nineteenth century (van Leeuwen 55). Language use has shifted from the functionalisation 
of the sodomite marker to the classification of the gay marker (ibid.). ‘Relational identification’ 
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includes markers denoting personal, kin, and work relations among people, for example friend, 
aunt, and colleague (van Leeuwen 56). ‘Physical identification’ includes markers which denote 
people’s physical characteristics. Nouns such as blonde and cripple, adjectives such as bearded 
and tall, and prepositional phrases which postmodify “highly generalised classifications” such 
as gender markers and use the prepositions “with” and “without,” (for example, A little girl with 
a long, fair pigtail and the man with the large moustache, (van Leeuwen 57) all express 
characteristics observable with the senses. 
 
As any neatly rounded off categorisation is near to impossible, van Leeuwen acknowledges that 
sometimes separating between functionalisation and classification (because they both depend 
on historical and cultural context) or classification and physical identification (for example, 
skin colour, or connotations of being blonde or redhead) is not straightforward (55-58). It might 
be interesting to note that scientist and spokesman are markers of functionalisation, however a 
sentence pointing out the institution in which the scientist or spokesman work, for example a 
Warwick University scientist or a Hambro Countrywide Chain spokesman, fits these markers 
into the classification category because the notion of belonging to a group is emphasised (van 
Leeuwen 55). Functionalisation and relational identification also intersect with markers such as 
caregiver (in the case of a parent) and lover (van Leeuwen 57).     
 
4.3. Categorisation of Identity Markers from the Pragmatic Perspective 
 
Keeping in mind Miller and Johnson-Laird’s overview of generic person labels, and van 
Leeuwen’s overview of aspects of representation of social actors, I have developed a 
categorisation of the pragmatic aspects of identity markers for the purpose of this thesis. Some 
terminology from my references has been invaluable in describing certain aspects of identity 
marker use. However, while being similar, the categories I outline further down employ 
different criteria from van Leeuwen’s, as this thesis is not concerned with discourse analysis. 
Whereas what van Leeuwen terms ‘categorisation’ distinguishes among social actors according 
to functionalisation and identification, mainly separating the markers along the lines of active 
and passive social roles, my categorisation draws distinctions between proper names, 
conditions, beliefs, and kin and other inter-personal relations, which resemble somewhat Miller 
and Johnson-Laird’s person designations. The categories denoting conditions, beliefs, and kin 
and other relations do relate to van Leeuwen’s categorisation of identification and 
functionalisation, and additionally include markers from other aspects of representation in van 
Leeuwen’s article. The category of personal names resembles what van Leeuwen terms 
nomination with some slight differences.  
There is overlap among the categories in some cases because, just as noted from van Leeuwen’s 
article, understandings of markers change and no devised categories are completely clear-cut. 
Crudely put, the classification I have developed separates markers according to how an 
individual relates to his or her environment. ‘Proper names’ are in a category of their own 
because they lack sense, i.e. their attribution is arbitrary, but are still considered markers of 
identity. In names of groups and organisations there might be an underlying semantic meaning 
expressing itself through the name intended to be interpreted as pragmatically meaningful, for 
example, in the case of the organisation Doctors Without Borders. The ‘conditions’ category is 
very flexible and the broadest, and contains markers that denote everything from people’s 
mental, emotional, and physical conditions to how they interact with the environment and other 
people in terms of their behaviour and actions. The category of ‘beliefs’ stands on its own 
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because beliefs primarily relate to people’s internal states, and while admittedly they are in 
constant interaction with conditions individuals find themselves in, beliefs still do not 
necessarily affect changes in conditions. It is possible to identify with a particular belief and 
not display it in interaction with others in the environment. The final category includes ‘kin and 
other inter-personal relations’ identity markers. Arguably, markers denoting kin and other inter-
personal relations could fit into the ‘conditions’ category, but the underlying rationalisation for 
them being separate is the social nature of human beings, which seems to me more fundamental 
to social life than the conditions we are marked by. To sum up simply, the first category is about 
an individual’s or a group’s arbitrary name, the second about his interaction with the outer 
world through his actions and his body, the third about his inner world, and the fourth about his 
specific relationships with other humans.  
The following categorisation of identity markers could just as easily be formed in any other 
way according to a different rationalisation. The categories I lay out seem the most practical 
and are of course based on subjective criteria. All markers provided have been chosen at random 
and sourced from books, magazines, podcasts, videos, memory and personal interest. The list 
is not meant to be exhaustive, but to merely provide a sample.  
The setup of the categorisation is as follows:  
1. Identity markers that name proper names 
2. Identity markers that name conditions (subdivided into physical and non-physical) 
3. Identity markers that name beliefs 
4. Identity markers that name kin and other inter-personal relations 
Every category comes with a list of subcategories which are exemplified by respective 
representative markers, with a small number of markers appearing multiple times across 
categories and subcategories due to the fact that categorisation cannot be completely clear-cut. 
Each category contains a short discussion of the way some of its identity markers can be 
understood. In the subchapter that follows, general examples of identity marker use are 
exemplified, including the possibilities of their manipulation and interpretation.  
In accordance with the definition of identity which includes markers’ stability and flexibility in 
time, without defining the precise timespan it takes for an identity marker to be considered 
valid, the identity markers I have chosen to represent cover varying timespans, from those that 
are valid for only a short amount of time to those that can remain indefinitely unchangeable.   
 
4.3.1. IDENTITY MARKERS NAME PROPER NAMES 
 
Proper names include personal first names and surnames, pseudonyms, artistic names, names 
of bands, organisations, clubs, etc. and are capitalised as a rule.  
1. First name and surname: Eric Arthur Blair, Reg (Reginald), William Arthur Philip 
Louis, Jesus, Sophocles  
2. Alternative name/pseudonym/artistic name/nickname: Gloriana, George Orwell, 
Akala, Banksy, Iron and Wine, Muffin 
3. Names of bands, organisations, clubs, etc.: First Aid Kit, Extinction Rebellion, 
Greenpeace, Doctors Without Borders, Arsenal, the European Union 
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It is an individual who is identified with the proper personal name. According to van Leeuwen, 
in discourse the person is therefore specified, determined, personalised, and nominated/named. 
The fact that people can have namesakes does not influence this process. In the third case, the 
markers apply to a number of people within a group. They are placed in this subcategory 
because the individuals within these groups may identify with the name of the group as they 
would with their personal name, for example We’re First Aid Kit and we are here to present 
our newest album. Albeit the name does not pick out a specific individual but a number of them, 
the name itself is devoid of sense just like personal names. At surface level, the names may 
carry a sense or meaning, so to demonstrate, first aid kit certainly means something specific in 
English, namely a kit for first aid. However, pragmatics allows us to understand the use of the 
marker not in its literal meaning, but as a specific name for a group of people who identify with 
it. The markers in this category differ from the generic markers of other categories because in 
this case their attribution is still arbitrary, i.e. the names people use to name themselves are used 
symbolically and based on a personal decision. They can either lack in sense (nonsensical 
words) or have a sense and meaning which pick out objects or abstract notions but do not refer 
to experienced aspects of people’s identities. Generic markers always contain a sense or 
meaning and are typically not used symbolically or artistically, but literally. Metaphors and 
metonymies take exception to this, and are considered specific cases of generic markers; what 
is called impersonalisation according to van Leeuwen. 
An additional reason why names of bands, groups, organisations are considered subcategories 
of identity markers is that they are personified when talked about, for example, the EU has 
declared… and Arsenal has apologised… Such cases are metonymical as the name of the 
organisations stands in place of its members. However, I exclude names of countries from this 
list, even though they are personified in discourse as well, because they are not officially 
recognised organisations. Names denoting citizenship are instead considered markers of 
identity.  
As already mentioned, proper names can be understood not to have a sense. This view was 
supported by J. S. Mill who “concluded that proper names like ‘John Brown’ do not mean 
anything—they are meaningless sounds used to designate particular individuals. According to 
this view, a proper name is simply a logical constant—it is a singular term, without internal 
semantic structure, that designates a unique object” (Miller and Johnson-Laird 303). 
Admittedly, Miller and Johnson-Laird aptly argue that it would be difficult for Mill to point out 
which John Brown someone was referring to if the name lacked in meaning (ibid.).  
Frege and Russell contest the idea that proper names lack sense, and separately argue that the 
sense or meaning of the name is contained within its definite description, i.e. in the description 
of the person to whom the name applies. “For example, one meaning of ‘John Brown’ might be 
‘the American abolitionist hanged at Charlestown’” (Miller and Johnson-Laird 303). Naturally, 
when multiple people carry the same name, there has to exist some way of knowing which 
person the name picks out in a given situation. This is believed to only be possible by defining 
the person in question, which leads to the conclusion that the same name must have as many 
meanings as there are people who carry the name. It is perhaps important to note that whereas 
proper names may have as many senses as there are people who carry the names, other markers 
of identity, which are generic, always have a single specific meaning, or a primary/major one 
and secondary or non-literal meanings. 
Such an understanding differs from relating different meanings to the same marker in the case 
of proper (personal) names. The same name may also have as many meanings as there are 
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people who know others by that name. Miller and Johnson-Laird provide an example of two 
people relating different meanings to the same name and individual who carries it, 
Consider the fact that “John Brown” can be associated with one description for Tom and a totally different 
description for Mary, yet both descriptions can fit the same individual and no barrier to communication 
between Tom and Mary need arise from the fact that (if the meaning of a name is synonymous with the 
definite description that could replace it) “John Brown” means something different for each of them. (304) 
To put the point another way, generic identity markers have set meanings that individuals adjust 
in their minds as ideas, but proper names do not have set meanings because individuals can 
only form ideas in their minds about the meaning of the name once they have met the person in 
question or know some information about it. The conceptions about proper personal names are 
a lot more subjective than those of generic identity markers.  
Searle also acknowledges the utility of understanding proper names as lacking sense, and states 
that the “convenience of proper names in our language lies precisely in the fact that they enable 
us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to an agreement as 
to which descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object” (qtd. in Miller 
and Johnson-Laird 308).  
Proper names indeed do not describe people, but strictly depend on our individual ideas about 
them. In the case of arriving at a meaning for a proper name, the meanings and ideas are much 
more highly individualised than those of generic markers. For this reason, I have argued that 
proper names are devoid of sense. They only have a meaning insofar as the meaning is 
understood to be the fact that they are personal proper names. Miller and Johnson-Laird 
demonstrate how the proper name Anthony Eden does not represent the meaning of Anthony 
Eden, and neither does a set of facts known about him, which might constitute an individual’s 
concept of Eden. An individual called by that name can still be properly identified even when 
there is no definite set of universally known facts about him (Miller and Johnson-Laird 306). A 
proper name does not stand for a set of information we know about the person which it names 
because anybody could be called by the same name. The proper name of the person is indeed 
only one of the facts known about the individual. Specific people might be conceptualised even 
in the absence of a proper name to stick onto our concept of them, for example, “the girl I met 
in Rochester who wouldn’t tell me her name” (Miller and Johnson-Laird 306-307).  
A final point to note is that personal names might be expressed in the form of diminutives, and 
used to show affection, especially when applied to a child or a loved one, for example, Toto 
(for Anthony) or Lizzie (for Elisabeth), etc. 
 
4.3.2. IDENTITY MARKERS NAME CONDITIONS 
 
‘Condition’ in this case is a very open term, spanning from an individual’s temporary to a 
permanent role in a given situation, which can be either voluntary or involuntary. It includes 
markers that express roles one is subject to, the roles and functions one performs on formal and 
informal occasions, job titles, occupation, social rank, one’s knowledge and qualifications, 
interests, abilities, and social behaviour, personality characteristics such as temperament, 
mental and emotional states, financial standing, social class, geographic and 
national/ethnic/cultural origin, etc. The identity markers in this category are generic. Van 
Leeuwen’s categorisation aspect of representation of social actors, namely functionalisation and 
classification almost completely overlap with this category. Markers in this category are as a 
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rule not capitalised with the exceptions of some instances, especially when denoting honorifics, 
titles, and high official functions. 
Conditions are separated into non-physical and physical.  
4.3.2.1. Examples of markers of identity denoting non-physical conditions  
 
Formal roles (including honorifics and hereditary, nobility, standard titles):  
(Kettering) MP, mayor, First Lady, President (of the USA), groom, bride, bridesmaid, best man, 
inmate, prisoner, patient, orphan, doctoral candidate, homeowner, landlord, priest, Father, 
nun, member (of an organisation), (tribe) member, visible minority, ethnic minority, immigrant, 
refugee, alien, expatriate, colonist, settler, whistle-blower Chief, judge, (enrolled) student, 
doctor (Dr), professor (Prof.), wife, mother, father (of four), Captain, Colonel, Coach, Officer, 
Reverend (Rev), Sir, Madam, (Your) Honour, (Your) Majesty, (Your) Highness, (her) 
Excellency, (Your) Eminence, Lady, Mister, Missus, Miss, Ms, Earl (of Sandwich), Duke (of 
Cambridge), Queen (Anne), (the Virgin) Queen, (Good) Queen (Bess) 
It can be argued that markers denoting official roles and other markers with capitalised titles 
should be considered proper names because they are capitalised and pick out specific 
individuals in communicative situations much like personal and artistic names do. They have 
been put into this category, however, because they do not lack in sense and are not attributed 
arbitrarily.  
Markers denoting formal roles express conditions that are in some way formally/officially 
recognised. Markers denoting informal roles, on the other hand, express conditions of being 
that are not related to any formal processes.  
Informal roles:  
pet-sitter, commoner, (uninvited) guest, yeoman, pickpocket, brigand, henchman, mobster, 
newlywed, victim, survivor, professional, lady, unemployed, witness, free rider, neighbour, 
apostate, (environmental) activist, ally, accomplice, earthling, incel, brother, rape sufferer, 
passenger, winner, runner-up, underdog, contributor, tea consumer, advocate of peace, 
follower, leader, addict, someone, anybody, nobody, person, anonymous, millennial, baby 
boomer, dear, beloved, woman, visible minority, ethnic minority, generation X/Y/Z, internet/hip 
hop/Google generation, server, beggar, lover 
Occupation and job title:  
(chief) executive (officer), (senior) manager, mayor, Kettering MP, President of the USA, judge, 
(software) engineer, teacher, doctor, writer, author, artist, influencer, (professional) footballer, 
flutist, usherette, tenant farmer, chief executive, senior manager, prostitute, bellhop, 
bureaucrat, window-cleaner, judge, boiler attendant, academic, politician, janitor, typist, 
rabbi, editor, brick-layer  
Social rank and social class:  
oil sheikh, Brahmin, aristocrat, landed gentry, serf, lower-middle/working class, proletarian, 
petit-bourgeois  
Financial standing:  
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pauper, impoverished, beggar, undeserving poor, (petite) bourgeoisie, the haves and the have 
nots, billionaire, the moneyed class, capitalist 
Knowledge and qualifications:  
layperson, newbie, expert, dilettante, history reader at Oxford, Etonian, intellectual, graduate, 
geek, doctoral candidate, (high school) dropout 
Interests:  
groupie, (Nirvana) fan, cosplayer, (amateur) footballer, flutist, yogini, bibliophile, MMA 
trainee, gamer, health fiend, spiritualist, bookworm, reader, Anglophile, drag queen, financial 
high-flier, bodybuilder, jock, palmist, astrologer, fortune-teller, busker, pickpocket, (wine) 
connoisseur, hipster, hippie, beatnik, metalhead, punk rocker, nepotist, televangelist, 
environmentalist, mobster, hanger-on, punter, dilettante, (environmental) activist, epicure, 
plant-based vegan, sugar daddy, gold digger, anti-Semite 
Abilities and disabilities: 
newbie, expert, footballer, flutist, yogini, MMA trainee, gamer, bodybuilder, psychic, 
anglophone, francophone, wheelchair user, person with a cognitive disability  
Behaviour:  
listener, speaker, brigand, nepotist, mobster, hanger-on, beggar, liar, lady, burka wearer, 
dandy, femme fatale, (environmental) activist, happy-go-lucky, OCD sufferer, jackass, ne’er-
do-well, leader, follower    
Personality traits: 
introvert, extrovert, INTJ, optimist, liar, milquetoast, germophobe, happy-go-lucky, OCD 
sufferer, pushover   
Mental and emotional states:  
person with a mental illness, depressive, lover, aromantic, grey-romantic, neurodivergent, 
schizophrenic, (non-binary) trans person, gender nonconforming, gender variant, woman, 
cisgender, agender, gay, (goldstar) lesbian, asexual, pansexual, genderqueer, amputee 
wannabe, two-spirit, anti-Semite, paedophile, adult, baby, theyby, toddler, child, 9-year-old, 
teenager, elder, octogenarian, septuagenarian, millennial, baby boomer, generation X/Y/Z, 
internet/hip hop/Google generation 
Geographic and national/ethnic/cultural origin (including racial terms) and 
habitation/location:  
burgher, city dweller, Maroon, neighbour, Kikuyu, (indigenous/non-indigenous) Australian, 
Caucasian, Indian, West Indian, Briton, (Irish) Traveller, Geordie, Liverpudlian, Ghanaian, 
Latinx, Cajun, Chicano, East Asian American, Native American, Anishnabe, Lakota, Anglo-
Saxon, (foreign) national, Black British, Anglo-Japanese, Afro-Scottish, Filipino, Métis, Stolen 
generation, settler, immigrant, refugee, alien, expatriate, ethnic minority, indigenous person, 
native (person), citizen, model minority (member), the American Negro, Teuton, person of 
colour, mulattress, browning, biracial, Colored, black, white, non-white, light-/dark-skinned, 
noir, city dweller, villager, peasant  
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4.3.2.2. Examples of markers naming physical conditions, i.e. aspects of identity according to 
biological characteristics and bodily states  
 
Homo sapiens, human (being), male, female, transsexual, brunette, hunchback, leper, visually-
impaired, wheelchair user, person with a congenital neuromuscular disease, hard of hearing, 
deaf, light-/dark-skinned, ginger, able-bodied, plus-size, green-eyed  
Identity markers denoting bodily states may be expressed with the preposition “with.” It is 
followed by the naming of the physical feature that marks the person’s aspect of identity.  
(1) I am not going to marry a man with carroty hair.                       Zangwill, “Transitional” 59  
Alternatively, a man with carroty hair could be referred to as a ginger, and the physical feature 
would be expressed with a negative connotation because of the term commonly being used 
offensively.  
4.3.2.3. Discussion of identity markers naming conditions 
 
Identity markers denoting bodily states include not only visible physical characteristics but also 
various physical limitations or disabilities that cannot be seen, but are only experienced. “The 
concept of disability as a social identity – as opposed to simply an historical group or medical 
designation – has thus emerged as part of the identity politics movement in a post-civil right 
era in the US, western, and the developing world” (Garland-Thomson and Bailey 403). People 
with disabilities are considered as a group with a particular identity, or rather an aspect of 
identity marked as disability, and in order to be protected from discrimination in terms of their 
disabilities, they have been granted legal protection; in the USA this is achieved through the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Garland-Thomson and Bailey state that 
“Antidiscrimination legislation . . . has affected practices of disability identification by making 
it necessary for persons to be legally identified as disabled in order to seek reparations, 
accommodations, or claim discrimination” (410).  
Of course, not everyone with a disability wants to identify with markers produced by the 
identity politics and political correctness movement. One consideration, for example, is the 
identity marker deaf and its relation to identity marker hearing impaired person or person with 
disability, where those “who identify as ‘deaf’ reject the phonocentric representation of 
themselves as hearing impaired . . . They argue that sign language and deaf identity mark 
another culture that is not based in disability” (Garland-Thomson and Bailey 408). This 
assertion again demonstrates the importance of identity markers to people and their implications 
for social and political movements. 
Markers denoting bodily states also sometimes include conceptualisations of race, nationality, 
and ethnicity. The geographic and ethnic origin category includes racial terminology and 
overlaps with the category of bodily states because racial terms do not exclusively relate to 
one’s culture, but tend to include distinguishing physical characteristics as well.  
Conditions denoted by national and ethnic identity markers result from a collective 
consciousness which relies on a myth of a common ancestral land and culture. Some people, 
however, do not subscribe to the idea that their nationality or ethnicity originates in mythical 
stories. Fenton and May observe that “the claims about ancestry and culture may . . . be as much 
a matter of fiction and myth as a matter of fact” (2). The same approach might also be taken 
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with racial categories, because rather than merely pertaining to a set of shared similar physical 
characteristics, they include beliefs about a common ancestry and culture (ibid.).   
‘Race’, despite its widely acknowledged scientific falsity (there are no such things as ‘races’), continues 
to be regarded as an ontological category in the US, primarily because of the ongoing salience of the 
historical relationship between white and African Americans . . . Consequently, ‘races’, like ethnic groups 
and nations, are also seen as culture and descent communities in the US context. (Fenton and May 2) 
Despite race not being recognised by some as a valid social category, it is still generally 
considered relevant and employed in discourse. This is not true only in the US, but throughout 
the anglophone world. The concepts of race, ethnicity and nationality are often difficult to 
distinguish (3). As noted, this is because they are all related to claiming identity on the basis of 
belief in a common ancestry and culture. Because the concept of race does not have support in 
modern science, it does not belong to a subcategory of its own in this thesis. Van Leeuwen 
notes its use in the classification aspect of representation of social actors. Miller and Johnson-
Laird also refer to it as one of the varieties of designations for people, including examples such 
as Oriental, Caucasian, and Bushman (320). The identity markers distinguishing racial 
categories are included in the subcategory with those of geographic, national, and ethnic origin.  
What determines national or ethnic aspects of identity? What does it mean to be British? What 
does it mean to be English? Fenton and May discuss how being English and British might be 
understood. The marker English, for example, has frequently been defined in the past as “white, 
broadly Christian, and whatever was and is meant by ‘Anglo Saxon’ (perhaps it simply meant 
‘not Celtic’)” (Fenton and May 11). Defining one marker in terms of another is the most 
frequent process of naming and definition. In this particular case, skin pigmentation, religion, 
and cultural ancestry are referred to. Based on what has commonly been understood to represent 
the English, Fenton and May observe that, 
the English-British continue to have difficulty in according to members of so-called ‘new’ or ‘visible 
minorities’ – migrants or ethnic minority groups in common parlance – the mantle of ‘co-national’, 
irrespective of whether such migrants may have already gained full citizenship and/or whether, as second- 
or third-generation migrants perhaps, they were actually also born in Britain . . . (11) 
The new minorities and visible minorities markers point to the fact of physical and cultural 
characteristics of individuals having an important role in how people are identified. Alternative 
markers for these minorities can be migrants and ethnic minority groups. What these markers 
have in common is that they are applied to people who look different from the norm, come from 
abroad, live a non-standard lifestyle, or who are, simply put, from another culture. The marker 
co-national is presented as a marker of identity that has to be earned by displaying an 
understanding and acceptance of some important aspects of the “national” culture. Those 
Britons who are English, though difficult to define in detail, have the ostensible right to decide 
whether someone who does not seem typically British English might be considered British 
English. The ability of English Britons to decide on the basis of some visual signs and 
alternative cultural practices who deserves to be considered and attributed the same marker 
speaks to how random the act of attribution of some identity markers can be.  
One common way of understanding identity markers denoting ethnic groups is to think of them 
as minorities within a majority national group. Fenton and May discuss how the meaning of the 
marker ethnic has changed throughout time, 
The association of ethnic group with minority status is not a necessary one. That is to say, it is not bound 
into the original meaning of the term, deriving as it does from a Greek term for ‘people’ or ‘tribe’. But in 
its earliest recorded uses in English it quickly came to acquire a meaning of foreign, alien and non-
Christian as applied within a Christian culture. Indeed, the equivalent term for ethnos in English – ‘ethnic’ 
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– was increasingly used from the mid-fourteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century as a means for 
describing someone as heathen or pagan . . . This etymological association was an obvious precursor to 
the pejorative construction of ethnic groups that we often still see today in relation to modern nation-
states, where the identification of ethnicity as a salient feature of identity tends to remain collocated with 
both ‘minority’ and ‘outsider’ status . . . Thus, in Britain, peoples of Chinese or Indian descent and family 
origin are still regularly termed ‘ethnic minorities’, despite originating from the two overwhelmingly 
largest nations on earth . . . (10) 
The paragraph explains how the marker ethnic in English first used to apply to foreigners and 
non-Christians, reflecting the English Christian cultural background as the norm. Heathen and 
pagan are markers that ethnic used to stand for throughout half a millennium. Even today, the 
attribution of the ethnic identity marker to the Chinese and the Indians who live in Britain, for 
example, reflects their predominantly non-Christian religious and cultural background. This, of 
course, deviates from the Christian worldview which is taken as the religious norm in the 
western cultures. Nowadays, heathen, pagan, and ethnic are no longer considered synonymous.  
It is safe to assume that the concepts of ethnicity, nationality, and race are often considered 
together in discourse. Whether the condition under inspection has to do with a concept denoting 
ethnicity, nationality or race, it will inevitably also include markers naming other two aspects. 
For example, it is difficult to conceive of markers naming particular nationalities without at the 
same time considering markers that relate to information about racial concepts, 
In France, populations from the DOM-TOM co-exist with populations of North African . . . and sub-
Saharan African origin, and one finds as little consensus over such labels as African French, French 
African, Black French, Blacks, Franco-Congolese, Franco-Senegalese, Franco-Cameroonian, etc., as one 
does across the Channel concerning the often interchangeable usage of African British, Black British, 
Nigerian British, Afro-British, etc. (Crumly Deventer and Thomas 339) 
 
All of the latter markers have in common the British component, a geographic and national 
concept. The prefixes and descriptors such as African, Black, Nigerian, and Afro however, 
denote slightly different concepts; namely, geographical, racial, ethnic, and national. There is 
little consensus about these labels because individuals conceptualise them differently. 
Considering the ideological base from which these terms developed, various reasons might be 
given as to why these markers might be synonymous or not. Nigerian, for example, may be 
considered a nationality, but this so-called nation is comprised of a large number of ethnic 
groups which profess different religious beliefs and maintain various cultural practices. Black 
can sometimes be considered only as a marker attributed to a particular set of physical features, 
but most often also implies a specific set of cultural practices, which are at the same time not 
universal in all people who are considered and who consider themselves Black. Likewise, it 
might be considered applicable to anyone who originally comes from the African continent or 
its neighbouring islands, while there are no specific criteria for the time span this claim to origin 
is considered valid. Therefore, the concepts of race and ethnicity as well as nationality are 
implied in one another.  
 
Afro-Europeans as an identity marker refers to people according to the geographic area of the 
world they come from and inhabit. Whereas the terms black and African might be used 
interchangeably in some contexts, they are not always interchangeable. According to Small, 
being Black might not entail African in all cases. The separation between a racial category and 
a geographical one is therefore made apparent.  
In focusing on Afro-Europeans, we are reminded of the existence of numerous other “racialized” groups, 
for as Stephen Small has shown, “if we ask who is Black European, we must also ask, who is Black in 
Europe […] Blackness is not just, or even, about African ancestry. It’s about racialization and the 
ascription of blackness.” (Small qtd in Crumly Deventer and Thomas 338) 
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Not surprisingly, it is mostly dependent on context which identity markers are most aptly 
attributed. The racial condition is especially well-known for its flexibility of definition. As 
history shows, the ascription of whiteness as marking identity has never been a straightforward 
process. Namely,  
How Irish, Jews, Italians, East Europeans, the working class, or for that matter Indians (“Hindu”), Syrians, 
Lebanese (in the US or South Africa), or Indonesians (in the Netherlands) became white has been 
narrowly tailored to the relevant legal and political histories in this place or that. Perhaps understandably 
so, as the histories differ from one site to the next, how the status and privilege associated with “being 
white” are ascribed, “earned,” or denied are very much a matter of where and how. (Goldberg 357) 
 
The understanding and the attribution of the white marker has changed throughout recent 
history. Once again, the fact of political implications in manipulating meanings and 
interpretations of lexical items becomes clear. The “legal and political” histories have produced 
different conceptualisations of the word as well as influenced its relevance in the social lives of 
people.  
   
Akala writes extensively about the invention and development of the white racial identity 
marker and how throughout time it has come to apply to people it did not apply to at the 
beginning. The marker’s pragmatic interpretation is made obvious in the following example: 
“South Africans can be found calling rich black people ‘white man’ and they mean this as a 
compliment, as in ‘now you have money, you are so successful that you are an honorary white 
man’ – the very definition of prosperity, even in an African country” (Akala 50). Below follow 
some of the observations by Akala regarding the historically varying definitions of black and 
white identity markers.  
 
The development of the concept of whiteness and its related racial marker were instrumental in 
the formation of some of the legal framework of 18th century Virginia and other American 
states,  
 
Theodore W. Allen’s meticulous study The Invention of the White Race . . . observes that in the first two 
generations of census data in the Virginia colonies there were no humans defined as white; the people we 
now think of as white were at that point still predominantly defined by other factors, such as the region 
of Europe from which they came. He argues that the ancestors of European Americans started to be 
defined as ‘white’ in response to labour solidarity between African- and European-American 
bondservants, especially after Bacon’s Rebellion of 1696, a multi-racial rebellion against British governor 
William Berkely. European ruling elites began doling out privileges, like the right to bear arms or certain 
privileged positions within the plantation economy, based on skin colour, or rather on ‘whiteness’ such 
as the Virginia slave codes of 1705 that made it illegal to whip a white Christian slave naked or for a 
black person to employ or own a white person. The act also fined white women for having bastard children 
with negroes or mulattoes, made racial intermarriage punishable by imprisonment and made it legal for a 
master to kill his slave. As indentured servitude turned to chattel slavery and slavery came to be reserved 
strictly for people of African heritage, this white privilege became all the more important, as it literally 
became the difference between still being a human being and becoming a piece of property. (Akala 51) 
 
Verbalising the notion of whiteness, therefore, was used to distinguish between people and to 
control inter-personal relationships. The next paragraphs show variances in the arbitrary 
conditions that had to be met in order to avoid being marked as something other than white. 
While ancestry involving a single person classed as black or negro in the United States robbed 
the individual of being attributed the white marker or seen as anything other than negative, this 
was not the case in the Caribbean islands. There, having ancestry marked as black was welcome 
and not presented as negative because the mixed-race category was used to ease tensions 
between those classed as privileged white and enslaved black,   
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In the USA, especially after slavery was ‘abolished’, there was a tendency toward the ‘one drop’ rule, 
which defined a person containing any vestige of ‘black blood’ as a negro and thus subject to Jim Crow 
discrimination. In the Caribbean plantations, there was a greater likelihood of ‘whites’ recognising their 
mixed-race offspring and even using these offspring as a buffer class in the plantation system. (Akala 52) 
 
Developing a definition of whiteness went hand in hand with the development of related 
markers such as mulatto, and coloured. These definitions, as observed earlier, had legal and 
real-life implications,  
 
To understand just how flexible the boundaries of whiteness have been, even in America, we can look at 
the case of just one state. In the early twentieth century, Virginians made the first change in their definition 
of ‘mulatto’ in 125 years. From the Act of 1785 to 1910, a mulatto, or ‘coloured’ person, was someone 
who had a quarter or more negro blood. In 1910, that category expanded to include anyone with one 
sixteenth or more negro blood, and many people previously classified as white became legally coloured. 
Then in 1924, in a statute entitled ‘Preservation of Racial Integrity’, legislators for the first time defined 
‘white’ rather than just ‘mulatto’ or ‘coloured’. The statute, which forbade a white person to marry any 
non-white, defined a ‘white’ as someone who had ‘no trace whatsoever of any blood other than 
Caucasian’ or no more than one sixteenth American-Indian blood. In 1930, the Virginia legislature 
defined ‘coloured’ in a similar, though slightly less restrictive way, as any person ‘in whom there is 
ascertainable any negro blood.’ (Akala 53) (emphasis added) 
 
The identity markers naming racial categories were invented for a specific purpose and were 
found relevant by people in positions of power to further their interests. They represent a rich 
example of neology concerning markers of identity due to the variations in content of their 
definitions and arbitrary applications throughout time and socio-cultural circumstances, 
 
Despite pretending to be permanent, fixed and scientific, racial classifications have always been bent to 
the perceived needs or wills of ruling groups. For example, in colonial Spanish America mixed people 
could buy a certificate of ‘whiteness’ and at a certain point under very specific circumstances in eighteenth 
century Georgia, when the frontier ‘needed protecting’ from Native Americans and the Spanish, even a 
black person could become white. (Akala 53) 
 
Akala concludes, similarly to Goldberg, that “[a]t various points in history, Hindus, Arabs and 
even the Japanese could find themselves defined as honorary whites; racial theory was never as 
precise as we may assume it to have been today, it was always amenable to utility” (54). 
 
While the utility of introducing new identity markers into the vocabulary can always be subject 
to questioning, the variety we are left with enables a communication that is more precise. 
Understanding identity markers not just as specific ideas individuals conceive of, but also in 
terms of expanded vocabulary choice enables information specificity. Modood and May’s 
article on exploring educational achievement in ethnic minority groups alludes to this fact by 
chance, 
. . . the data was still collected for some time using an undifferentiated ‘Asian’ category. When later 
‘‘Asian’’ was unpacked into ‘‘Indian,’’ ‘‘Pakistani,’’ ‘‘Bangladeshi,’’ and so on, it was found that the 
Asian-white parity hid the fact that Indians, especially East African Asians, were achieving better than 
whites, but the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were doing even worse than Caribbeans . . . This 
simultaneously challenged the view that all non-white groups perform worse than whites, and that blacks 
perform worst . . . (309–310). (emphasis added) 
Asian, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, East African Asian, and Caribbean are also termed non-
white groups. Whites refers to British students whose ancestry had ostensibly lived in Britain 
for a number of generations. These markers result from ideas about nationality and ethnicity, 
and their meanings are not necessarily always clear as they sometimes require further 
explanation within a communicative situation, such as, for example, specifying a group of 
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Indian students as East African Asians. Nonetheless, they help communicate thoughts more 
precisely.  
The case of identifying a specific group of Indian students as East Asian Africans is a case of 
determination. According to van Leeuwen, it specifies the identity of social actors (51). 
Determination can go on ad infinitum, denoting infinite possibilities for the creation and usage 
of identity markers. Miyoshi explains it thus:  
Consider, for instance, the minority called Asian American? Shouldn’t that general and abstract entity be 
broken down into Chinese-American, Korean-American, Vietnamese-American, and many other sub-
groups? And among Chinese-Americans, are the mainland Chinese to be considered in the same category 
as the Taiwanese? The Hong-Kong Chinese? Overseas Chinese? Chinese Women? Gays? Lesbians? 
Queers? Where does the logic of difference stop? (137) 
All of the aforementioned markers in the passage demonstrate our ability to categorise 
categories. Miyoshi’s choice to turn from geographical and national identity markers to 
categories of gender and sexuality brings awareness that categories are contained within 
categories, and that we can never completely separate them.  
Because aspects of identity are marked by identity markers, when one speaks of how he 
conceptualises of an aspect of identity, he at the same time attempts to define the identity marker 
that denotes it. Whereas sometimes politics might refuse to acknowledge the existence of a 
particular nationality and grant it an official status, a consensus is that nationality is nonetheless 
a valid category of identification. How nationality identity markers are conceived of varies 
person to person. “As research on patriotism demonstrates, American identity does not mean 
the same thing to all Americans. And it is the meaning of American identity, not its existence, 
that determines its political consequences” (Huddy 130). The more abstract and complex a 
marker is the more variety in its interpretation is allowed.  
Politics does not only affect how identity markers of nationality and ethnicity are used. Its 
influence is far-reaching, and one of the other areas it is importantly intertwined with are 
people’s sexual orientations and gender identifications. In “Imitation and Gender 
Insubordination,” Butler discusses the use of the identity marker lesbian (that she refers to as 
signifier) and its political implications,  
I’m not at ease with “lesbian theories, gay theories,” for as I’ve argued elsewhere, identity categories tend 
to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures 
or as the rallying points for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression. This is not to say that I will 
not appear at political occasions under the sign of lesbian, but that I would like to have it permanently 
unclear what precisely that sign signifies. (Butler 308) 
While the general existence of any word brings with it the expectation that the sense of the word 
should be clearly defined, Butler interestingly disagrees with this idea. In the paragraph, she 
argues for a vagueness of the lesbian marker. If a marker is vague enough to not be specific 
then its benefit is seen in the fact that it makes it harder to negatively affect people who identify 
with it. Butler observes that identity markers can be restrictive and not conducive to desired 
outcomes. Meanings, or rather, senses of identity markers are often difficult to precisely define 
because of their complexity, i.e. interconnectedness with other markers. This fact is something 
people involved in communication are cognisant of, but still tend towards wanting to specify 
their senses. Butler’s proposal is to intentionally not bother with trying to pin down an exact 
definition. She also observes that she cannot equate herself in her totality with an identity 
marker that can only “define” one aspect of her identity,  
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To claim that this is what I am is to suggest a provisional totalization of this “I.” But if the I can so 
determine itself, then that which it excludes in order to make that determination remains constitutive of 
the determination itself. In other words, such a statement presupposes that the “I” exceeds its 
determination, and even produces that very excess in and by the act which seeks to exhaust the semantic 
field of that “I.” In the act which would disclose the true and full content of that “I,” a certain radical 
concealment is thereby produced. For it is always finally unclear what is meant by invoking the lesbian-
signifier, since its signification is always to some degree out of one’s control, but also because its 
specificity can only be demarcated by exclusions that return to disrupt its claim to coherence. What, if 
anything, can lesbians be said to share? And who will decide this question, and in the name of whom? 
(Butler 309) 
Butler explains that the understanding of the identity marker comes from knowing what it is as 
well as what it is not, what its sense includes and everything it excludes. In attempting to 
comprehend what a marker contains, knowing what is absent from it is also informative. 
Basically, Butler claims that a person can never be understood fully, no matter what words are 
used to refer to it, because every attempt at definition, at equalling a person’s identity with 
identity markers, inevitably winds up as only an approximation of the definition. Because the 
meaning of identity markers, in this particular case the lesbian one, is located inside people’s 
heads, every individual will have a specific concept or a number of them peculiar to them. This 
is reflected in the individual decisions we make to attribute words to others and which 
sometimes has nothing to do with how they self-identify. The two final questions address the 
conceptualisation of identity markers as categories based on a set of commonalities, i.e. what 
features should people identifying as lesbians indeed share, and who should have the authority 
to finally define the sense of the marker.  
It is possible to argue that whereas no transparent or full revelation is afforded by “lesbian” and “gay,” 
there remains a political imperative to use these necessary errors or category mistakes, as it were (what 
Gayatri Spivak might call “catachrestic” operations: to use a proper name improperly), to rally and 
represent an oppressed political constituency. Clearly, I am not legislating against the use of the term. My 
question is simply: which use will be legislated, and what play will there be between legislation and use 
such that the instrumental uses of “identity” do not become regulatory imperatives? (Butler 309) 
While Butler notes that markers lesbian and gay do not say anything too specific about 
individuals to whom they apply, she also recognises that the existence of the words and their 
generally understood sense are useful to further political goals of people with marginalised 
aspects of identity. Butler refers to the markers as “category mistakes” in order to point to their 
inability to appropriately represent all the people to whom they might apply. Nonetheless, she 
notes their utility. The legal and political frameworks that employ discussed identity markers 
should be unanimous and rigorous with their definitions because their decisions have real-life 
implications for the people to whom they are attributed and who self-attribute them.  
Identity markers that have typically been used to distinguish between the two typical sexes, 
male and female, have extended to include people whose ideas about themselves do not match 
their biologically determined sex and corresponding gender attribution:  
(2) While gender-neutral or unisex collections would, in an ideal world, serve the queer, trans 
and non-binary communities by providing clothes that go beyond ‘male’ or ‘female’ and 
towards more fluid definitions of gender, retailers have fallen down again and again.  
Wallace, “Wearing Thin” 
Whereas the female and male as biologically determined sexes most commonly correspond with 
the “woman” and “man” gender identity markers respectively, both of which are usually 
ascribed to individuals at birth, the non-binary gender identity marker is usually self-attributed: 
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(3) “I identify as female so I could never speak on behalf of a non-binary person,” she explains, 
“but I just think it’s so important to give people who identify in this way a platform.  
 
Wallace, “Love Letters” 
 
Identity markers may mark a person’s gender and sexual aspect of identity in a single compound 
word. For example, cishet is a compound word denoting one’s being cis-gendered and 
heterosexual:  
 
(4) Chuchoter are adamant about making their gigs safe spaces “even if it means making cishet 
men a little uncomfortable for half an hour,” and are thrilled to be bringing their ethos and 
sound to this year’s Electric Fields Festival.                                                         
Bowles 
Commonly, discourse that includes markers of sexuality and gender will denote a series of 
identity markers following the order: 1-sexual orientation marker, 2-gender marker, because 
adjectives (markers of sexual orientation) premodify the noun (gender marker). Often, the 
racial/ethnic marker is included as well, in which case the racial marker tends to come after the 
sexual orientation one.  
 
(5) While the world of comedy is hostile for women, for men who fall outside the parameters of 
straight white cis male – a model of masculinity stand-up has long embodied – the industry is 
equally as challenging.                                                              
Goh, “Non-toxic Masculinity” 
(6) It was an old straight white man who said it to me as well.   Goh, “Non-toxic Masculinity” 
(7) . . . as historically film has been the reserve of straight, white, middle-class men, they have 
favoured art that speaks to their experience and viewpoint.               
Woodhead in Goh, “Why diversity in film criticism” 
(8) . . . as someone who has grown up with a tonne of privilege, white, male, middle-class, born 
in America, born in this time, all of these things, but . . .  
 
 “Elle Luna” 01:14:16-01:14:25 
 
4.3.3. IDENTITY MARKERS NAME BELIEFS 
 
Beliefs certainly overlap with interests, for example, believing that saving the future of the 
planet and humankind is of the utmost importance results in some people becoming 
environmental activists, which combines beliefs with actions of the individual. Therefore, there 
is inevitable connection between the categories of markers which name beliefs and those that 
name conditions, such as interests, abilities, functions, etc. as our belief systems always interact 
with the conditions in which we find ourselves and with the roles and functions we perform.  
Whether or not a person partakes in social occasions demonstrating his or her belief, due to the 
fact that beliefs are personal internal states, they all fit into the same category. In other terms, 
whether or not you are an active participant in society regarding your philosophical, economic, 
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political, religious, ethical, or other beliefs does not require a separation in categories. 
According to van Leeuwen’s categorisation of aspects of representation of social actors, a 
Trump supporter might be a functionalisation because the marker expresses an active role, i.e. 
a Trump supporter (actively) supports Trump. Markers denoting religious beliefs, on the other 
hand, are placed in the classification category of identification.   
Beliefs can be philosophical, socio-economic and socio-political, religious, and other 
convictions, which in some cases affect multiple aspects of life. They can reflect our upbringing 
and the choices we make with regards to our personal value systems. 
Examples:  
1. Philosophical beliefs:  
humanist, nihilist, Stoic, utilitarian, vegan, pacifist, antinatalist, minimalist 
 
2. Socio-economic and socio-political beliefs:  
postmodern Neo-Marxist, anarcho-syndicalist, feminist, leftist, libertarian, democrat, 
centrist, Conservative, liberal, Liberal Republican, conservative Democrat, Islamist, 
neofascist, Trump supporter, Thatcherite, Eurosceptic, loyalist, anarcho-syndicalist, 
partisan, feminist, Communist, the reds 
 
3. Religious beliefs:  
(practicing) Jew, Gentile, pagan, (Orthodox) Christian, Methodist, Seventh-Day 
Adventist, sinner, saved, believer, untouchable, witch, Islamist, dervish Pythagorean 
Quaker 
 
4. Other beliefs:  
(environmental) activist, hippie, Pan-Africanist, nutrivore, nutritarian, vegetarian, 
freegan, omnivore, carnist, epicure (also Epicurean), hedonist  
Identity markers denoting religious beliefs can simultaneously apply to identity markers 
denoting race, nationality, and ethnicity. This is especially true with people who identify as 
Jewish, as Zangwill observes in his collection Ghetto Tragedies, “‘How much Judaism is there 
in your sisters’ husbands?’  he said. ‘And without the religion, what is the use of the race?’” 
(83)   
Common conceptualisations and interpretations of identity markers functioning as expressions 
of political beliefs are not exempt from changing in time. Different contexts impact people’s 
understanding of the markers differently. Even if the definition of a marker denoting a certain 
set of beliefs has not officially changed, those using the term may interpret it in another way 
but continue to apply the same marker. The following paragraph by a commenter on an article 
from Time shows how the understanding of conservatism has changed and therefore the markers 
Conservative and Republican no longer means what it used to, or rather, the actions and beliefs 
of those who self-attribute the markers today have deviated from the actions and beliefs of those 
who used to attribute said markers in the past,  
Conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic are in crisis because they have forgotten what conservatism is 
about . . . Edmund Burke’s idea of conservatism in the 18th century was a disposition toward slow, organic 
change rather than risk revolutionary upheaval. The Republicans today are progressives who pursue the ideal 
of minimal government with zeal. They support unconservative ideas like foreign military intervention. On 
the other hand, Tory support for gay marriage is not necessarily unconservative, because this view has spread 
among the British public in a slow, organic way and has now reached a critical mass. There seems to be little 
that either party can learn from the other, but they could learn some consistency. (Soans 2) 
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4.3.4. IDENTITY MARKERS NAME KIN AND OTHER INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS 
 
1. Kinship:  
spouse, wife, husband, mother, father, parent, son, daughter, (older) brother, (little) 
sister, child, sibling, cousin, nibling, nephew, niece, uncle, aunt, grandmother, 
grandparent, grandchild, granddaughter, foster parent, father-in-law, sister-in-law, 
ancestor, progeny 
 
2. Non-kin:  
friend, girlfriend, fiancée, guardian, foster parent, foster child, employer, employee, 
master, slave, enemy, neighbour, seller, buyer, co-worker, claimant, defendant 
This category coincides with van Leeuwen’s relational identification aspect of representation 
of social actors in discourse, within which he notes the functions of possessivation, namely 
identity markers may be possessivated by possessive pronouns (her friend), genitive (the child’s 
mother), or the postmodifying prepositional -of phrase (van Leeuwen 56), as seen in the next 
example.   
In discourse, identity markers of kinship may be called upon to stress a particular relationship 
due to its relevance in the wider social context:  
(9) For decades until his April 30 death at 102, Benzion Netanyahu—historian, editor, activist 
and father of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—was the living legacy of this hawkish view 
of Israel’s destiny.                                          
Stengel 13 
 
Regarding inter-personal relations, it should be noted that they refer to at least two people in 
some kind of a social/communicative exchange. Therefore, they generally do not apply to 
occupational roles, for example, builder, journalist, pharmacist, web designer, etc. but do apply 
to occupational roles which note a direct relation between two people, for example, a 
doctor/nurse, patient, seller and buyer. Of course, people always relate to others, and all the 
markers denoting kin and other relations also express conditions or states we occupy. This 
category specifically includes inter-personal relations beside kinship because some markers are 
commonly conceptualised alongside their so-called opposites. Such markers, as mentioned, 
denote particular occupational roles and their counterparts as well as other markers which 
commonly include the relative marker of the person they relate to within the concept or 
definition.   
Miller and Johnson-Laird point to the fact that context, as already established, plays a role in 
the interpretation of kinship identity markers (362). Child does not only mean a specific child 
of specific parents, regardless of biological connection, but also denotes any individual who is 
not older than a teenager. In one instance, its meaning relates to kin relations and parenthood, 
and in another it serves to designate the person’s young age. The marker son is used to denote 
a male child of a parent, but is also used as a form of address functioning as a proper name 
applied to any male child, for example “Come here, son” (Miller and Johnson-Laird 362). 
Similes expressing similarities such as being like a father or a mother to someone compare 
social roles (ibid.). The authors also note that nuclear kin relations include sexed and sexless 
identity markers, for example mother and father in opposition to parent, son and daughter in 
opposition to child, and brother and sister in opposition to sibling (363).   
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I noted earlier that kin and other inter-personal relations could technically belong into the 
‘conditions’ category instead of being separate. They are only separate because human relations 
are deemed more fundamental or relevant to every-day life than other roles we fill and functions 
we perform.  
 
 5. Pragmatic considerations of identity markers 
 
This part of the thesis considers some particular ways identity markers are created and how 
their use is manipulated in order to achieve a certain communicative aim. This includes how 
they can be understood from a pragmatic perspective, i.e. interpreted in utterances.  
 
5.1 Identity markers and causing offence  
 
Some identity markers that function as expressions of condition contain derogatory meanings 
and are attributed with the intention to offend. As a rule, their use aims at targeting emotions, 
i.e. offending an individual or a group of people due to disapproval of their behaviour, state, or 
particular characteristics.  
Examples:  
spastic, spazzer, wook, sponge, redneck, cunt, tart, harlot, slut, bimbo, snowflake, bougie, kike, 
lunatic, sissy, tranny, poofta, goon, pillock, gringo, geriatric, crone, battleaxe, hag, fag hag, 
gossip, white trash, savage, half-breed, rat, thug couch potato, piece of shit, cheating scumbag, 
motherfucker, bumpkin, stupid, welfare cheat, fence sitter 
Often a series of offensive identity markers are used simultaneously, for example:  
(11) . . . you dim black motherf. . .                                                                               Kushner 11  
(12) You’re a butterfingers spook faggot nurse.                                                          Kushner 13                                                                                                                       
What is typical of markers intended to cause offence is to employ inanimate modifiers that 
impersonalise individuals. 
(13) Tomorrow, you two-bit scumsucking shitheel flypaper insignificant dried-out little turd.   
                                                                                                                                    Kushner 14 
Some markers intended to offend and shame, for example bitch, slut, cunt, etc. have undergone 
the process of re-appropriation or reclaiming, whereby they have ceased to be used in a negative 
sense in some contexts. This topic is covered in the section on neology. A common 
characteristic of identity markers used to offend is that they may be employed by people to 
whom the marker may be attributed in an offensive way as a means to reclaim the term for 
themselves in a positive, or at the very least neutral, manner:  
(10) Consider it solidarity. One faggot to another.                                                    Kushner 13  
Commonly, the markers intended to offend are either sexually explicit, target cognitive 
capacities, and point at ethnic/national origins of the person being offended. Offensive identity 
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markers also refer to individual’s abilities and behaviour, appearance, gender expression, sexual 
orientation, religious belief, etc.  
In discourse, even markers not intended to cause offence can do so as the interpretation depends 
on the person on the receiving end of the message. It is not difficult to imagine how a deeply 
devoted follower of Jesus might receive Aslan’s words describing Jesus as a historical figure 
and be personally offended on behalf of Jesus,  
 (14) And so, when I think of Jesus as a man, what I see is not somebody who’s normal or no 
longer extraordinary. On the contrary, what I see is a man, a poor, pious, illiterate, uneducated 
Jewish peasant from the backwoods of Galilee. What we would nowadays refer to as a country 
bumpkin basically . . .                     
 “The Jesus of History” 00:29:43–00:30:09 
Identity markers used to offend may through stereotyping and generalisations be attributed to 
people in their non-literal use, for example, in Britain the insult Paki is often used to refer to 
anyone seeming to come from South Asia, even though it is originally a derogatory term for 
persons of Pakistani origin.  
In Australian slang, the marker Mexican used to mark people living geographically further south 
(especially residents of Victoria) from those who attributed the term with a negative meaning 
in mind. This metaphor reflects the relationship between the USA and Mexico and the 
migrations of Mexicans to the north. In Australia, the meaning of Mexican acquired a negative 
connotation when attributed as an identity marker to people who did come from Mexico.   
The marker retard is now considered an offensive expression because of its negative association 
with markers like idiot, and stupid, and as carrying a negative connotation reserved for people 
with mental disabilities. Garland-Thomson and Bailey note that “[t]he blatant use of this 
offensive term speaks to the invisibility of ableism within popular culture. Disability activists 
have even taken to using the construction ‘the R-word’…” (409). This example hints at the 
effects of political correctness on expressions used in a derogatory way and how they reflect 
the socio-political context in which they are used. It also demonstrates how identity markers 
may be used in a shortened form to communicate about them while ostensibly avoiding offence, 
where only the first letter of the lexical unit is preserved and followed by the suffix –word. 
Rogan and Saad dedicated a part of the “#1218 – Gad Saad” podcast to discussing the use of 
the R-word and its implications,  
(15) We have to say the R-word. I got banned from Twitter for 12 hours because at one point I 
was interacting with some schmuck who I called retarded degenerate schmuck . . . I can’t 
remember the exact combination of insults, and I was banned for using the R-word. So, I mean 
where does this end? How many more words do we have to remove from the lexicon?  
 
“#1218” 00:13:34-00:14:03  
 
Later, Rogan comments, “When you and I were 25, that word was nothing, that word, you 
would get called it by your teacher” (00:25:04-00:25:12). Thereby, Rogan observes how the 
appropriateness of the attribution of the marker has changed, how people no longer interpret 
the term in the same way and as a rule do not use it as they used to. The marker retard has been 
synonymous with mentally retarded, i.e. stupid with the offensive meaning since 1970s. 
According to some, it should not be a censored or forbidden term, because it has since been 
conceptually removed from its origin as applying to people with issues in mental development. 
In other words, it is not used as a developmental classification and not intended to cause offence 
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to people with mental disabilities when attributed to someone in order to offend them. Precisely 
because the term originally applied to people with mental slowness, some argue that due to its 
origin, whenever applied offensively to people without mental disabilities, its use offends those 
with mental disabilities. 
 
Negative appraisal, which refers to markers used to shame and to cause offence, in van 
Leeuwen’s terms also includes derogatory slurs, such as the bastard and the wretch, which are 
modified by the “the” determiner (58). Such markers express the speaker’s attitude towards the 
marked individual as that of pity, hate, or badness (ibid.). 
 
5.2 Identity markers and shaming  
 
A subcategory of identity markers that function as expressions of beliefs is the one denoting 
markers with the intention to shame. Markers intended to cause offence and those intended to 
shame are considered separately because the ones intended to shame express a wider societal 
disapproval of a certain set of beliefs and behaviours, whereas the ones intended to offend aim 
at personal hurt feelings mostly distinct from societal approval or disapproval of the individual 
being caused offence.   
Examples:  
ableist, ageist, racist, sexist, fascist, Nazi, white supremacist, homophobe, transphobe, feminazi 
(16) These racist guys, simpletons, I never had any use for them – too rigid.           Kushner 12  
In some instances, the attribution of identity markers with the intention to shame expresses 
intentional misattribution. This happens when the markers mentioned do not correspond with 
the beliefs and actions of the person to whom they are attributed:   
(17) . . . then we held the event about three months later, but the people who shut us down had 
put out a Facebook page where they said, ‘We don’t want these white supremacist Nazis in 
Toronto.’ This is to a Jewish person who escaped prosecution in Lebanon.                                                     
“#1218” 00:35:51-00:36:08 
Identity markers used with the intention to shame might be applied to people with their literal 
sense expressing extreme fear or phobia while the interpreted meaning is one of extreme dislike 
or hatred: 
(18) . . . you disgusting transphobes . . .                                          “#1218” 00:49:14-00:49:16 
 
5.3 Identity markers and praising  
 
Some identity markers serve to praise individuals and to express the speaker’s positive attitude 
towards them. Positive appraisal, including markers such as the darling, are used to positively 
appraise individuals and express speakers’ attitudes towards them as love, admiration, and a 
general perception of goodness (van Leeuwen 58).  
Examples:  
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superwoman, good person, hero, cream of the crop, dear, love, darling, sweetie, cupcake, 
munchkin, gran, nan, auntie, baby 
Hyperbole is frequently used to exaggerate somebody’s perceived positive qualities as well as 
negative ones, of course.  
(19) Bill is the nicest person there is.                                                     Sperber and Wilson 235 
What the speaker is really saying is “Bill is a very nice person.”  
As mentioned in the section regarding personal names, diminutives may be used to express 
affectionate feelings and therefore describe people in positive terms, for example, Bertie, Katie, 
etc.   
 
5.4 Identity markers and figurative language, i.e. figures of speech 
 
5.4.1. METAPHORS 
 
Metaphors stem from a cognitive association between the source or vehicle concept and the 
target concept, with the source indicating the intended meaning of the given expression. 
Metaphors help to understand one concept in terms of another. The reader or hearer is expected 
to grasp the intended meaning based on his knowledge of the marker’s primary meaning. As 
Lakoff and Johnson observe, “[o]ur ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both 
think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (3). Lakoff and Johnson explain the 
human capacity to understand metaphors due to the fact that our minds operate with conceptual 
systems that are already wired to think in terms of metaphors (6). Hip hop artists may be 
considered poets, people in coma are sometimes referred to as vegetables, etc.  
The following example demonstrates the capacity for metaphorical thinking and its frequent 
use in communication. The richer the context the higher the chances for a correct interpretation.  
(20) Robert is a bulldozer.                                                                      Sperber and Wilson 236 
Without a context which points to the correct way of interpreting the utterance, the possibilities 
of interpretation are numerous. As Sperber and Wilson conclude: “Here there is no single strong 
implicature that automatically comes to mind, but rather a slightly weaker, less determinate 
range having to do with Robert’s persistence, obstinacy, insensitivity and refusal to be 
deflected” (236). The idea we get of Robert is somewhat vague and based on our basic 
knowledge of bulldozers. Therefore, the strength of metaphors can vary and is inevitably related 
to the informativeness context.  
Markers of identity denoting skin colour and racial categories are further discussed in relation 
to polysemy in the section on neology. Nonce words intended to represent identity markers 
create situational polysemous markers which often result from metaphors. Such is the case of 
Smith’s playful literary description of a skin tone,  
(21) And when Sean Paul, who is, in the Jamaican parlance, ‘yellow’, moves in on the hot girl 
at the party, the thing to note is that she is black. Not yellow, not café au lait, black-black.  
Smith, “On Island Life” 317 
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Café au lait as well as black-black are not commonly used as markers denoting racial aspect of 
identity. The first example can be considered a nonce use, and the second shows how repetition 
of the same lexical item serves to stress its literalness.  
Metaphors can be used to name an aspect of identity in terms of another already existing identity 
marker, such as a personal name in the following example. 
(22) Anozie, no one will dispute, is Africa’s first and principal structuralist, a veritable sub-
Saharan Roland Barthes.                                                                         
 Gates 15–16 
Personal names as markers of identity may also serve to highlight other aspects of identity. 
They can sometimes indeed inform the hearer about the individual’s cultural background. It is 
not infrequent for people to attempt guessing cultural origins of others based on solely knowing 
their personal name.  
(23) The four younger girls all bore pagan names — Sylvia, Lily, Daisy, Florence — symbolic 
of the influence upon the family councils of the three elder sisters, grown to years of discretion 
and disgust with their own Leah, Rachael, and Rebecca. Between these two strata of girls — 
Jewish and pagan — . . .                 
 Zangwill, “Transitional” 57-58 
Personal names are not only used to distinguish a person or a group of people from a bigger 
crowd, but they also serve as symbols, as metaphorical characterisations, and as set phrases.  
Names Jane Doe and John Doe are commonly used to denote people whose names and 
identities are unknown. Names that are chosen or given to individuals can express their known 
or aspired to characteristics, for example, biblical names such as Peter, or the name of the Native 
American chief Sitting Bull, etc. Fictional characters might be named with a view to denote 
something typical of them. Names that function as characterisations may refer to people’s 
behaviour, physical characteristics, or circumstances, for example, Stick Insect (a character in 
the Adrian Mole books), Lady Bountiful, King John nicknamed John Lackland and Softsword, 
Richard the Lionheart (Richard Cœur de Lion), Frederick Barbarossa, or Margaret Thatcher 
who was dubbed the Iron Lady, etc.  
The set phrase comprised of personal names every Tom, Dick, and Harry lacks referents and is 
used to express notions about regular people. It can also serve a humorous function. Abani 
demostrates how a Nigerian joke about Tom, Dick and Harry can be understood as being about 
the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa ethnic groups. According to Abani, this “seemingly innocent joke” 
is used as “a way to spread ethnic hatred” (“Chris Abani” 00:06:54-00:07:51). The joke is 
therefore metaphorical, using names from a commonly known set phrase in order to deliver a 
message about real people and their identitites.   
 
Not only names, but also letters may symbolise meanings and represent them metaphorically. 
The letter X used in place of a name is according to van Leeuwen a means of name obscuration. 
Namely, “nomination can be signified while the name is, at the same time, withheld,” as, for 
example, with “Mr X” (van Leeuwen 53). A name may be replaced by letters or numbers (ibid.). 
The X in Malcolm X, for example, can be interpreted as a symbol of something that cannot be 
known, as “an ironic modernist revision of all those imposed and borrowed designations 
spawned by slavery and its aftermath (Gates 17).  
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5.4.1.1. Metaphors – non-human animal identity markers 
 
Frequently, individuals may be identified by markers denoting non-human animals. Our 
experience with animals, their physical characteristics and typical behaviours as well as myths 
surrounding them serve as the base for metaphorically conceptualising of people as animals. 
According to Lakoff and Johnson, conceptualisation is linked to the culture (8-9). The 
prevailing stereotypes about animals in a society will condition what types of metaphoric 
relations are formed with regards to individual people or groups and corresponding stereotypes 
about them. Sometimes we use our experience with animals to conceptualise aspects of people’s 
identities, and attribute to people particular identity markers when they are in some sort of a 
correspondence. This is based on salient features and cultural myths. 
Van Leeuwen does not observe such a case in his article on aspects of representation of social 
actors. However, he does note one aspect as impersonalisation and divides it into abstraction 
and objectivation (van Leeuwen 59). The former presents people as abstractions and the latter 
as a metonymical reference. Humans being identified by animal names would in this case fit 
somewhere in between.     
Groups such as sports teams, gangs, etc., frequently choose names that identify with different 
kinds of animals, for example, the Chicago Bulls, the Baltimore Ravens, the Atlanta Hawks, the 
Thunderbirds, the Cobras, etc. When a metaphor is based on social groups as containers, 
individuals belonging to the group are named by the non-human animal marker, identify with 
it, and this results in the name of the group being considered a marker of identity for the 
individual as well. To Lakoff and Johnson’s example, “Harry is in the Elks” (59), I add the 
possibility of Harry claiming that he is an Elk, meaning that he identifies with the group, and 
Elk takes on relevance as a marker of identity, namely Harry’s marker of identity.  
Markers of identity referring to people as non-human animals are used in astrology (Scorpio, 
Taurus, etc.), finance (bulls, bears), politics (dove, hawk), to express social power (big fish), 
status (alpha male, bird, chick), behaviour (dark horse, dog, bitch), etc.  
Frequently, people are referred to as animals as a means of negative value attribution. For 
example, parasite, cockroach, rat, pack rat, nag, vermin, pig, black sheep, etc., to express 
dislike, disgust, and fear. These markers are attributed with the intention to offend.  
Literature allows for an in-depth exploration of identity markers as it may combine real life 
usage with imagined stories to display certain kinds of societal dynamics. Identity markers 
using non-human animals to refer to people are modified in the same way as other identity 
markers.   
(24) The choice of a white Creole to epitomise the condition of an individual – a country – 
living in a post-colonial situation is a very interesting one . . . Antoinette, and her mother before 
her, is an outsider in a double way. She is a “white nigger” for the whites and a “white 
cockroach” for the blacks.  
Riem Natale 126 
 
People may be referred to as non-human animals in an endearing way as well, for example 
bunny, dove and pet. The marker pet is primarily applied to house animals, but may also be 
attributed to people. The term pet does not denote a kind of animal but rather its role among 
humans. Nonetheless, it is a name reserved for animals and may be attributed to humans in a 
metaphorical sense.  
(25) And that’s your pet Schnapsie!                                                   Zangwill, “Transitional” 77 
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The marker refers to Florence, the daughter of one of the characters in Zangwill’s story. 
Metaphorically, the term means that one takes care of the person as they would a house animal.   
 
5.4.2. SIMILES 
 
Identity markers are used to express similes between the social roles we occupy.  
(26) She was like a mother to me.                                               Goddard, Semantic Analysis 63  
Goddard observes that such a simile expresses the notion of mother as caregiver or nurturer 
(Semantic Analysis 63). Similes utilising identity markers point out common aspects between a 
set of characteristics a marker denotes and the behaviour of an individual, i.e. the person’s role 
on a given occasion, when the marker itself cannot be attributed    
(27) . . . I almost feel like I’m caring for you like a mother, is that weird? . . . And not like a dad 
but like a mother. Yeah. Like a nurturing maternal instinct for me, I feel when I see you, I mean 
not even see you, when I think, god I feel like my mom, . . .  
 
“Feeling Desired” 00:06:29-00:07:00 
 
Expressions such as “sort of” and “kind of” also denote likeness.  
(28) Oh, haven’t you ever heard of the Pope, mother? . . . He’s a sort of Chief Rabbi of the 
Roman Catholics. He wears a tiara. Kings and emperors used to tremble before him.    
            Zangwill, “They That Walk” 32 
 
5.4.3. METONYMY AND SYNECDOCHE 
 
Metonymy replaces the name of a thing, person, or entity with the name of another entity it is 
closely linked to, while remaining within one conceptual domain, so the terms may be used 
interchangeably. Lakoff and Johnson note that “in the case of metonymy there are many parts 
that can stand for the whole. Which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we 
are focusing on” (36). A part can stand for a whole and vice-versa, an organisation can stand 
for a person, etc. Synecdoche is a case of metonymy which uses names of component parts to 
stand for the whole of an object, person, or notion, and uses names of objects, people or notions 
to represent some of their component parts.  
In the following example, a person is represented by genes, its component parts.  
(29) Female individual seeks male individual for loving relationship. And vice versa . . . Some 
genes, seeking their own survival, pursue whatever will most likely result in their replication.    
                                                                                                                Smith, N-W 227 
Objects, or rather, body parts such as faces, heads, eyes, hands, etc. can in varying 
circumstances represent people. For example, all hands on deck is commonly used to refer to 
sailors on a ship. Good heads is another way of saying intelligent people, and a person might 
be referred to according to the name of the newspaper company they work for, such as saying 
that The Times has not yet arrived to the conference instead of Robert Morris, who represents 
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the newspaper (Lakoff and Johnson 36-39). Lakoff and Johnson also point out that, “when a 
waitress says ‘the ham sandwich wants his check,’ she is not interested in the person as a person 
but only as a customer, which is why the use of such a sentence is dehumanizing” (39). Lakoff 
and Johnson note that it is dehumanizing to use impersonalised common nouns (as markers of 
identity) instead of referring to people with personalised markers, which according to van 
Leeuwen denote people as human. Van Leeuwen makes the same observation as Lakoff and 
Johnson. Instead of referring to it as dehumanisation, he refers to it as impersonalisation due to 
the usage of abstract and concrete nouns that do not “include the semantic feature ‘human’” 
(van Leeuwen 59). Therefore, metonymy is also found in cases of referring to the monarch as 
the Crown, to judges in court as the bench, or to a chairperson as the chair, etc.  
A similar observation, namely that dehumanisation has taken place, may be made when 
referring to a person as a doormat. However, the ham sandwich example is a case of metonymy 
because the person referred to as a ham sandwich had ordered a ham sandwich and the two now 
fit into the same conceptual domain, whereas the doormat case is a metaphorical comparison 
because conceptualising of a person in terms of an object they have no literal connection to is 
expressed by a metaphor.  
Identity markers such as personal names can be used to name inanimate objects through 
metonymical reference. Names of objects may be named after their creators, for example 
referring to a painting by Picasso as a Picasso (Lakoff and Johnson 39).  
As seen with The Times example, personal names as identity markers may in some contexts be 
used interchangeably with nouns denoting the specific activity of the person to whom the 
personal name applies. The personal name in that case extends to the action. Metonymy is 
therefore utilised when identity markers such as personal names are also attributed to the project 
or thing the person carrying the personal name is connected to. For example, by asking someone 
Did you watch Rubin yesterday? the question is simultaneously about whether the hearer saw 
the show The Rubin Report, and Rubin as the host of the show. Rubin might, in theory, identify 
with his show to the point of claiming “I am The Rubin Report,” and consequently turn the 
names of the show into another marker of identity, as already observed with organisations, 
clubs, band names, etc.  
Markers that are attributed to people do not only extend to literal activities, but can also extend 
to areas of interest, for example, 
(30) The essays collected in Black Literature and Literary Theory are concerned with the 
question of the formal relation between ‘black’ (African, Caribbean, Afro-American) 
literatures and Western literature.                                                                     
Gates 2-3  
The racial and geographical terminology primarily denoting people has been attributed to 
literary classifications.  
 
5.5. Neology  
 
Neology is the process by which new identity markers come into existence. Neologisms are 
either completely new words or expressions, or new meanings or senses of already existing 
lexical items. When they first appear, they are not (yet) a part of the active vocabulary of native 
speakers, and unless they become established in language through time and used by a 
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considerable portion of speakers, they are not recognised by official dictionaries, but remain 
relegated to colloquial use. We constantly reconceptualise and invent words as our experience 
and perceptions change. For example, Justin Bieber’s fans became known as Beliebers 
relatively quickly and the term has made its way into the online Urban Dictionary, however the 
word is not likely to be defined within an official dictionary.  
The relevance of identity markers changes throughout time as social arrangements develop. 
Some markers may go out of use (for example, markers such as kings, barons, knights, freemen, 
villeins, negros, etc. are no longer in common use) and others may acquire additional and new 
meanings. New lexical units denoting markers of identity are also constantly being invented.  
Polysemy results from cases of past neology that have stayed in language and become 
commonly used in everyday communication with a single lexical unit having a number of 
related meanings. Polysemous items tend to have a common etymology, but not necessarily. 
They can also be distinguished in terms of primary (historically first) and secondary or derived 
meanings, and major (occurring most frequently) and minor meanings.  
Murphy relates polysemy and neology with the conclusion that “the fact of polysemy reveals 
that it is apparently easier for people to take old words and extend them to new meanings than 
to invent new words” (406). Referring to people with the names of non-human animals is an 
example of polysemy where the markers used to refer to people are derived or secondary 
meanings; marker dog is, for example, primarily understood as a type of animal, and 
secondarily as an untrustworthy man, a worthless man, a sexually aggressive man, or an 
unattractive woman in slang usages. Metaphors theoretically develop polysemous lexical items.  
Murphy refers to Clark’s analysis of the names for skin colour, i.e. racial identity markers 
(Murphy 410). We speak of skin pigmentation in terms of colours even though the descriptors 
we use do not reflect the colours as we see them literally. Therefore, colour terms such as black, 
white, yellow, or red are used to denote variations in skin pigmentation, and do not distinguish 
people as being literally black, white, yellow, or red-skinned. According to Clark, we use the 
colour terms as approximations, as markers which are closest to what we are most familiar with 
and use most commonly (Murphy 410). People are referred to as white because their skin colour 
most closely resembles the colour white (ibid.). Additionally, the term is, as observed, 
commonly used and therefore familiar and appropriately short (ibid.). Because we aim to 
communicate efficiently, time is saved by not explaining skin tones in detail, as it is generally 
perceived as redundant information.  
Whereas some meanings of polysemous identity markers are stored in our lexicon, Murphy also 
notes, referring to Clark, that others may be understood and learned only in specific contexts, 
resulting from people’s creative thinking in a particular communicative situation (Murphy 411). 
They are termed nonce uses (ibid.). For example, the statement “She’s trying to turn me into a 
farmer,” spoken by a man whose wife wants him to paint farms, is understood correctly only 
within a very specific context (Gerrig qtd. in Murphy 411). The hearer must be aware that the 
man is talking about painting and not the primarily considered farming activity.  
 
5.5.1. NEW EXPRESSIONS 
 
The manipulation of identity markers and their creation reflect the cultural and political 
landscape. Often when identity markers are manipulated in discourse and created anew it is 
because there is political motivation for it. This motivation is driven either by individuals or 
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groups of people with a common interest, and is sometimes known as political correctness. For 
example, due to attempts at political correctness, the marker hermaphrodite is now considered 
derogatory and outdated and has been replaced by intersex, Eskimo has been replaced by Inuit, 
half-caste by mixed-race, etc.  
Some argue that identity politics only allows for linguistic emancipation. The introduction of a 
new term does not automatically change people’s interpretations and uses of markers or their 
feelings about them. As Brand says in his podcast interview on fascism and violence, “Political 
correctness doesn’t alter ethics, it alters semantics” (“#069 Finding Joy” 00:16:11-00:16:15). 
This means that while valid attempts are made to improve society and reshape it with the use 
of different words, by changing existing definitions, and with projects of reclaiming, the 
manipulation of language alone does not guarantee a change in people’s beliefs, behaviour, and 
language use. New expressions do not guarantee desired and changed interpretations of the 
markers.    
In The Penguin Guide to Plain English, Blamires writes about the movement of political 
correctness and the expressions that have resulted from it. In some instances, especially due to 
efforts of the feminist movement, the marker man is being replaced by human (humankind) and 
person (chairperson), some female forms have ceased to be used, for example chauffeuse, 
creatrix, authoress, poetess, instructress, sculptress, etc., however some distinctions by sex 
remain in use, such as actor and actress, waiter and waitress, hero and heroine, master and 
mistress, etc., and terms that do not distinguish between the sexes are sometimes modified by 
the marker woman, for example, woman doctor (Blamires 311-312).  
The endeavour to make occupation terms gender neutral has produced markers such as camera 
operator instead of cameraman, salesperson instead of salesman, sewer instead of seamstress, 
firefighter instead of fireman, flight attendant instead of steward or stewardess, house manager 
or homeworker instead of housewife, etc.  
The introduction of new markers always follows societal changes. There were no Americans 
and Native Americans in English before the continents were named. People who voted for 
Brexit became known as Leavers, and those against it as Remainers.  
As already observed, individuals may invent markers of their own, sometimes known as nonce 
words when used on a particular occasion. Canadian PM Trudeau has referred to humanity as 
peoplekind (Livsey, “Justin Trudeau”), Applewhite refers in a podcast to older people and older 
Americans as olders and to younger people as youngers (“Ashton” 00:42:31-00:42:43), and 
those South Africans arguing for the necessary fall of science or rather current scientific 
methods are known as fallists.   
When it comes to markers of identity and word formation, the most common way of inventing 
new expressions results from affixation, especially with deverbal nouns. Van Leeuwen provides 
examples including suffixes -ant, -ent, -ian, -ee, -ist, and -eer (54), however, Miller and 
Johnson-Laird observe that -er is an especially common suffix for new identity markers 
resulting from verbs, particularly agentive ones (320). It is arguably the most productive one. 
A very recent case is the marker influencer. 
The following example is a nonce word employing the -er suffix, 
(31) I’m not a gut-truster.                                                               “is the law” 00:04:32-00:04:34 
Literary works especially abound in original identity markers functioning as personal names. 
They can denote individuals’ characteristics and frequently point to the social circles and 
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interests peculiar to them, as well as how the speaker sees them. Their usage can be entirely 
informative as well as humorous.    
(32) He was one of the Great Glitter Queens. He couldn’t be buried like a civilian. 
 Kushner 21 
(33) Guess who just checked in with the troubles? The Killer Queen herself. New York’s number 
one closeted queer.                                                                                                             
Kushner 10 
Neologisms might derive from a personal name,  
(34) Call me an old-fashioned Aristotelian, but I’m sure this isn’t true.                    Burrow 27 
Marker milquetoast denoting a shy and nervous person comes from the name of a comic strip 
character Caspar Milquetoast.  
Markers may additionally be formed by analogy with similar existing markers and through 
word play: 
(35) Saad: So classical economists have this if you like stylised homo economicus, this vision 
of how someone who is rational ought to behave. And there are these axioms of rational choice.    
 “#1218” 00:28:11-00:28:21 
New markers also come into use from other languages, which is how, for example, English got 
coquette from French, or Yardie from Jamaican patois.   
(36) I’m sure various Jamaicans will have various bones to pick with Thomson: it’s a little 
galling to have a backra tell you what’s what.  
Smith, “On Island Life” 316  
The expansion of vocabulary inevitably leads to synonyms. Synonymous lexical items enrich 
the vocabulary and the possibilities of a varied and dynamic communication. As a rule, 
synonyms are not completely interchangeable in all contexts as they do not overlap in all their 
senses and meanings. One lexical item in a synonymic group tends to be the general, dominant 
one with the most widely applicable usage. It is the stylistically neutral term, whereas others 
usually carry connotations, or pertain to literary or colloquial usage. Synonyms that do not 
overlap in all senses, but are interchangeable only in certain contexts, are context-bound 
synonyms. On the other hand, context-free synonyms are readily interchangeable because they 
overlap in all senses.  
Identity markers somnambulist and sleepwalker might be considered context-free synonyms; 
bastard and illegitimate child might be considered context-bound synonyms because they are 
only interchangeable in certain circumstances. The same applies, for example, to the Roma or 
gypsies who are marked as Travellers in Ireland (the Traveller community being an ethnic 
minority group in Ireland), and to the Tories or the Conservative Party, as a Conservative in 
the UK is informally referred to as a Tory. Identity markers student and pupil are not completely 
synonymous, but overlap in one sense, namely the educational one. Markers may differ in 
connotation, for example homosexual and gay, or lad and boy. They may also differ in register, 
for example, there are notable differences between markers wife, spouse, and old lady or missus, 
where the wife marker represents the neutral term, spouse a formal legal one, and old lady and 
missus informal terms.  
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On the syntactic front, collocations also play a part in correctly expressing the meaning of 
certain markers, namely denoting a brother’s seniority is only acceptable using the marker my 
big brother and not my large brother, where the latter can only be understood as denoting size. 
Therefore, certain markers only combine with particular other lexical items to convey the 
intended meaning, i.e. the syntagmatic and paradigmatic choice is not arbitrary but must be 
learned.    
Synonymous identity markers often result from attempts at political correctness in order to 
encourage language users to use terminology considered inoffensive (Inuit instead of Eskimo, 
mixed-race instead of half-caste, people with learning difficulties instead of the mentally 
handicapped); alternatively identity markers may result from the intention to offend (the 
unemployed may be referred to as welfare cheats, refugees and asylum seekers might be called 
queue jumpers), or from euphemisms (working girl used instead of female prostitute), etc.  
 
In a lecture on linguistics, Pinker describes language prescriptivists with synonyms of varying 
degrees of overlap. It goes without saying that the following expressions are not interchangeable 
in all contexts, 
 
(37) . . . prescriptivists who prescribe how people ought to speak and write. They are also 
known as the purists, sticklers, pedants, peevers, snobs, snoots, nitpickers, traditionalists, 
language police, usage nannies, grammar Nazis, and the Gotcha! Gang.       
                                                                                   
                                              “Linguistics, Style and Writing” 00:42:21-00:42:37  
 
Identity markers in the form of multiple personal names, pseudonyms, and names denoting 
function can be considered synonymous in certain circumstances, i.e. in contexts where they 
are interchangeable, especially if the marker denoting function applies to only one particular 
person at a given time, for example, Queen Mary I a.k.a. Mary Tudor a.k.a. Bloody Mary, or 
Queen Victoria a.k.a. Empress of India, or Prince Harry a.k.a. Henry Charles Albert David 
a.k.a. Duke of Sussex, etc. 
Not exactly synonyms but used in place of noun phrases are pronouns which can obscure a 
person’s identity. How may pronouns be considered identity markers? Indefinite pronouns 
denote people in discourse by what van Leeuwen terms indetermination (51). This includes 
pronouns such as somebody, someone, anybody, anyone, everybody, everyone, nobody, no one, 
etc.  
(38) There can be a real power imbalance when you have a researcher from one of Scotland’s 
top universities who is a world-expert on something speaking to someone who feels like an 
average member of society. However, universities are publicly-funded institutions and everyone 
has a right to benefit from the knowledge they generate.  
Anderson qtd. in Smith “Cabaret”    
Indefinite pronouns are not informative about individuals and groups, but seem to serve a 
function in discourse of distinguishing between an individual unidentified person and a group 
of them, to express a presence or absence of humans in a situation, and to give a general 
statement. They do not determine individual social actors. Because of this, indefinite pronouns 
are not generally considered markers of identity, unless they are expressed in a nominal form. 
For example, one might say “I am a nobody,” “She is a someone,” and in such cases the 
pronouns can be considered to denote identity because they in fact determine an individual. The 
indefinite article in front of the indefinite pronoun changes the meaning of the pronoun. The 
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same applies to personal pronouns, where one can say I am a she, they are a zir/ze/hir, etc. 
Whereas hir is a dated form of her, the zir and ze pronouns represent recent cases of neology.  
Vocabulary expands with the introduction of lexical items from other languages and with 
neology through translation. Translation requires special diligence with regards to identity 
markers if the original meaning of the marker is to be retained. Philcox discusses his difficulty 
with translating Fanon’s work from French into English at the start of the twenty-first century. 
One of the problematic terms to translate was the French marker colon, 
One of the translation problems I had to settle, which came up time and time again throughout the text, 
was the translation of “colon,” the European inhabitant of a colony once the colonization process has got 
under way. I was tempted to use the word colonizer since it sounded right pitted against the word 
colonized. But a colonizer composes the original force that colonized the country and does not convey 
the meaning of the European who settled, lived, worked, and was born in the colony. Colonial has two 
different associations, one for the English, especially in East Africa, and one for the Americans, pertaining 
to thirteen British colonies that became the United States of America or to that period; settler was being 
used by the media in the Mideast crisis to refer to the Jewish settlers and would be the immediate reference 
for a reader. I first decided on a compromise between the French word colon and the English colonist and 
coined “colonist.” My editor, however, decided otherwise, and we kept the word colonist. I felt that by 
keeping the word colon the term not only spoke to the English-speaking reader but also remained faithful 
to Fanon, for whom Algeria was the constant point of reference. (Philcox in Fanon 246–247) 
One needs a rich semantic knowledge of the lexical expressions he is working with as well as 
a good understanding of the socio-cultural context. Pragmatic considerations of interpretation 
must also be considered because the translator always thinks about his readers and expects their 
potential interpretations. Philcox had to decide what form to give the translated lexical item, 
considering colonizer, colonial, settler, and colonist, and finally settling on the latter. 
Another marker that presented a translational challenge for Philcox was the French racial 
marker nègre. The decision was not as simple as just replacing the term with the historically 
appropriate Negro marker because it could be interpreted in two differing ways depending on 
the communicative context, i.e. who was using the term and to whom it was attributed. Philcox 
notes that nègre would have been interpreted in the same way in French. The markers had by 
the point of Fanon’s writing acquired a positive and a negative meaning.  
And finally there is that word dreaded by all translators of French Caribbean texts: nègre. Constance 
Farrington did not deal with the problem or perhaps she didn’t have to at the time: she merely translated 
nègre and noir by the word Negro, which was accepted usage in the 1950s and ‘60s, and in the process 
lost a subtle difference. But if the translator decides to update and modernize his vocabulary, then he is 
faced with a sticky issue. In Randall Kennedy’s fascinating book Nigger: The Strange Career of a 
Troublesome Word (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002) he cites Professor Clarence Major as saying that 
when it is used by black people among themselves it is a racial term with undertones of warmth and 
goodwill . . . reflecting a tragicomic sensibility that is aware of black history. It is also “the filthiest, 
dirtiest, nastiest in the English language.” The word nègre would have been used in the same way by 
Fanon, the Martinican, whether referring to the black man in general or putting it in the mouth of the 
oppressor as an insult. It was a word rehabilitated by the black intelligentsia of the time and thrown back 
at the European as the supreme weapon. One of the great achievements of Césaire’s epic poem “Notebook 
of a Return to My Native Land” is to reappropriate the negative term and give it a positive meaning. 
(Philcox in Fanon 247–248) 
Philcox finally decided to use a number of versions of the one translated racial marker, namely 
black, nigger, and Negro, depending on the communicative context. The translator recognizes 
that the translated markers do not equal the meaning and interpretation of the original French 
term and sees it as a loss. He also decided to translate the marker indigène as colonized instead 
of native in order to remove the negative meaning from the term, but recognises that the original 
author uses both markers interchangeably.   
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Now that the vocabulary has evolved it places the translator in a twenty-first century predicament. I have 
updated the word Negro, when he refers to the peoples of Africa or the diaspora, to black, and used nigger 
when it is the colonizer referring to the same. In some cases, I have left Negro in its historical context. 
But I have lost something in the translation of the word nègre, for it has both a sting and an embrace, and 
that is irretrievable. I have modernized the word indigène to colonized or colonized subject, ridding it of 
today’s pejorative sense of native although Fanon, in keeping with the colonial vocabulary of his time, 
uses both terms indifferently in the very same paragraph. (Philcox in Fanon 248) 
 
5.5.2. ASSIGNING NEW AND DIFFERENT MEANINGS 
 
Identity markers may undergo semantic changes, i.e. changes in meaning. In general, semantic 
changes are distinguished as amelioration, deterioration, expansion, restriction, semantic 
bleaching, as well as the already discussed metonymy and metaphor. In the process of 
amelioration, the meaning of lexical items acquires a positive connotation. This is typical of 
identity markers which are the subject of reclamation or reappropriation attempts. Deterioration 
of a lexical item means that an identity marker acquires a negative connotation. The marker 
villain originally applied to farmers but is today used with the pejorative meaning for a bad 
person. Expansion results in a marker widening its meaning and consequently increasing the 
possibilities of application. The marker gay as a synonym of homosexual was originally 
predominantly attributed to gay men, but has in time become a common marker for gay women 
as well. Semantic restriction leads to a narrowing in the possibilities of attribution because a 
marker has lost some part of its meaning. Whereas the girl marker used to denote a child, it is 
only attributed to female children today. Semantic bleaching results in a marker being used very 
broadly because of its original meaning having weakened. For example, the marker greenhorn 
originally used to apply to new soldiers, but is today attributed to any inexperienced person.  
Sometimes the changes in meaning are not recognised by the language community, but result 
from intentional projects of individuals or groups. They are known as cases of reappropriation.  
Not all reappropriation endeavours are successful in their execution. Garland-Thomson and 
Bailey refer to Riddell and Watson when they note that “[u]nlike the reclamation projects of re-
appropriating terms like ‘black’, ‘dyke’, ‘queer’, or ‘disabled’, ‘mentally ill’ or ‘insane’ are not 
as easily divested of their problematic connotations” (408). Indeed, reappropriation regarding 
the usage of a number of markers such as black, dyke, bitch, queer, etc. has been quite 
successful. However, as mental illnesses remain a taboo topic in many spaces, reappropriation 
projects of terms develop at a slower pace.  
Reclaiming or reappropriating identity markers is typically undertaken in order to rid a lexical 
item of its derogatory meaning or negative connotation and instead to understand it in a positive 
or neutral unmarked way, as a form of accepting or celebrating the aspect of identity it refers 
to. It is how suffragette in the past, and more recently queer, bitch, slut, nerd, geek, ginger, etc. 
have all had their meanings change from markers of ridicule to identity markers of pride and 
acceptance of matters of fact. The Chicano marker used to have a negative meaning prior to the 
Civil rights movement, but was later reappropriated to express a marker of pride.  
Markers related to the varieties of human sexuality are especially popular reclamation projects, 
 
(39) . . . I want to reclaim faggot, because people don’t want to be a faggot. People want to be 
queer, people want to be gay, people want you know like, like, there’s like sort of a mainstream 
element to LGBT and I feel like faggot still lies like squarely outside of that, you know.  
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“Feeling Desired” 00:08:37-00:09:00 
 
Amira explains how the meaning of the marker bimbo has evolved through time and how she 
conceptualises the term, i.e. how she has appropriated it for herself, especially regarding the 
stereotype of a bimbo as a stupid blonde woman brazen about her sexual tendencies, 
(40) . . . obviously it's from… it's Italian, where it means baby, and the early nineteen hundred 
it got adapted into American language and was then used as… for only using… people only 
using it to call a man, like a stupid man 'a bimbo' and then it kind of died out. And then in the 
1980s and 1990s when Barb Wire and those movies with Pamela Anderson… uhmm… got into 
fashion, it started to be used as only describing women who were blond and looking overly 
sexual. – So, you're trying to claim the word back in a way. – Yeah, definitely. Because my aim 
is to show people that you don't have to be stupid to be a bimbo. This is my choice.  
 
“Alicia Amira” 00:03:08-00:04:00 
 
Changes in meaning that do not result from reappropriation which aims at changing the 
connotation of expressions, result from a general shift in meaning or the addition of a new 
meaning throughout the language community. The process is usually gradual. 
Existing identity markers may be given new meanings on the basis of extraction of qualifiers. 
The following can be considered a case of semantic bleaching. The marker fascist used with 
the intention to shame no longer expresses the original meaning. The part of meaning denoting 
someone who promotes fascist ideology has been extracted from the original meaning in order 
to allow for a broader usage. As Orwell notes, “The word Fascism has now no meaning except 
in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable’” (148-149). Likewise, so does the marker 
fascist. Lakoff quotes Austin regarding the marker, 
Take a word like ‘fascist’: this originally connotes a great many characteristics at once: say x, y, and z. 
Now we will use ‘fascist’ subsequently of things which possess only one of these striking characteristics. 
So that things called ‘fascist’ in these senses, which we may call ‘incomplete’ senses, need not be similar 
at all to each other. (Austin qtd. in Lakoff 20) 
The attribution of the term now is broader than at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
used as a regular insult within political discussions.  
(41) Mrs. Thatcher would have enjoyed all this. Her former speechwriter John O’Sullivan 
recalls how, some years after leaving office, she arrived to address a small group at an English 
seaside resort to be greeted by enraged lefties chanting “Thatcher Thatcher Thatcher! Fascist 
fascist fascist!”  
Steyn “Mrs. Thatcher’s Losing Victory” 
5.6. Stereotyping 
 
Stereotypes are linked to categorisation when sufficient information for a more precise or 
correct idea of a person or a group of people is lacking. It also serves simpler and more effective 
communication. As seen earlier, most frequently the housewife stereotype serves as a prototype 
for mother. We rely on stereotyping while verbalising our ideas about individuals to others, and 
in order to categorise them in our minds. Stereotypes inform our expectations.  
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For example, in a conversation with an online acquaintance, I was told I could be imagined 
better on the basis of the fact that I liked George Carlin. I was compared to a person my 
acquaintance already knew to also like George Carlin.  
(42) B: Ah now I see a better picture of you… or maybe that’s too much to judge. I had a friend 
in college who loved George Carlin.  
T: What were they like? 
B: So I have this sense of what type of person would like George Carlin . . . Politically Ayn 
Rand loving libertarian . . . 
According to Lakoff, “[s]ocial stereotypes are usually conscious and subject to public 
discussion—and may even have names. However, the use of typical category members is 
usually unconscious and automatic” (86). Examples such as Uncle Tom, Jewish princess, stud, 
etc. “are categories that function as stereotypes for other categories. An understanding of such 
categories requires an understanding of their role as stereotypes” (ibid.). Stereotypes in fact 
play an important role in categorisation and concept structure despite the claims of the classical 
theory of concepts which sees social stereotypes as irrelevant, and believes that concepts and 
consequently category membership are definable by the necessary and sufficient conditions 
(Lakoff 81).  
Stereotypes can also be metaphorical, as seen in the earlier example of Anozie being dubbed a 
veritable sub-Saharan Roland Barthes (Gates 15–16). As Lakoff observes, we “comprehend 
categories in terms of individual members who represent either an ideal or its opposite . . . 
Paragons are made use of in constructions in the language: a regular Babe Ruth, another Willie 
Mays, the Cadillac of vacuum cleaners, etc.” (87). Expressions such as to be more English than 
the English and to out-Herod Herod are also based in stereotypes.  
In discourse, stereotyping is commonly signalled by expressions such as “looks like,” “sounds 
like,” etc. 
(43) ‘Millard Fillmore’ sounds like the name of an American president.  
Miller and Johnson-Laird 310 
In the chapter on categorisation, the metonymical prototype of mother based on the housewife 
stereotype was explained. It was established that housewives are prototypes of mothers, i.e. 
mothers are stereotyped as housewives. “Social stereotypes are cases of metonymy—where a 
subcategory has a socially recognized status as standing for the category as a whole, usually for 
the purpose of making quick judgments about people” (Lakoff 79). In our culture, people’s 
ideas of mother as a housewife are more common than imagining a mother who is not a 
housewife, but perhaps a worker in the private sector, etc. Lakoff summarises the best example 
or prototype of a mother thus: “a biological mother who is a housewife principally concerned 
with nurturance, not working at a paid position, and married to the child’s father” (82). An 
unwed mother is not to be interpreted as merely a mother who is not married but instead, 
according to the stereotype, as a woman who “did not choose to get pregnant, and she has 
difficulty supporting a child” (Lakoff 82). The situation is similar with the daddy marker, 
namely the stereotypical use of the term includes not only the biological parent or birth parent 
component but the nurturing one as well (ibid.), “[t]hus, one may ask of an unmarried pregnant 
woman Who is the child’s father? But not Who is the child’s daddy?” (ibid.). Whereas the father 
marker can be argued to contain both components as well, the birth model certainly 
predominates in its everyday use compared to the daddy marker where both components or 
models are equally required.  
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The identity marker bachelor was also discussed earlier. In stereotypical terms, there is an idea 
in western society about typical characteristics of bachelors. It does not merely reflect the 
definition of being an unmarried adult male, but additionally comprises another set of specifics, 
namely those that distinguish between better and worse examples of bachelors within the 
category. According to Lakoff, “the social stereotype of a bachelor will characterize the best 
examples, and those undisputed bachelors who don’t fit the social stereotype will be less good 
examples” (86). Therefore, “[a] bachelor who is macho, promiscuous, and nondomestic fits the 
stereotype of bachelor better than, say, a nonmacho man who likes to take care of children, 
prefers a stable relationship with one person, is not interested in sexual conquest, loves 
housework and does it well, etc.” (ibid.).   
Stereotypical mothers and bachelors are arguably some of the easier identity markers to define. 
Often, however, markers involve complex conceptualisations forming a cluster. When Smith 
talks about how her family had gone from working class to lower middle class, she demonstrates 
the complexity of the class concept, i.e. what considerations are made in comprehending its 
meaning, 
The spare room, the extra toilet – these represented, for my parents, a very British form of achievement. 
Raised in poverty, they were now officially what the census-takers call ‘lower middle class’. . . When you 
were lower middle class, in the eighties, you went to Europe occasionally – though only on flights that 
left at 3 a.m, and on planes in which you freely chose the smoking section – and you drove a Mini Metro, 
and you bought fresh orange juice. You went to state school of course and had never seen a ski lift but 
you took the Guardian11 and, if there was a good front-page sex scandal, the Mirror, and you had those 
nice stripy Habitat blinds in the kitchen and china plates hanging on the walls and you absolutely 
understood that doormats with jokes on them were a bad taste. You told people you ‘never watched ITV’, 
although this was actually a lie: you watched ITV all the time. And each summer you packed the car and 
motored down the M4 to Devon or Cornwall, stopping along the route to take tea – thanks to the National 
Trust – in the various country mansions of the penniless aristocrats. At least, that’s how it was for us. 
Thinking back on it, I remember a lot of happiness. I’m sure every category in the census will stake its 
own claim – the noble working poor, the striving bourgeoisie, the elegant rich, the serenely high born, the 
haute bourgeoisie intellectual or artist – but the unlovable lower middle class also have their points of 
pride, although most of their satisfactions are, in my experience, the consequence of a series of 
counterfactuals. It’s not what happens to the lower middle class, exactly, that makes them relatively 
content, but rather what doesn’t happen. When each bill hitting the mat no longer represents an existential 
threat you are freed from an inhibiting and oppressive form of daily fear. Nor are you touched by the self-
contempt that tends to stalk the solidly middle and upper middle class, and you are perfectly ignorant of 
that sense of enervation too often found in the highest born. The lower-middle-class child has, as the 
football managers like to say, everything to play for.  
 Smith, “The Bathroom” 355-356 
Because interlocutors in discourse expect the other party to already have a set of assumptions 
regarding particular markers of identity, i.e. they are cognisant of the fact that the listener is 
working with stereotypes, sometimes a modification of what has been said is necessary to point 
out that the stereotypical interpretation of the marker does not completely overlap with the 
identified person’s beliefs and/or actions. This can be achieved using expressions such as “sort 
of,” “kind of,” etc. For example:  
(44) Are you… What? Catholic, or… – Um, Protestant. Sort of.                               Kushner 15  
The expression “Sort of” influences the hearer’s interpretation of the marker in question by 
making him aware that his stereotypical idea could be refined.   
 
 
11 Smith follows the name of the newspaper with an asterisk and notes in footnotes: “If you were on the left.” 
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5.6.1. STEREOTYPING - PREFERENCES IN DISCOURSE 
 
Most communication allows the speaker or writer to pick what identity markers to use for 
describing people when there are a number of options available. This is what synonyms are 
useful for—they enable the speaker to use the marker according to his preference and the 
message he wants to communicate.  
There is another kind of preferential usage of markers, namely when one does not decide among 
synonyms but instead focuses on the wider implications of the message he is delivering. This 
is why the analysis of political and other kinds of speeches is popular. Such analyses often have 
a lot of room for interpretation, specifically why certain markers are chosen instead of others 
and what is the implied, intended or hidden message behind them. Political orientation of the 
media commonly influences the language they use. 
Van Leeuwen demonstrates newspaper preferences for the use of specific identity markers in 
terms of genericisation and specification. Namely, “[i]n middle-class oriented newspapers 
government agents and experts tend to be referred to specifically, and ‘ordinary people’ 
generically,” whereas “[i]n working-class oriented newspapers . . . ‘ordinary people’ are 
frequently referred to specifically” (van Leeuwen 47). Based on a statement by Australia’s 
Minister for Sport and Recreation, the examples provided were published on the same day. The 
first paragraph is excerpted from a middle-class oriented newspaper, the Sydney Morning 
Herald, whereas the second paragraph comes from a working-class oriented newspaper, namely 
the Daily Telegraph (ibid.).   
 
(45) 5.3 Australia has one of the highest childhood drowning rates in the world, with children    
under 5 making up a quarter of the toll, this is the grim news from Government studies of 
Australia’s high incidence of drowning. The studies show over 500 people drown in 
Australia every year, with backyard swimming pools the biggest killers for children under 
15. The Minister for Sport and Recreation, Mr Brown, said the childhood drowning rate 
was higher than developed countries such as Britain and the US and comparable with 
many Asian countries. He said children should be encouraged to swim and parents should 
learn resuscitation techniques.  
 
5.4 The tragic drowning of a toddler in a backyard swimming pool has mystified his family. 
Matthew Harding, two, one of twin boys, had to climb over a one-metre ‘child-proof’ fence 
before he fell into the pool. Mrs Desley Harding found Matthew floating in the pool when 
she went to call the twins in for tea yesterday. ‘I have got no idea how he got in the pool’, 
says Mrs Harding at her home in Wentworthville South today.  
 
                                                                                                                            van Leeuwen 47 
 
Whereas the middle-class oriented newspaper identifies the Minister for Sport and Recreation 
by his personal name and keeps other people’s identities regarding childhood drownings 
unspecified, the working-class newspaper specifies the common person, noting the personal 
names of those involved in a drowning accident, while the first newspaper genericises them as 
children and parents who are given suggestions.  
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5.7. Syntax and orthography 
 
This final section of the thesis regarding pragmatic considerations of identity markers is 
intended as a short overview of how the markers tend to be expressed syntactically and 
orthographically.   
 
5.7.1. APPOSITIONS 
 
Definitions of identity markers can be found as and within appositive phrases,  
 
(46) Thomson finds a bit of hope in the village descendants of the Maroons, runaway slaves 
who formed their own communities and retained their Gold Coast heritage, and have no desire 
to enter the ghettos of Kingston, etc.  
Smith, “On Island Life” 315  
 
Smith employs the “etc.” to stand for all the possible markers and phrases that could be applied 
to the definition of the Maroons to specify the group further. 
(47) That’s Valerie Salmon, a Kingston housekeeper in her fifties, one of the first Jamaicans to 
try to explain to Thomson the cycle of envy, . . .                                        
  Smith, “On Island Life” 313  
 
5.7.2. OF-PHRASE 
 
Identity markers denoting conditions, such as geographic/ethnic origin and relations (a mother 
of two), can be expressed by the of-phrase, 
 
(48) . . . the Asante of Ghana and the Creole French of Louisiana . . .                          Gates 15 
 
5.7.3. MODIFIERS 
 
Identity markers might be defined more specifically and modified by adverbs and adjectives, 
determiners, and strings of hyphenated modifiers. Modifiers or qualifiers (adjectives and 
adverbs) can go on ad infinitum, i.e. it is common for identity markers to allow for recursion.  
(49)  . . . but modest fashion is often marketed toward culturally Muslim women.  
Wallace “Wearing Thin”  
(50) Here is Sheila Hamilton, a seventy-three-year-old Justice of the Peace: ‘I’m not black. I’m 
brown. A light brown lady . . . Actually I’m virtually white.’  
Smith, “On Island Life” 315  
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(51) Of course, nobody needs to tell that to Akala, who describes himself as half-Jamaican and 
half-Scottish, and has been exploring issues of race in his music for over a decade.   
Rimmer “Akala on Race” 
 
(52) But that’s only half the picture, that’s the ego-anarchist-cowboys-shrilling-for-no-
government part of the Republicans but what about the other half, the religious fanatics who 
want to control every breath every citizen takes?                                                       
Kushner 17 
(53) . . . thanks to musician-turned-cook Levi Roots . . .             “Feeling hot” theguardian.com 
 
Nominal identity markers may become modifiers as adjectival identity markers, for example, a 
Christian may become a Christian missionary, a vegan may become a vegan activist, etc.  
 
5.7.4. CAPITALISATION 
 
Capitalisation is obligatory in personal names, titles as direct addresses, in higher social titles 
and functions, markers of nationality as nouns and adjectives, organisations and institutions. 
It can be arbitrary in racial markers of identity, dependent primarily on the communicator’s 
intentions and some other convention,    
(54) Meanwhile, Jewish, Indian and Chinese Jamaicans appear to thrive, much to the 
annoyance of the black majority.  
Smith, “On Island Life” 316  
(55) . . . the ‘singular “X”’ that the Black Muslims employed as a complex ‘variable’, . . .      
Gates 17 
Non-capitalised identity markers may be capitalised when functioning as proper nouns. The 
story “Admission” from Denzy Senna’s collection You Are Free provides an example of using 
identity markers with the intention to offend, with capitalised first letters in order to raise the 
importance of the marker to the level of a personal name,  
(56) We will have to scale back – seriously – just so the kid can get to sit in a classroom with 
future Rich Fucks of America . . .                                        
 Smith, “On Island Life” 318 
  
5.7.5. NOMINALISATION 
 
Identity markers may take the form of nominalised adjectives, for example, the 
(political/politically) Right, the unemployed, the visually-impaired, the poor, the haves and the 
have nots, the filthy rich, etc.  
(57) . . . the children of the relatively rich and the poor . . .                         Smith, “Fences” 22 
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(58) Two very old ladies, one extremely tall and fat, the other very small and thin, gazed up at    
Sebastian and me with horrified fascination. 
“I hope you don’t mind us poking our heads in, only we heard…” said The Small, 
addressing Joyce. 
“But perhaps they are friends of yours,” suggested The Tall, indicating Sebastian and me 
with an incredulous stare.                                                                                                   
Ingham 124 
 
(59) His blue eyes exuded concern, he held out an arm to steady Fat, and nodded gravely at 
Thin.   
Ingham 178 
(60) I mean you say law isn’t Justice and Justice isn’t morals but really, who if not the Right 
is putting the Prude back in Jurisprudence?                                                                         
Kushner 17 
(61) But the thing about The American Negro is, he never went Communist. Loser Jews did. 
But you people had Jesus so the reds never got to you.  
Kushner 11 
5.7.6. ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, COMPOUNDS 
 
Abbreviations, acronyms, and compounds are used in written and spoken discourse to 
economise on time taken to communicate: PhD, MD, DSc, M.A., Esq., Dr, Mr, Mrs, SJW (Social 
Justice Warrior), BME (Black and Minority Ethnic), FTM (female-to-male), MTF (male-to-
female), PM (Prime Minister), MP (Member of Parliament), MGTOW (Men Going Their Own 
Way, WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant), POC (people of colour), POW (prisoner of war), 
PIGS  (Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slavs), WAGs (wives and girlfriends of footballers), 
LGBTQ2S (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer, Two-spirit), INCEL (involuntary celibate), 
alt-right (alternative right), cishet (cisgender and heterosexual), blackamoor (black Moor), 
begpacker (begging backpacker), yuppie (young urban professional), etc.  
(62) You’re just a fucking nurse. Why should I listen to you over my very qualified, very 
expensive WASP doctor?                                                                                                                   
Kushner 13 
(63) . . . there needs to be more POC and LGBTQ+ individuals working at every stage; not 
just models, but designers, buyers, marketers, CEOs and fashion writers and photographers.                         
                                                                                                                   
Wallace “Wearing Thin” 
 
(64) . . . The Heiresses is a moving twist on the LGBTQIA+ coming of age genre, in that it’s 
about an older gay woman embracing new things.   
                                                                                          Slater-Williams “Marcelo Martinessi” 
 
(65) It’s common for promoters to book one female, one LGBTQ+, and one BAME comedian, 
put them on a line-up with seven straight white men and call that diversity.  
                                                                                                       Goh “Non-toxic Masculinity” 
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6. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this thesis was to present semantic and pragmatic aspects of identity markers in 
English. This was accomplished in two ways. First, through literature review, sociological and 
dictionary definitions and understandings of identity were outlined, and the definition of 
identity markers was established for the purpose of this thesis. This was followed by the 
representation of the most prominent theories of meaning, and then by observing the importance 
of categorisation for cognition and communication. In the second part, the thesis provides a 
practical system for distinguishing among identity markers according to how people relate to 
their environment in four major areas, which are further subdivided. Additionally, the thesis 
exemplifies the ways identity markers are used in communication and how they may be 
interpreted in discourse, while pointing to where the vocabulary is sourced, and highlighting 
various communicative aims and approaches.  
The semantic aspects of identity markers are related to how the meaning of identity markers 
may be understood within the framework of theories of meaning, as well as to semantic changes 
identity markers undergo through time. Theories of meaning have been closely discussed in the 
theoretical part of the thesis. Despite sematic changes not being dealt with in detail, they are 
observed in the subchapter on neology, which also considers polysemy, synonymy, political 
correctness, nonce uses, and translation. Semantic aspects of identity markers are observed 
wherever the analysis of their meaning takes place, which includes metonymy, metaphorical 
language, stereotyping, etc. The pragmatic aspects of identity markers, i.e. their manipulation 
and interpretation, have been exemplified and analysed in the second part, first through a 
categorisation, and then through discussions of specific ways of use and conceptualisations.  
The relevance of the theories of meaning and discussion of categorisation to the thesis is that 
the assumptions the thesis operates with are the following:  
1) Humans understand the meaning of lexical items, and specifically, of identity markers (as 
abstract notions) to be conceptual in nature, i.e. the meaning of markers takes the form of 
concepts in our minds. This assumption results from the conceptual theories of meaning.  
2) Categorisation includes concepts existing as categories within our minds. This assumption 
is based on the idea that categorisation is an innate mental faculty which helps us understand 
the world around and within us and to organise it efficiently. We organise individual identity 
markers into larger structures within our mind, and we also organise clusters of identity markers 
into systematic categories, with the process being predominantly subconscious.   
These two basic assumptions form the basis on which the second part is built. Namely, my 
categorisation of identity markers according to the pragmatic viewpoint takes its form from the 
categories I devised through my own mental capacity for categorisation informed by conceptual 
structures that came about by contextual learning. Every subchapter includes some discussion 
of how the markers may be interpreted in context, in discourse, in utterances.  
Below are stated the main conclusions of the thesis. 
The term identity applies to notions about who and what people are, in terms of their physical 
and non-physical characteristics. In common parlance, identity is understood as who and what 
someone is or a group of people are, which is why I also speak of aspects of identity and how 
identity markers are used to name these aspects. Lexical items denoting various aspects of 
identity can be self-ascribed as well as attributed by others. The term identity is difficult to 
72 
 
define precisely, and it allows for a generous interpretation which comprises the totality of 
human experience. Identity markers have been described as lexical items which result from the 
process of identification or category attribution and name aspects of people’s identities. They 
take the form of simple (Mary) and complex (secretary general) nominal and adjectival (very 
tall) phrases. This thesis has argued that identity can be comprehended neither with the use of 
a single marker nor multiple ones because it names a process of categorisation and identification 
instead of a specific state. When Clarke talks about identity being ascriptive, elective, and 
formal (750), she does not speak about what identity inherently is, but rather, whether 
identification results from generally choiceless ascription, free election, and from being legally 
recognised and attained. Identification can be expressed by noticing a presence of certain 
features as well as their absence, when people are identified by identity markers as being the 
opposite, i.e. not that which is named, for example, a seller is not a buyer.  
 
It has been established that semantics studies the meaning of lexical items and sentences outside 
of context, and pragmatics study the meaning within a communicative situation, i.e. how lexical 
items and utterances (sentences in use) can be understood. Pragmatic interpretations are based 
on semantic knowledge. The ‘meaning’ of a lexical item contains the ‘sense’ (the definition) 
within it, albeit the two terms can also be considered synonymous in semantic analyses of 
lexical items. In pragmatic analyses, however, it is useful to separate them as ‘meaning’ 
containing the ‘sense’ as the definition but also noting whether the word is used as a swear-
word, as used ironically, metaphorically, etc. The meaning of lexical items is not what they 
refer to, it is not contained in their scientific definitions, and it is not solely their definition in 
dictionaries and style manuals. The meaning of lexical items is also not how they are used 
during communication, even though the way they are used does point to their meaning. The 
pragmatic interpretation of a particular utterance may result in understanding the meaning of 
the identity markers used in it to be something else than what the term is understood to convey 
in its literal non-contextualised sense.   
 
Mainly drawing on Goddard’s discussion of linguistic approaches to meaning in Semantic 
Analysis, the thesis has highlighted truth-conditional, referential, structuralist, Platonist, 
translational, and conceptual theories of meaning, and considers the latter as the best-argued 
approach to understand how people conceptualise of markers of identity. Conceptual theories 
of meaning hold that the meaning of lexical items is contained in the form of concepts within 
individuals’ minds. Concepts cannot be proven to exist, but an awareness of a mental faculty 
that is concept-forming-like is held highly plausible. The formation of concepts is believed to 
be an innate cognitive capability. The classical view of concepts argues that meanings of lexical 
items are contained within the necessary and sufficient conditions which define it, i.e. concepts 
are definitions of lexical items within the mind. This view is not satisfactory when it comes to 
certain complex identity markers where the exact set of necessary and sufficient conditions is 
not easily provided. According to the classical approach, one can either be a category or a group 
member or not, depending on whether he meets all the conditions. Conceptual prototype and 
exemplar theories, however, do not argue that the meaning of lexical items is to be found in 
their definitions, but is instead represented through prototypes or exemplars. Concepts are 
formed simultaneously with all other knowledge we acquire. The non-classical approaches 
expect the concepts to contain degrees of typicality.  
 
The thesis has also observed the necessity of categorisation as an immanent mental faculty. The 
categories we form in the mind are formed based on subjective criteria of grouping features, 
individuals, and groups. Identity markers are names for categories. Idealised cognitive models 
of categories help us organise knowledge and communicate by picking out prototypes of 
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categories. This has been demonstrated with the marker bachelor. Because mental categories 
are concepts, it follows that they too, just as concepts, are gradable in some cases. Categories 
of identity markers denoting physical and socio-cultural features tend to be gradable, whereas 
those denoting functions people perform tend to be non-gradable.  
 
In the second part, the thesis presents my categorisation of identity markers which is not based 
in analysis of discourse, but instead resembles Miller and Johnson-Laird’s exemplified varieties 
of person designation. My categories distinguish between groups of identity markers according 
to how individuals relate to their environment. They include a group of markers which contain 
proper names, a group denoting physical and non-physical conditions (embodied experience in 
interaction with the environment), a group expressing beliefs (individual’s inner world), and a 
group identifying kinship relations and other inter-personal relations.  
 
Identity markers which name proper names include first names and surnames, alternative names 
such as pseudonyms, artistic names, nicknames, and names of bands, organisation, clubs, etc. 
Their attribution is generally arbitrary and officially recognised. Primarily, they represent 
personal names that lack sense. Secondarily, they represent generic markers which have a sense 
are used to name individuals and groups symbolically.  
 
Identity markers that name conditions include physical and non-physical conditions. Physical 
conditions include names for biological characteristics and variations in bodily states. Non-
physical conditions denote our formal and informal roles, occupation, social rank and class, 
financial standing, qualifications and knowledge, interests, abilities as well as disabilities, 
behaviour, personality traits, mental and emotional states, geographic and 
national/ethnic/cultural origin as well as location. Identity markers denoting racial categories 
are not put into a separate category and neither are markers expressing sexual orientation and 
gender identity. While these tend to be pointed out specifically in common discussions about 
what labels people identify with, here they are considered within wider categories. Arguably, 
the groups containing markers that express formal and informal roles could in most cases 
contain other groups within the ‘conditions’ category, for example, the ‘occupation and job 
title’ group could be included in the ‘formal roles’ group, but that would only make the whole 
category less systematic and more wide-spanning than need be. The discussion of the markers 
denoting conditions has focused on conceptualisations of race, nationality and ethnicity, as well 
as sexuality and gender. In this, it reflects the relevance of these markers in anglophone 
societies, and points to the possibilities of their interpretation.  
 
Identity markers that name beliefs roughly distinguish between those naming philosophical 
beliefs, socio-economic and socio-political, religious, and other beliefs. The group of ‘other 
beliefs’ contains markers denoting predominantly dietary beliefs, but includes all others that 
would not typically be classed within the other groups. As with all other groups throughout the 
categorisation, this one, too, distinguishes its members according to some separations among 
my own conceptual structures influenced by world knowledge and contextual learning.  
 
Identity markers that name kinship and other inter-personal relations distinguish between their 
respective groups.  
 
Identity markers are used not only to objectively name the people around us, but also to express 
how we think about them and respond emotionally. Specific terms are used with the intention 
to cause offence. It is common for some people to try and change their connotation to positive, 
in order to turn them into markers of pride and acceptance, as well as use them light-heartedly. 
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Particular lexical items are used to shame individuals, and on the other hand, there is a collection 
of markers for the attribution to people we praise, admire, or are emotionally attached to. The 
use of figurative language in daily communication is pervasive. We frequently rely on 
metaphors because metaphorical thinking is immanent in our conceptual structures. Besides 
markers which name people in terms of objects, markers denoting non-human animals are 
popular and widespread. They may be attributed with a derogatory meaning, in order to express 
resemblances between people or different various areas of interest and particular animals. 
Similes express likeness between a set of characteristics a marker denotes and a person who 
expresses the same characteristics but to whom the marker itself cannot be attributed. With 
metonymy and synecdoche people may be attributed markers denoting objects when they are 
in conceptual proximity. One pragmatic consideration of identity markers is how they may be 
attributed and interpreted as a result of neology, when markers go out of use, change in meaning, 
or are freshly invented. With regards to neology, the thesis has touched on polysemy and 
synonymy, the effect of political correctness on the appropriate use of gender-marked markers, 
markers in nonce uses, translated markers, and the types of semantic changes, including 
reappropriation of terms. Another important consideration regarding pragmatic interpretations 
of identity markers are stereotypes which inform our concepts as well as influence our 
understanding of the terms in communication. Lakoff has observed that stereotypes are 
metonymical because we tend to conceptualise of a category (i.e. marker) through a prototype 
as the representative of the category. The prototype is usually the socially stereotypical image 
of the marker and is attributed the category name despite possibly having a name of its own. 
This was exemplified with the mother as housewife and father as daddy stereotype. The 
bachelor marker has been used to show that we conceptualise of differences among less good 
and better examples of stereotypes. In discourse, markers are chosen with intention, and 
preferences of writers and speakers for choosing certain words over others to refer to people 
need to be taken into consideration for pragmatic interpretation.  
 
The final part of the ‘pragmatic considerations of identity markers’ chapter look at the way 
markers may be expressed syntactically and orthographically. While this part is not related to 
semantic nor pragmatic aspects of identity markers per se, the markers themselves are expressed 
through language and put into written form, so I thought it fair to acknowledge how this is done. 
In short, syntactically, the markers can be expressed in appositive phrases, of-phrases, they are 
more often than not modified by determiners, adverbs, adjectives, including hyphenation. 
Capitalisation is required in personal names and in official, exclusive titles, functions and direct 
addresses, as well as in nominal and adjectival markers denoting nationality and ethnicity, and 
in names of bands, institutions and organisations. It may be applied arbitrarily to other markers 
depending on the communicator’s preference. Identity markers may be turned into nominalised 
adjectives. The markers containing multiple lexical items frequently form combinations as 
compounds and acronyms, or are simply abbreviated, in speech as well as in writing.  
 
The final paragraphs consider questions and recommendations for further research.  
 
1) In the first part of literature review, I state that people are identified or categorised in order 
for communication to be simpler and cognitive effort lessened. Communication is certainly 
simpler if one gets to say Mary is a couch potato instead of explaining that Mary is a lazy, 
inactive person who spends her days in front of the television, if the hearer comprehends the 
same meaning in either case. Whether cognitive effort is lessened is a question that requires a 
detailed answer. Categorisation on the most basic level happens effortlessly in the mind, 
however verbalising it when more specific notions and markers are required seems to demand 
considerable cognitive effort. This is particularly true of fringe cases and complex markers 
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where one has to decide what definition befits the intended marker best, whether it is applicable, 
and whether it could not be replaced by a different term or a lengthy explanation. 
Communicating about markers therefore requires more cognitive effort than simply identifying 
individuals mentally, especially in some circumstances, for example, when forming and 
understanding metaphorical expressions and irony.  
2) Because the conceptual theory of meaning rests on the assumption that there are such ‘things’ 
as concepts within our mind, it can be disputed by those who do not perceive their mental 
processing of information to include the formation of concepts. Because we cannot see into 
each other’s minds, this theory might not be applicable universally. It would be interesting to 
explore how those that do not conceptualise of identity markers in terms of concepts as mental 
images but see them rather as words or in some other way understand their meaning.  
 
3) Since identity markers have been defined for the purpose of this thesis, it was my own 
decision to treat pronouns as markers of identity only in circumstances where they are 
nominalised. However, the recent attempts at introducing a multitude of personal pronouns into 
English use influence the understanding of personal pronouns as very important and as such 
relevant aspects of identity, and hence, identity markers. A debate on this topic would be 
welcome. According to van Leeuwen indefinite pronouns denote people in discourse by 
indetermination (51), which arguably means that identification does not occur because people 
are not determined. It might follow, then, that indefinite pronouns should not be considered 
markers of identity, unless, as argued, they take a nominalised form by following an indefinite 
article (I am a somebody) and therefore determining an individual. Regarding personal 
pronouns, they may be understood as representing markers of identity in deictic use as well 
(They are a hir). 
4) One area of pragmatic considerations that has been left out but might be worth looking into 
is the use of identity markers in irony. Sperber and Wilson mention it in Relevance: 
Communication and Cognition with regards to such utterances as “Jim is a fine friend” (200), 
and “What an honest fellow Joe is” (11). The hearer must infer the ironic meaning of the 
utterance and that the identity markers attributed are to be understood as the opposite of their 
meaning.  
5) Because the thesis touches on so many different aspects of how identity markers may be 
considered, both from the semantic and pragmatic perspective, it offers an introduction into the 
fantastic world of expressions we use to apply to one another. Because of this, many topics that 
could be discussed in detail have been only mentioned in passing, specifically, semantic 
changes which could provide a lot of analysis of specific identity markers, as well as anything 
that seems worth delving into to the reader.  
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7. Povzetek  
 
Magistrsko delo obravnava identitetne označevalce v sodobni angleščini iz semantičnega in 
pragmatičnega vidika. Naloga vsebuje v prvem delu slovarske in sociološke definicije 
identitete, opredelitev identitetnih označevalcev, predstavitev vplivnih teorij pomena ter 
obravnavo kategorizacije. Drugi del vsebuje razvrstitev identitetnih označevalcev, upoštevajoč 
štiri glavna področja človekovega življenja in njegovega odnosa do sveta. Tako identitetni 
označevalci na splošno imenujejo osebna in stvarna lastna imena, fizična in nefizična stanja 
(vključujoč dejanja in funkcije), verjetja ter sorodstvene in nekatere druge medosebne odnose. 
Vsaka skupina v razvrstitvi se deli tudi na podskupine. Temu sledijo primeri rabe označevalcev 
zunaj in znotraj konteksta, ki so mestoma obravnavani z različnimi načini interpretacije.  
Identitetni označevalci so opredeljeni kot besede in besedne zveze, ki poimenujejo različne 
aspekte identitet posameznikov in skupin. Drugače rečeno, identitetni označevalci se 
uporabljajo za poimenovanje ljudi iz raznoraznih aspektov življenjskih izkušenj, pojavljajo pa 
se v imenovalniški in pridevniški obliki.  
Semantični aspekti identitetnih označevalcev se nanašajo na razumevanje pomena besed, ki je 
obravnavano v teorijah pomena, prav tako pa se nanašajo na spremembe pomena posameznih 
označevalcev, ki so nakazane v drugem delu naloge. Naloga zavzame stališče, po katerem 
razumevanje pomena besed temelji na konceptualni teoriji pomena, ki predpostavlja, da se 
pomen besed nahaja v obliki konceptov znotraj človeškega uma. Poleg konceptualne teorije 
pomena naloga predstavi še pogojno-resnično, referencialno, strukturalistično, platonistično ter 
prevodno teorijo.  
Ker semantika obravnava pomen besed in povedi, pragmatika pa se ukvarja s konkretno rabo 
besed ter z interpretacijo besed in povedi znotraj konteksta oziroma komunikacijske situacije, 
sta področji povezani in v bistvu neločljivi tudi v nalogi. Obravnavani so na primer označevalci, 
ki se uporabljajo z namenom žalitve, sramočenja, hvale, z metaforami, še posebej z označevalci, 
ki primarno imenujejo živali, potem naloga predstavi še rabo označevalcev skozi primerjavo, 
metonimijo in sinekdoho, kjer se ljudi lahko označuje z imeni predmetov in drugimi imeni, ki 
primarno ne označujejo posameznikov. Poglavje o neologiji nakaže na vrste semantičnih 
sprememb, poleg tega pa vsebuje polisemijo, sinonimijo, vpliv politične korektnosti na rabo 
označevalcev, primere enkratne rabe ter primer prevajanja. Posebej sta obravnavana še 
stereotipiziranje in preferenčna raba označevalcev v diskurzu. Na koncu so izpostavljeni 
primeri pravopisne rabe označevalcev ter različni načini njihove sintaktične umeščenosti. 
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